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Summary
This thesis contributes to the modelling of intergovernmental cooperation for global
biodiversity conservation and analyses multilateral cooperation on the genetic re-
source market. The inter- and transdisciplinary research consists of game theoretic
modelling, economic analyses, the study of political and legal documents, as well
as the conducting of expert interviews. The game theoretic biodiversity conserva-
tion model developed in this thesis considers countries that are heterogeneous in
ecosystems and wealth. The ecosystems are characterised by imperfect ecosystem
substitutability as well as an ecosystem resilience threshold and provide local as well
as global benefits. One of the main findings of the numerical appraisal is that coop-
eration improves upon the conservation share in the Nash equilibrium and optimal
transfers facilitate a large stable coalition. Moreover, it is evinced that established
‘per-member partition functions’ are currently not applicable to the biodiversity
conservation game. Based on expert interview results and technical feasibility and
political economy considerations, an alternative benefit-sharing rule is derived. It is
shown how this rule can be incorporated into the standard game-theoretic frame-
work once countries have gained sufficient information to form expectations about
biodiversity benefits. The main finding on multilateral cooperation on the market
for physical genetic resources is that eco-regional cooperation and, even more so, a
comprehensive global mechanism have the potential to significantly reduce transac-
tion costs for both supplying countries and customers. They can thereby decrease
prices for customers and increase demand, conservation levels and providers’ bene-
fits. A case study of the Andean Community’s joint access legislation shows that the
member countries realise few of their potential cooperation advantages. Collusion
on the physical genetic resource market will not lead to high benefits as market
power is limited by substitutes in form of ex-situ resources and freely available
genetic information. The economically preferable instrument of a comprehensive
global mechanism, in turn, is politically not feasible any time soon due to path
dependencies and an arguably narrow understanding of national sovereignty.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation erweitert bestehende Ansa¨tze zur Modellierung von zwischen-
staatlicher Kooperation fu¨r den globalen Biodiversita¨tsschutz und analysiert multi-
laterale Kooperation auf dem Markt fu¨r genetische Ressourcen. Die inter- und trans-
disziplina¨re Forschung beruht auf spieltheoretischen Methoden, o¨konomischen Ana-
lysen, der Auswertung politischer und juristischer Dokumente sowie der Durchfu¨h-
rung von Experteninterviews. Das in dieser Dissertation entwickelte spieltheoreti-
sche Biodiversita¨tsschutz-Modell beru¨cksichtigt La¨nder, die heterogen in O¨kosyste-
men und Wohlstand sind. Die O¨kosysteme sind durch imperfekte Substituierbar-
keit sowie Resilienzschwellen charakterisiert und stiften lokalen wie auch globalen
Nutzen. Eines der zentralen Ergebnisse der numerischen Abscha¨tzung ist, dass Ko-
operation zu einer Verbesserung des Schutzniveaus im Vergleich zum Nash-Gleich-
gewicht fu¨hrt und optimale Transferzahlungen eine große stabile Koalition begu¨nsti-
gen. Außerdem zeigt sich, dass etablierte ‘per-member partition functions’ (spiel-
theoretisch begru¨ndete Ausgleichszahlungen) zurzeit nicht auf das Biodiversita¨ts-
schutz-Spiel anwendbar sind. Basierend auf den Ergebnissen der Experteninterviews
und unter Beru¨cksichtigung der technischen Realisierbarkeit sowie polit-o¨konomi-
scher Erwa¨gungen wird ein alternativer Bestimmungsfaktor fu¨r den Vorteilsaus-
gleich entwickelt. Dabei wird herausgearbeitet, wie diese Verteilungsregel in den
spieltheoretischen Standardmodellrahmen integriert werden kann, sobald die La¨nder
ausreichende Kenntnisse erworben haben, um den Nutzen der Biodiversita¨t zu be-
werten. Das Hauptergebnis zu multilateraler Kooperation auf dem Markt fu¨r physi-
sche genetische Ressourcen ist, dass o¨koregionale Kooperation und vor allem ein um-
fassender globaler Mechanismus das Potential haben, die Transaktionskosten sowohl
fu¨r Anbieterla¨nder als auch Nutzer signifikant zu verringern. Dadurch ko¨nnen sich
die Preise fu¨r die Nutzer reduzieren und die Nachfrage, das Schutzniveau und die
Gewinne der Anbieterla¨nder erho¨hen. In einer Fallstudie zur Andengemeinschaft
wird aufgezeigt, dass die Mitgliedsla¨nder wenige ihrer potenziellen Kooperationsvor-
teile realisieren. Kollusion auf dem Markt fu¨r physische genetische Ressourcen wird
keine hohen Gewinne erzielen, da die Marktmacht durch Substitute in Form von Ex-
situ Ressourcen und frei erha¨ltlicher genetischer Information limitiert ist. Das aus
o¨konomischer Sicht vorzuziehende Instrument eines umfassenden globalen Mecha-
nismus wiederum ist politisch in absehbarer Zeit aufgrund von Pfadabha¨ngigkeiten
und einem wohl engen Versta¨ndnis nationaler Souvera¨nita¨t nicht durchsetzbar.
xi
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Chapter 1
Thesis Introduction
Biodiversity is essential for all living beings including humans. Its multi-layered
dimensions across local to global scales require a similarly multi-faceted reflection
in human actions. In this thesis I focus on the global scale and consider several
aspects of international cooperation for the conservation and sustainable and fair
use of biodiversity. In the following, I introduce the thesis’ motivation (Section
1.1), research objective (Section 1.2), and methods (Section 1.3), and outline the
subsequent chapters (Section 1.4).
1.1 Motivation
The motivation to study international cooperation for the conservation and sustain-
able and fair use of biodiversity is threefold. The first and broader underlying motive
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2 Chapter 1. Thesis Introduction
is the apparent need for conserving biodiversity and using it sustainably. This follows
from the importance of biodiversity for life on earth in its present form in conjunc-
tion with the continued loss of biodiversity beyond sustainable levels, even beyond
‘planetary boundaries’ (as defined by Rockstro¨m et al. (2009), Steffen et al. (2015)).
Biodiversity increases ecosystem resilience (Holling (1973, p. 18), Folke et al. (1996,
p. 1020)), contributes to ecosystem functioning (Tilman 1999, p. 1470), and thereby
to ecosystem services and benefits (Balvanera et al. 2006, p. 1155). Biodiversity,
ecosystem functioning and ecosystem services have multiple ecocentric (Mazzotta
and Kline 1995) to anthropocentric values of immense size (TEEB 2010). However,
biodiversity decreases at rates higher than the average in geological time (Mace et al.
2005, p. 104).
The second motivation to focus on international biodiversity cooperation lies
in the demanding concept and nature of biodiversity. Biodiversity–or biological
diversity–is a multi-layered concept that includes genetic diversity, species diversity
and ecosystem diversity (CBD, Art. 1 ) and is characterised by different spatial and
temporal scales (Fisher et al. 2009, p. 648). Hence, it is difficult to operationalise
(Sarr et al. 2008, p. 185). The complex nature of biodiversity provides a challenge
for conserving biodiversity and using it sustainably.
The third motivation for this research is that the latter is especially demand-
ing on the global scale. Albeit a large part of countries aspires strong cooperation,
in most cases national and international efforts to reach global consensus targets
for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use are not sufficient (UNEP 2014,
p. 10). Worldwide biodiversity conservation and sustainable use requires effective
self-enforcing cooperation by sovereign countries. The international community co-
operates to this end under the United Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ 1
(CBD) and its ‘Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization’ 2. Without a superior
enforcement authority such cooperation needs to be in the self-interest of every
cooperating country–and risks to merely codify the status-quo (Barrett 1994).
Together, the need for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, the multi-
layered demanding nature of biodiversity, and the challenging international cooper-
ation, motivate my research on aspects of international cooperation for the conser-
1United Nations (1992): Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 Int’l Leg. Mat. 818, Rio de
Janeiro, 05.06.1992.
2United Nations (2010): Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Eq-
uitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Nagoya, 29.10.2010.
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vation and sustainable and fair use of biodiversity.
1.2 Objective and research questions
The objective of my thesis is twofold: (I) to contribute to the game theoretic mod-
elling of cooperation for biodiversity conservation and (II) to analyse multilateral
cooperation for the internalisation of positive conservation externalities accruing to
genetic resource users3.
Game theory can be a valuable tool to analyze cooperation incentives, strategic
interactions, and critical factors stabilising a biodiversity coalition. In contrast to
climate change, the other major global environmental cooperation challenge, the
game theoretic literature on international biodiversity agreements is relatively small.
Barrett’s (1994) ‘Biodiversity Supergame’ is the most influential model. It seems
to confirm that the CBD is unable to improve much upon global welfare compared
to the non-cooperative scenario. However, the result is based on restrictive model
assumptions (Weikard 2009, p. 578). Besides, established general game theoretic
benefit-sharing rules (i.a. Carraro et al. (2006), Weikard (2009), Eyckmans et al.
(2012)) may not be applicable to biodiversity conservation cooperation, because
of informational limitations due to ecological uncertainty and economic valuation
problems. Two sets of research questions thus relate to the first objective:
Q I.1 How can international cooperation for biodiversity conservation of sovereign
heterogeneous states be modelled game theoretically? How does heterogeneity
in wealth and imperfectly substitutable ecosystems impact the stability of in-
ternational biodiversity conservation agreements among countries differing in
these two dimensions? How do local benefits, ecosystem resilience thresholds,
and transfers impact conservation levels and stability?
Q I.2 Are established sharing rules for coalition formation games (i.e. benefit sur-
plus sharing rule, outside option sharing rule) applicable to the case of biodi-
versity conservation cooperation? If not, which ones are?
In the second part of the thesis I focus on international cooperation under the
CBD’s ‘Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization’. Hence, genetic diversity, which is
3There are other positive externalities of biodiversity conservation. I focus only one those par-
ticular positive externalities that accrue to genetic resource users such as pharmaceutical firms.
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one of the dimensions of biodiversity, is in the centre of the remaining research. The
Andean Community passed community legislation4 on access to genetic resources
and serves as a case study for eco-regional cooperation. I address the second research
objective with two sets of research questions:
Q II.1 Can eco-regional cooperation, as compared to the status-quo situation with
bilateral contracts, increase payments for physical genetic resource use and
thereby contribute to biodiversity conservation? How do different dimensions
of cooperation impact on economies of scale and other institutional factors–
and thereby on the volume of trade, monetary and non-monetary benefits
of cooperating countries, and conservation levels? Is there a potential for
collusion? Which insights can be gained in these respects from the case
study of the Andean Community’s joint access regulation?
Q II.2 Is a global mechanism that internalises positive biodiversity conservation
externalities accruing to commercial users of physical genetic resources and
genetic information with the objective of increasing biodiversity protection
politically feasible?
1.3 Methods
To address these research questions I conduct inter- and transdisciplinary research
consisting of game theoretic modelling, economic, political, and legal analyses, as
well as expert interviews.
I model coalition formation for international biodiversity conservation with coun-
tries that are heterogeneous in wealth and ecosystems. The general modelling ap-
proach follows established non-cooperative game theoretic environmental models (e.g
Barrett (2003); Hoel (1992)). It is solved sequentially in three stages by backward in-
duction. The model approach differs from Barrett (1994) by assuming non-identical
countries, modelling a continuous action space, explicitly considering local benefits,
assuming an ecosystem resilience threshold, and most notably by respecting im-
perfect substitutability between ecosystem services. A fund redistributes coalition
benefits according to a specific sharing rule. With the game theoretic model and a
numerical appraisal I address the first set of research questions (Q I.1).
4Decisio´n 391 on a ‘Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources’ (Comision del Acuerdo
Cartagena (1996): Decisio´n 391: Re´gimen Comu´n sobre Acceso a los Recursos Gene´ticos, Gaceta
Oficial del Acuerdo de Cartagena, An˜o XII, Numero 213, Lima, 17.06.1996.).
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To answer the second set of research questions (Q I.2), I transfer established per-
member partition functions to the biodiversity conservation game and appraise these
rules by conducting semi-structured expert interviews. The experts are selected
decision makers from countries that host large parts of global biodiversity and are
thus important members of a biodiversity coalition. Based on the interview results
as well as on technical feasibility and political economy considerations, I derive an
alternative benefit-sharing rule. Whereas sharing rules are generally determined
theoretically, I differ in grounding it on empirical-qualitative research.
The methodology to address the third set of research questions (Q II.1) consists of
both a theoretical and an applied institutional economic analysis, whereby the latter
is based on legal and policy documents. I use transaction cost theory to study on a
generic level how general dimensions of cooperation impact on economies of scale and
other institutional factors, the volume of trade, monetary and non-monetary benefits
of cooperating countries, and conservation levels. Besides, I analyse how a country’s
characteristics influence its share of cooperation induced benefits. I also discuss the
potential of collusion and its impact on conservation. As a case study, I discuss
the cooperation of the Andean Community, which passed community legislation on
access to genetic resources, based on legal and policy documents in light of the
institutional economic findings of the previous theoretical analysis. Moreover I use
empirical data to explain cooperation incentives of Andean countries.
My approach to the fourth set of research questions (Q II.2) is the most inter-
and transdisciplinary one: I study the genetic resource market from the economic
and political perspective, draw on legal texts and studies, and involve stakeholders.
For the economic analysis I employ economics of information and transaction costs
economics and derive a simple economic model to illustrate the findings. The em-
pirical research methodology is a triangulation that consists of the study of CBD
documents and an online discussion forum organised by the CBD Secretariat on a
global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism as well as expert interviews with im-
portant political stakeholders. I consider this combination of economic theory and
actors’ perceptions essential for exploring appropriate policy tools.
1.4 Outline
The thesis is structured into a wider background chapter, two parts that each com-
prise two chapters and address the two research objectives, and a conclusion. Chap-
ter 2 sets the scene. In this chapter I introduce the terms and concepts of biodi-
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versity, ecosystem functioning, ecosystem functions, services and benefits as well as
biological and genetic resources as a background for the further analysis. In addi-
tion, I outline and motivate in more detail the rationale for biodiversity conservation
and its sustainable and fair use–and thereby for investigating aspects of multilat-
eral cooperation to this end. The chapter also provides an overview of international
cooperation under the United Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ and its
Nagoya Protocol. Thesis Part I on ‘Modelling cooperation for biodiversity conserva-
tion’ covers the third and fourth chapter. Chapter 35 address the first set of research
questions (Q I.1) on modelling a biodiversity game with countries heterogeneous in
wealth and ecosystems. Chapter 4 focuses on the second set of research questions
(Q I.2) on benefit-sharing rules applicable to biodiversity coalition formation games.
Part II on ‘Multilateral cooperation on the genetic resource market’ consists of the
fifth and sixth chapter. Chapter 56 pertains to the third set of research questions (Q
II.1) and covers eco-regional cooperation advantages to obtain payments for in-situ
conservation of genetic resources. Chapter 6 addresses the fourth set of research
questions (Q II.2) on a global mechanism to internalise positive conservation exter-
nalities accruing to genetic resource users. These main chapters are self-contained
in that they each include a specific introduction, background to the respective re-
search question, overview of the relevant literature, methodology and conclusion.
In Chapter 7 I provide an overall conclusion of the main findings together with a
discussion of their relevance for international cooperation under the CBD and its
Nagoya Protocol.
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Chapter 2
The Bigger Picture of Biodiversity and its Con-
servation and Sustainable and Fair Use
2.1 Introduction
Biological diversity is of paramount importance for our common future. The United
Nations ‘World Commission on Environment and Development’ (WCED)’s report
(1987) of the same name drew attention to the importance of biological diversity
for sustainable development. The WCED (1987, par. 27) coined the notion of sus-
tainable development as “meet[ing] the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”–which carries over to the
sustainable and fair use of biodiversity. In 1992 the groundbreaking ‘United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development’ (UNCED) followed, at which, inter
alia, the United Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ 1 (CBD) was opened
for signature. Since then, the conservation and sustainable and fair use of biological
diversity is firmly anchored in the international political agenda. In this chapter,
I portray the bigger picture of biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use–
of which I can only colour fractions in this thesis. Figure 2.1 guides through this
chapter and the thesis: In Section 2.2, I introduce biodiversity and related terms
and concepts. Moreover, I outline the rationale for biodiversity conservation and its
sustainable and fair use by presenting the multiple values of biodiversity as well as
the status and trends of global biodiversity. The resulting international cooperation
is the focus of Section 2.3. I briefly describe the CBD and its ‘Nagoya Protocol on
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising
1United Nations (1992): Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 Int’l Leg. Mat. 818, Rio de
Janeiro, 05.06.1992.
9
10 Chapter 2. The Bigger Picture
Figure 2.1: Chapter and thesis outline
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from their Utilization’ 2 and present the biodiversity goals and targets of the CBD’s
‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020’ 3. To achieve global biodiversity conser-
vation goals different approaches and policy instruments can be employed (for an
overview refer to, e.g., MEA (2005, p. 69 ff.), Pascual and Perrings (2007, p. 262),
Helm and Hepburn (2012, p. 10 ff.)). Different instruments are apt to address differ-
ent aspects of biodiversity. Hence, a mix of policy instruments is needed to capture
the multiple biodiversity dimensions. OECD (2013) classifies policy instruments for
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use into ‘information and other voluntary
instruments’, ‘regulation’, and ‘economic instruments’. The next chapters can be
integrated into this picture. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on protected areas.4 In-situ
conservation in, for example, protected areas is an important regulative biodiversity
policy instrument as it has not only the potential to preserve the status-quo biodi-
versity but also to contribute to the continuous evolution of biodiversity. Chapters
5 and 6 consider economic policy instruments.5 In the following, I lay out the bigger
2United Nations (2010): Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Eq-
uitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Nagoya, 29.10.2010.
3UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2, Online: www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-02-
en.pdf, last 06.02.2015.
4In Chapters 3 and 4, I model biodiversity conservation as a game where the control variable is
a country’s conservation share of an ecosystem in terms of size.
5In Chapters 5 and 6, I discuss eco-regional cooperation and a global mechanism respectively as
economic policy tools to internalise positive conservation externalities accruing to commercial users
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picture of international cooperation for the conservation and sustainable and fair
use of biodiversity as a foundation for analysing important aspects of it in detail in
the next chapters.
2.2 The rationale for biodiversity conservation and sus-
tainable and fair use
The rationale for biodiversity conservation and sustainable and fair use rests upon
three interlinked arguments that are the focus of this section: First, biodiversity sta-
bilises ecosystems, contributes to ecosystem functioning and thereby to ecosystem
services and benefits (Section 2.2.1). Secondly, biodiversity, ecosystem functioning
and ecosystem services have multiple and extensive values of immense size (Sec-
tion 2.2.2). Thirdly, we have by far crossed planetary boundaries6 with respect to
biodiversity and continue to loose biodiversity at alarming rates (Section 2.2.3).
2.2.1 Biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, and ecosystem services
Biodiversity forms the basis for ecosystem services through the cascade visualised
in Figure 2.2–subject to temporal dynamics and with heterogeneous interrelations
along the local, regional and global scale. The demarcations and interlinkages be-
tween the elements biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, ecosystem functions, services
and benefits have not been sufficiently substantiated by scientific research, however
there seems to be a consensus about the cascade as such (Go´mez-Baggethun and
de Groot 2010, p. 109). In the following I introduce these terms and concepts as
well as biological and genetic resources.
Biodiversity as a term dates back to the ‘National Forum on BioDiversity’ 7 in
Washington D.C. in 1986. It gained popularity through the book entitled ‘Biodi-
versity’ by E. O. Wilson and F. M. Peters published in 1988 (Wilson 1997, p. 1).
Since then references to biodiversity have increased rapidly in the scientific litera-
ture. Similarly, biodiversity gained importance in the political debate. In 1993 the
United Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ (CBD) entered into force. Two
global influential studies followed: the ‘Millennium Ecosystem Assessment’ (MEA
2005) and the study ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity’ (TEEB 2010).
of genetic resources.
6Ref. Rockstro¨m et al. (2009), Steffen et al. (2015).
7The forum was organised by the ‘National Academy of Science’ and the ‘Smithsonian Institute’.
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Figure 2.2: Conceptual framework: The cascade from biodiversity to ecosystem services
and benefits along temporal and intertwining spacial dimensions
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Source: Own diagram, adapted from Go´mez-Baggethun and de Groot (2010, p. 110), De Groot
et al. (2002, Fig. 1, p. 394), MEA (2005, Fig. 1.4, p. 28), and TEEB (2010, Fig 1.4, p. 17).
Only a few years ago in 2012, the ‘Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services’ (IPBES)8 was established.
Biological diversity or, in short, biodiversity is a multi-layered concept. It is char-
acterised by multiple diversity dimensions at different spatial and temporal scales.
Following the definition of the CBD (Art. 2 ), biological diversity “means the vari-
ability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial,
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they
are part: this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems”.
The CBD definition is applied broadly in the political and economic realm (Mace
et al. 2012, p. 20). Also biologists use this definition as a general framework for the
study of more detailed aspects of biodiversity (Meinard et al. 2014, p. 88). Common
diversity scales to measure biodiversity are species or population richness, evenness,
and difference (Purvis and Hector 2000, p. 212). Richness counts the number of
8Online: www.ipbes.net, last 06.02.2015.
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species or populations in a geographic area. Evenness describes the size of each
species relative to the size of the others for a given geographic area. Difference
refers to the degree of similarity between different species or populations at geno- or
phenotype level. Depending on the diversity measure chosen, different conservation
priorities under restricted resources result (Solow et al. 1993).
From an economic perspective, biodiversity is a resource. It is an input of pro-
duction and welfare functions–through the cascade pictured in Fig. 2.2. Biological
diversity is in a broad sense a stock resource. Its present state determines its future
state: reducing the diversity at a time t decreases the potential for diversification
and thereby biological diversity at time t+ 1. This relation is non-linear; the diver-
sification potential differs in phylogenetic lineages (Purvis and Hector 2000, p. 214).
With increasing diversity reduction, marginal productivity of biodiversity eventually
converges to infinity. Hence, biodiversity is an essential resource.
Biodiversity is a global public good as it is non-rival and non-excludable on a
global scale (Sandler 1993, p. 229).9 Since long, biodiversity has been treated as
‘common heritage of mankind ’10 (Gepts 2004, p. 1295). But some scholars (e.g. ibid.
(p. 1297); Lerch (1998, p. 289)) purport that this principle has been invalidated by
the CBD. I argue, though, that biodiversity remains in the public domain. In the
preamble of the CBD the international community “affirm[s] that the conservation of
biological diversity is a common concern of humankind, [and] reaffirm[s] that states
have sovereign rights over their own biological resources”. Private property rights
are assigned to biological resources. The global public good biological diversity,
however, remains in the public domain and its conservation a common concern of
humankind. Hence, the CBD acts as the global common property regime governing
the public good biodiversity.
Ecosystem structures and processes characterise the functioning of an ecosys-
tem. Biodiversity is closely intertwined with ecosystems as it underlies all ecosystem
structures and processes (Mace et al. 2005, p. 79). The CBD (Art. 2 ) defines an
ecosystem as “a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities
and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit”. Biodiversity as-
sures the permanent functioning of ecosystems, its resilience11; variability increases
9It thereby differs fundamentally in its economic nature from biological and genetic resources.
10The expression ‘common heritage of mankind’ was first used in the context of naval resources at
the 1930 convention of the ‘League of Nations’ and finally established at the 1972 ‘World Heritage
Convention’ (Lerch 1998, p. 288).
11Resilience describes the ability of an ecosystem to persist (Holling 1973).
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ecosystem resilience (Holling (1973, p. 18), Folke et al. (1996, p. 1020)). Tilman
(1999, p. 1470) concludes from theory and experiments that “diversity impacts the
structure, dynamics, and functioning of ecosystems” together with the factors “com-
position, disturbance, nutrient supply dynamics, and climate”, whereby a ranking
according to importance is not possible at present. He finds that with rising bio-
diversity alien species invasions decrease, community temporal stability12 increases,
and population temporal stability decreases. Schwartz et al. (2000) conclude from an
empirical literature review that there is a general positive relation between species
diversity and ecosystem function, however no evidence for a linear relationship and
thus no support for the hypothesis that rare species are per se important for ecosys-
tem processes. Cardinale et al. (2006, p. 989) derive from a meta-analysis that
“the average species loss does indeed affect the functioning of a wide variety of
organisms and ecosystems, but the magnitude of these effects is ultimately deter-
mined by the identity of species that are going extinct”. Folke et al. (1996) expound
that a limited number of “keystone process species” are responsible for ecosystem
functioning whereas a number of other species that occupy niches formed by the
former guarantee ecosystem resilience. The MEA (2005, p. 24) ascertains that
“changes in biotic interactions among species–predation, parasitism, competition,
and facilitation–can lead to disproportionately large, irreversible, and often nega-
tive alterations of ecosystem processes”. There still remains need for further detailed
research on the biodiversity–ecosystem functioning link.
Ecosystem functions can be included as a step in the cascade (ref. Fig. 2.2)
to facilitate the visualisation from ecosystem functioning to ecosystem services (see
below). They are a subset of ecosystem structures and processes that give rise
to ecosystem services (Go´mez-Baggethun and de Groot 2010, p. 109). De Groot
(1992, p. 7) defines ecosystem functions as “the capacity of natural processes and
components to provide goods and services that satisfy human needs (directly and/or
indirectly)” (emphasis added).13 Ecosystem functions comprise biotic and abiotic
functions (De Groot 1992, p. 16). They can be grouped into regulation, habitat,
production and information functions (De Groot et al. 2002, p. 394). Examples
12Holling (1973, p. 17) defines stability as “the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium
state after a temporary disturbance”.
13De Groot (1992) uses the term ecosystem functions in the sense of ecosystem goods and services
(ref. De Groot (1992, p. 13)). In later work, e.g. De Groot et al. (2002), he distinguishes between
ecosystem functions and ecosystem services while still using the ecosystem function definition of
De Groot (1992). In this thesis I use the term in the later understanding.
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are respectively climate regulation, refugium function, raw materials, and genetic
information (ibid., p. 396 f.). The focus lies on the capacity to provide ecosystem
services. Functions such as climate regulation by, for example, forest ecosystems
translate into regulating ecosystem services–in this case a climate comfortable for
humans. Thereby ecosystem functions are the element connecting ecological and
economic concepts (Go´mez-Baggethun and de Groot 2010, p. 111).
The CBD uses the terms biological resources and genetic resources in a con-
ceptual understanding of ecosystem functions. According to the definition of the
CBD (Art. 2 ), biological resources comprise “genetic resources, organisms or parts
thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or
potential use or value for humanity”. Biological resources are flow goods originat-
ing from ecosystems. They are “conditionally-renewable” (Winands et al. (2013)
id. Chapter 3): they reproduce themselves above certain ecosystem stock and bio-
diversity levels. Below these levels, their flow subsides–they are exhaustible–either
because the stock generating their flow is run down or the base for the stock has
been diminished too much. The preamble of the CBD assigns private property rights
to states over their biological resources.
Genetic resources are or have been part of biological resources. The CBD
(Art. 2 ) defines genetic resources as “genetic material of actual or potential value”,
whereby “genetic material means any material of plant, animal, microbial or other
origin containing functional units of heredity”. The CBD (Art. 15.1 ) assigns private
property rights to states over their genetic resources. Besides the genetic material,
genetic resources have a second dimension, genetic or natural information (Schei
and Tvedt 2010, p. 18). The predominant, though not uncontested (e.g. ibid., p.
18), interpretation is that the CBD applies only to genetic material, not to genetic
or natural information. In-situ, genetic resources are often distributed over several
countries14, which are all possible suppliers. Genetic resources also exist ex-situ in
botanical or zoological gardens or genbanks. The economic nature of genetic re-
sources depends on the dimension: genetic material is rival in consumption, genetic
information non-rival (Sedjo 1992, p. 200f.). Exclusion is possible albeit difficult
in case of genetic material, but almost impossible for genetic information. Thus,
genetic material is a private good and genetic information a public good.
The ecosystem function ‘pool of genetic resources’ translates into an ecosystem
service for, e.g., a pharmaceutical firm when searching for leads for pharmaceutical
14Based on data from the ‘Global Biodiversity Information Facility’, Oldham et al. (2013) show
that species appearing in patents are often distributed across several countries.
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products. With view to the later analysis–and as a small digression within this
section–, I classify the following types of access to genetic resources:
(i) Access to physical genetic resources,
(ii) Access to genetic/natural information resources ...
(ii.a) ... contained in physical genetic resources,
(ii.b) ... not in the public domain,
(ii.c) ... in the public domain.
Physical genetic resources are accessed and exported for proliferation (i); for ex-
ample plant seeds with observed healing properties or seeds of a bean variety with
special properties that are not known in the customer’s home country (e.g. colour).
In addition, physical genetic resources are accessed as carrier of genetic information
resources (ii.a); for example a pharmaceutical research institute that screens the
genetic material for useful genetic information in the home country of the institute.
These two types of access were the original focus of the CBD (cf. CBD, Art. 2 ).
Besides, genetic information is accessed directly. This form of access is of increasing
importance (Schei and Tvedt (2010, p. 18), Laird and Wynberg (2012)). Users
can either access genetic information that has not yet been released into the public
domain by local researchers (ii.b) or such that is already in the public domain (ii.c),
that is, for example, available in genbanks. Genetic information is accessible free of
charge and unrestricted online from the ‘International Nucleotide Sequence Database
Collaboration’ (INSDC), a cooperation between GenBank of the ‘National Center
for Biotechnology Information’ (NCBI) of the United States of America, the ‘Eu-
ropean Nucleotide Archive’, and the ‘DNA Data Bank of Japan’.15 INSDC patners
daily exchange information. INSDC assigns an internationally authorized accession
number and the names of all organisms with sequence data in INSDC are recorded
in the NCBI taxonomy database (Nakamura et al. 2013). Currently ∼10% of all
species described worldwide are included in the public sequence databases16.
15Online: INSDC: www.insdc.org; GenBank: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank; European Nu-
cleotide Archive: www.ebi.ac.uk/ena; DNA Data Bank of Japan: www.ddbj.nig.ac.jp; last
14.12.2014.
16Ref. NCBI taxonomy database online: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/taxonomy, last 14.12.2014. In
September 2013 GenBank, for example, contained sequences data for over 280 000 formally described
species (Benson et al. 2014, p. D32). Benson et al. (2014) specify that GenBank obtains sequence
data submissions from authors and sequencing centres as well as from the ‘Patent and Trademark
Office’ of the United States of America from issued patents.
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Ecosystem services are specified by their contribution to human well-being (Bate-
man et al. 2011, p. 180) and thus an anthropocentric concept. The MEA (2005, p.
1) defines ecosystem services as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems”. Oth-
ers (Boyd and Banzhaf (2007), Fisher et al. (2009)) argue that ecosystem services
are not identical to benefits. According to Fisher et al. (2009, p. 645) ecosystem
services “are the aspects of ecosystems utilized (actively or passively) to produce
human well-being”–ecological phenomena. Benefits arise from ecosystem services in
combination with other inputs: the ecosystem service ‘clean water’, for example,
translates in combination with tools for water collection into the benefit ‘drinking
water’ (ibid., p. 646).
The MEA (2005, p. 28) categorises ecosystem services into supporting, regu-
lating, provisioning and cultural services. This classification is widely used (Fisher
et al. 2009, p. 644) and the reason for employing it in this study instead of, e.g, the
slightly deviating TEEB (2010) classification17. Supporting services are for example
nutrient cycling and soil formation, provisioning services include food and fuel, reg-
ulating services cover inter alia climate and disease regulation, and cultural services
are for example aesthetic and recreational services. Ecosystem services comprise a
vast array of different types of services on the local, regional and global scale. Local
rainforests, for example, supply non-timber products such as food and fibre (local
provisioning ecosystem services), provide for the regional water and temperature
circulation (regional regulating ecosystem services), and contribute to the global
oxygen turnover (global regulating ecosystem service). In this thesis I define all
ecosystem services from the perspective of nation states: all nationally appropriable
ecosystem services are local services as, in principle, institutions exist for optimal
conservation. National–viz. local–externalities can be internalised by nation states
whereas there are no binding institutions at the international level.
Biodiversity is the base for ecosystem services–through the cascade pictured in
Fig. 2.2. For example, genetic diversity (biodiversity) is the foundation for constant
genetic transformations (ecosystem functioning); the latter provide genetic material
and information (ecosystem function) which may provide leads for pharmaceutical
research (ecosystem service) that can be used in the development of pharmaceutical
products (benefits). Scientific research provides some insights into the relationship
between biodiversity and ecosystem services. Tilman (1999, p. 1470) concludes
from models and empirical experiments that primary plant productivity rises with
17TEEB (2010) differentiates between the four categories provisioning, regulating, habitat as well
as cultural and amenity services. Within them, it identifies a total of 22 ecosystem service types.
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increasing biodiversity. Hooper et al. (2012) evince from a meta-analysis that “in
experiments, intermediate levels of species loss (21–40%) reduced plant production
by 5–10%, comparable to previously documented effects of ultraviolet radiation and
climate warming” and that at these levels “species loss generally had equal or greater
effects on decomposition than did elevated CO2 and nitrogen addition”. The MEA
(2005, p. 22) highlights that composition of species is more important than richness
for the provision of ecosystem services. Balvanera et al. (2006, p. 1155) conclude
from a quantitative meta-analysis that there is “clear evidence that biodiversity
has positive effects on the provision of those [ecosystem] services” which they have
examined. Supporting services are with high certainty dependent on biodiversity
through ecosystem processes (MEA 2005, p. 25). The regulating service ‘resistance
to invasions’, for example, is enhanced with medium certainty by the conservation
of biodiversity in terms of “the number, types, and relative abundance of resident
species” (ibid., p. 25), and the ‘pest control services’ strongly depends on biodiver-
sity (ibid., p. 29).18 Again, there is much need to advance and consolidate knowledge
(TEEB 2010, p. 54 f.).
Ecosystem services can be conceived and modelled as flow resources from an
ecosystem and–following the previous exposition–ultimately a biodiversity stock (cf.
Ma¨ler et al. (2009), Winands et al. (2013) id. Chapter 3). Bateman et al. (2011, p.
183) picture ecosystem services as a “flow from primary and intermediate through to
final ecosystem services”. Fisher et al. (2009) differentiate between intermediate and
final services. Boyd and Banzhaf (2007) propose a definition of ecosystem services
that only includes final services.
The economic nature of ecosystem services is broad. There are public goods such
as climate regulation, common pool goods like fish stocks in the high sea, club goods
such as religious connotations, as well as private goods such as food.
2.2.2 Multiple values of biodiversity
Biodiversity has multiple values. In the previous Section I introduced the cascade
from biodiversity to ecosystem services and benefits. The focus of this section is
the link to value concepts of biodiversity as visualised by Figure 2.3. Values ul-
timately reveal normative ethic convictions. In the extremes, biodiversity can be
valuable on its own ground (intrinsic value) or only as a means to achieve human
18For further findings on the biodiversity–ecosystem service link refer to, e.g., Tilman (1999),
MEA (2005), and TEEB (2010).
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Figure 2.3: Extended conceptual framework: The cascade from biodiversity to ecosystem
services and benefits along temporal and intertwining spacial dimensions linked to different
value categories
local
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global
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Source: Own diagram, adapted from Go´mez-Baggethun and de Groot (2010, p. 110), De Groot
et al. (2002, Fig. 1, p. 394), MEA (2005, Fig. 1.4, p. 28), and TEEB (2010, Fig 1.4, p. 17).
welfare. Ecocentrism and biocentrism are related concepts of intrinsic value of na-
ture. Whereas biocentrism ascribes absolute values to all living beings, ecocentrism
is an even broader concept that also embraces non-living parts of ecosystems. An-
thropocentrism on the other end of the spectrum attributes an instrumental value
to biodiversity. An anthropocentric standpoint is likely to be the least disputed as a
normative minimum consensus. Biophysical values refer to the value of biodiversity
for the functioning of ecosystems. Although biophysical values are prima facie eco-
centric values, they may fit as well in anthropocentric concepts (ref. “primary value”
in Gren et al. (1994)). The preamble of the CBD regards intrinsic, biophysical and
anthropocentric values: “Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity and
of the ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recre-
ational and aesthetic values of biological diversity and its components. Conscious
also of the importance of biological diversity for evolution and for maintaining life
sustaining systems of the biosphere”. Values of biodiversity can be addressed from
different perspectives and classification types, that are difficult to align into one
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classification system; Chan et al. (2012) discuss seven dimensions of value besides
“anthropocentric vs. biocentric”. In the following, I introduce eco- and biocentric
as well as anthropocentric values of biodiversity and ecosystem services.
Ecocentric and biocentric values are non-anthropocentric values of biodiver-
sity that originate from ecocentrism respectively biocentrism, which are both phys-
iocentric approaches to nature. Ecocentrism regards nature as a moral subject. As
a consequence from an ecocentric world-view, “ethical human actions necessarily
promote all life on earth by preserving intrinsic values such as diversity, stability,
and beauty ” (Mazzotta and Kline 1995, p. 246). Biocentrism attaches intrinsic
values only to living beings. Biocentrists consider human beings as part of the
planet’s complex ecosystems where “the sound biological functioning of each being
[is] dependent on the sound biological functioning of the others” (ibid., p. 245).
Emotional experiences connected to nature induce a conviction by some people
that biodiversity has an intrinsic value. Literature and art provide testimony that
humans have been experiencing surges of elation induced by biodiversity since cen-
turies. Some religions including, and in particular, natural religions ascribe a divine
facet to biodiversity. The Christian Nicholas of Cusa, for example, professes that
“God is the enfolding of all things in that all things are in Him; and He is the unfold-
ing of all things in that He is in all things” (De docta ignorantia, II, 3, 107)19. He
reflects on diversity of species expressing God who is in himself inexpressible (Sermo
CLXX, n. 8, 14-17). These biodiversity values are often ‘protected values’ that peo-
ple are not willing to trade-off; if they are forced to do so, they feel miserable about
their behaviour (Baron and Spranca 1997, p. 1). Intrinsic values of biodiversity may
underlie attempts to value ecosystem services (Chan et al. 2012, p. 12) as well as
conservation efforts (Mace et al. 2012, p. 24). Physiocentric attitudes may imply
that protection of biodiversity is an obligation (Mazzotta and Kline 1995, p. 245).
Intrinsic values of biodiversity are different from anthropocentric non-use values
“by placing natural resource values outside of human determination”–and thus can-
not be valued using willingness-to-pay techniques (ibid., p. 245). Chan et al. (2012,
p. 12) assert that “only the metaphorical shadow of these biocentric values can be
captured as ecosystem services, e.g., in the form of existence and bequest values”.
Biophysical values–or ecological values (De Groot et al. 2002)–of biodiversity
link to ecosystem structure, processes, and functions. They are instrumental values–
19Translation online: http://urts99.uni-trier.de/cusanus/content/fw.php?werk=13& lid=22605&
ids=& ln=hopkins, last 09.01.2015.
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as opposed to the above discussed intrinsic values–within an ecocentric perspective.
Whereas intrinsic values are not measurable, biophysical valuation methods exist.
Go´mez-Baggethun and de Groot (2010) introduce several of these methods and
classify them into ‘Surface or Material Accounting Methods’ and ‘Energy Based
Methods’. According to De Groot et al. (2002, p. 403), the ecological value is
“determined both by the integrity of the Regulation and Habitat Functions of the
ecosystem and by ecosystem parameters such as complexity, diversity, and rarity”.
Folke et al. (1996, p. 1021) highlight that biodiversity has an insurance value in
that it enables ecosystems to function under different environmental conditions.
The values instrumental for ecosystem functioning can also be integrated into an
anthropocentric value framework–as instrumental values for ecosystem services and
thus humans. Baumga¨rtner (2007), for example, discusses the insurance value of
biodiversity for the provision of ecosystem services.
Anthropocentric values of biodiversity refer to values humans ascribe to the
benefits they obtain from ecosystem services. These values are linked to biodiversity
through the cascade depicted in Figure 2.3. Thereby they are more indirect values
of biodiversity than ecocentric values and hinge on strictly positive relationships
between all elements of the biodiversity–ecosystem service chain. Anthropocentric
values have different spatial scales, from local over regional to global, depending
on the scale of the ecosystem service as well as on human valuation. For example,
provision of food on a small island belonging to country A (local ecosystem service)
is valued by the island’s population (local value), but the existence of food on the
island may also be valued by the mainland population of country A as they do not
have to transport and possibly pay for food (regional value) as well as to distant
relatives of the island’s inhabitants living in a far-away country B that care about
their kinsman (global value). Anthropocentric values are instrumental values in
that the reference point is human well-being. This implies that they are measurable
through their contribution to human well-being. It also means that they are specific
to those who perceive the values. Moreover, values are specific to space and time
(Fisher et al. 2011). Different anthropocentric value categories and related valuation
methods exist that can be grouped into a socio-cultural and an economic framework.
The challenge for decision-making is to integrate these values; meta-frameworks and
multi-criteria analysis are tools to assist in this endeavour (e.g. Munda (2004);
Go´mez-Baggethun and de Groot (2010); Chan et al. (2012)).
The socio-cultural value framework regards social values and human pref-
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erences for biodiversity. These values are often not monetised. A ranking among
alternatives allows trade-offs and can guide decision-making. Valuation techniques
to obtain such ranking are group deliberations and joint analysis (Go´mez-Baggethun
and de Groot 2010, p. 115).
The economic value framework considers trade-offs between biodiversity
conservation and land use by analysing the different values humans attach to biodi-
versity. The concept of the ‘Total Economic Value’ (TEV) depicted in Figure 2.4
integrates the values of biodiversity from an economic perspective into one frame-
work. The TEV consists of the broad value categories ‘use value’ and ‘non use value’.
Figure 2.4: Total economic value
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Source: Adapted from TEEB (2010, Fig 5.3, p. 195).
Use values comprise the value types ‘direct value’, ‘indirect value’ and ‘option value’.
Humans ascribe direct values to provisional services such as food and clean water
(‘consumptive use value’) or cultural services like recreation (‘non-consumptive use
value’), indirect values to regulating services such as disease regulation, and option
values to services they might potentially use in the future. People assign a high
option value to biodiversity if they have a low discount rate and are risk averse, i.e.
if they are willing to pay much in order to ensure that biodiversity provides specific
services in the future. The category ‘non use value’ includes the value types ‘bequest
value’, ‘altruist value’ and ‘existence value’. Some people value biodiversity because
it provides services to future generations (‘bequest value’) or to other, possibly un-
known, fellow humans of the own generation (‘altruist value’). The mere existence
of biodiversity is also valued by some people (‘existence value’). People ascribe dif-
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ferent values and different value magnitudes to biodiversity and ecosystem services.
The values of biodiversity a persons perceives depend on the social, cultural, and
economic background. Maslow (1943) purports that only once basic needs, which
he calls ‘deficit needs’, are fulfilled, nature can be regarded as a luxury good.
Importantly, economic valuation20 is not attempting an ethical valuation state-
ment. Economic valuation cannot express holistic viz. total values. It deals with
marginal values. A total value of global biodiversity or world-wide ecosystem services
can hardly be meaningfully calculated (cf. the critical discussions of the famous pa-
per ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital’ by Costanza
et al. (1997), i.a. Heal et al. (2005, p. 188 f.); Simpson (2011, p. 6 f.), but also in
Costanza et al. (1997, p. 258)). Valuing total biodiversity by using a willingness-to-
pay approach cannot result in a value greater than the global gross domestic product
(GDP) and by employing a willingness-to-accept approach it leads to infinity (Heal
et al. 2005, p. 188). Moreover, there is high uncertainty over marginal benefit curves
for large ranges of biodiversity levels and how to approach discounting (Bateman
et al. 2011, p. 196, 202). In any case, total values are not relevant for most decision
problems as they relate to small, locally confined changes. Economic valuation is
best understood as a tool and one argument among many for the conservation of
biodiversity and ecosystem services. It is first and foremost a conceptualisation to
communicate biodiversity to people which do not have an background in ecology or
biology. This is exactly the intention the global study ‘The Economics of Ecosys-
tems and Biodiversity ’ (TEEB) pursues: to make the values of biodiversity and
ecosystem services visible for decision making. Balmford et al. (2002, p. 950), for
example, estimate conservatively that “the overall benefit:cost ratio of an effective
global program for the conservation of remaining wild nature is at least 100:1”. This
language is not always adequate; for other audiences intrinsic, cultural or religious
20Economists attempt to capture the monetary units people assign to the values of biodiversity
and ecosystem services with various methods: market valuation (market prices (prices only approx-
imate values in competitive markets (Fisher et al. 2011, p.6))), indirect market valuation methods
(avoided cost, replacement cost, mitigation and adaptation cost, production function approaches),
revealed preference methods (travel cost, hedonic pricing), and stated preference methods (con-
tingent valuation, choice modelling, group valuation) (e.g. Freeman (2003), TEEB (2010, p. 196
ff.)). Economic valuation suffers from several limitations. Firstly, revealing preferences for different
levels of biodiversity and ecosystem services is not straightforward due to eliciting problems (Toman
1998, p. 59). Aggregating preferences and different value types is even more challenging. Secondly,
marginal benefit curves of biodiversity and ecosystem services are unknown across large ranges.
Huge ecological uncertainty prevails with regard to evolutionary processes and ecological systems,
their interdependencies and thresholds–and only a small share of all existing species has been dis-
covered (Purvis and Hector 2000, p. 213). Hence, economic valuation is “necessarily incomplete”
(Helm and Hepburn 2012, p. 7).
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values of biodiversity might be better communication channels.21
2.2.3 The status and trends of global biodiversity
The multidimensional and complex nature of biodiversity renders a comprehensive
assessment of the state of biodiversity similarly complicated and necessarily multi-
faceted. The global study ‘Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and
Trends’ of the ‘The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Series’ provides a compre-
hensive global assessment of the status and trends of biodiversity at the scales of
biogeographic realms, biomes, species, populations, and genes (Mace et al. 2005).
In all eight biogeographic realms, at least 10% of the habitats have been destroyed,
with the highest percentage of 54% for the Indo-Malayan realm (ibid., p. 83). The
largest percentage of total endangered species of 25% is recorded in the Oceanic
realm (ibid., p. 110). On the scale of biomes, 20-50% of the land size has been
transformed in more than half of the biomes, whereby the tropical dry forests are
the most diminished (ibid., p. 86). Tropical biomes (tropical moist forest, tropical
grasslands and savannahs, tropical dry forests) are characterised by the highest over-
all species richness (ibid., p. 86), but the tropical moist forest also by the highest
percentage of total endangered species (ibid., p. 87).
The status and trends of species (species richness viz. its decline) is measured
most frequently to describe the situation of biodiversity. Still, even this assessment
builds on vague figures. Only close to two million species out of an estimated three
to thirty million species are formally described–whereby an upward deviation might
be possible due to knowledge gaps in poorly researched groups (May 1992). Species
richness is very unevenly distributed; for example, 44% of all vascular plant species
and 35% of all vertebrate species belonging to the species groups mammals, birds,
reptiles, and amphibians occur in only 1.4% of the planet’s terrestrial surface (Myers
et al. 2000). The ‘Tropical Andes Hotspot ’ is the leading of the 35 world biodiversity
hotspots22 (Mittermeier et al. (2004); Williams et al. (2011)). It has the highest
estimated number of endemic plant and vertebrate species and the second largest
remaining primary vegetation area (Mittermeier et al. 2004, p. 32 f.). The ‘Red List’
of the year 2004 of the ‘International Union for Conservation of Nature’ (IUCN)
21For some audiences economic values are even irritating and counterproductive. Moreover, there
are outright critics of the concept of economic valuation (e.g. Kill 2014). A discussion about
the “language”–intrinsic and ecological vs. economic values–might hinder the (common) goal of
biodiversity conservation.
22Biodiversity hotspots are areas that host at least 0.5% of global plant species as endemic ones
and that have diminished to 30% of its original size (Myers et al. 2000).
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covers 38,047 species (2.5% of the world’s described species) out of which 15,589
(41%) belong to the threatened with extinction categories23 ‘critically endangered’,
‘endangered’, ‘vulnerable’, 844 (2%) to the categories ‘extinct’ or ‘extinct in the
wild’, 3,700 (9.72%) to the category ‘near threatened’ or conservation dependent,
14,334 (38%) to ‘least concern’ category, and for 3,580 (10%) data is deficient (Baillie
et al. (2004, p. 6); ref. Figure 2.5). Referencing the IUCN Red List 2004 category
Figure 2.5: Species classification according to risk of extinction (IUCN Red List 2004)
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Source: Own diagram based on data from Baillie et al. (2004, p. 6).
‘species threatened with extinction’ to all described species on earth, the species
threatened with extinction make up just over 1% of the described species. Yet this
category comprises 12% of all bird species, 23% of all mammal species, 32% of all
amphibian species, and 34% of all gymnosperms (ibid., p. 6). Mace et al. (2005,
p. 109) conclude that “the rate of species extinction is several orders of magnitude
higher than the natural or background rate, even in birds, where the level of threat
is the lowest among the assessed taxa. And the great majority of threatened species
continue to decline.”24 Barnosky et al. (2011, p. 56) ascertain that further species
extinctions in the ‘critically endagered’ category “would propel the world to a state
23For the IUCN Red List categories and criteria refer to IUCN (2012).
24The natural background extinction rate is 0.1 to 1 E/MSY (extinctions per million species per
year). The current E/MSY of birds, mammals, and amphibians is 48 to 476 times higher (Mace
et al. 2005, p. 105).
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of mass extinction that has previously been seen only five times in about 540 million
years” and that“additional losses of species in the ‘endangered’ and ‘vulnerable’
categories could accomplish the sixth mass extinction in just a few centuries”.25
Populations extinctions are even much higher than species extinctions (Hughes
et al. 1997, p. 691)–species are lost once all its constituting populations are lost. The
‘Living Plant Index’ (LPI) of the ‘World Wide Fund For Nature’ (WWF) measures
trends in over 10,000 vertebrate species populations and provides the best available
assessment of global population trends (Mace et al. 2005, p. 100). The LPI 2014
reveals a 52% decline of overall global vertebrate species populations between 1970
and 2010 (WWF 2014, p. 8) (ref. Fig. 2.6). The freshwater species populations
Figure 2.6: Decline in global vertebrate species populations between 1970 and 2010 (Living
Plant Index 2014)
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Source: Own diagram based on data from WWF (2014, p. 12).
declined by 76%, and the marine and terrestrial populations both by 39% (ibid., p.
12). The highest LPI decline occured in South America, followed by the Asia-Pacific
region (ibid., p. 12). Even in terrestrial protected areas, populations declined, albeit
half as fast (18% LPI decline) (ibid., p. 12).
For trends in genetic diversity, data is scarce. Fluctuating population sizes and
endangered species populations tend to have less genetic diversity than their coun-
terparts (Mace et al. 2005, p. 96, 99).
Steffen et al. (2015) (revision and update of Rockstro¨m et al. (2009)) find that
25A mass extinction occurs when over three quarters of species are lost within less than about
two million years (Barnosky et al. 2011, p. 52).
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four of nine ‘planetary boundaries’26 associated with Earth-system processes have
been crossed: climate change, land-system change, and, furthest trespassed, intro-
duction of novel entities (interference with the nitrogen cycle) and biosphere integrity
(rate of biodiversity loss). The planetary boundaries describe the “safe operating
space for humanity with respect to the Earth system” (Rockstro¨m et al. 2009, p.
472). Human activities contribute largely to biodiversity loss (MEA (2005, p. 96);
Rockstro¨m et al. (2009, p. 474); Murphy and Romanuk (2014)). The most im-
portant driving factor for terrestrial ecosystems is widely recognised to be habitat
loss through land-use change (Sala et al. (2000); Murphy and Romanuk (2014, p.
97)). Loss of habitat characteristics viz. ‘quality’ through habitat fragmentation,
overexploitation, species invasions, climate change, nitrogen deposition, pollution,
and diseases are further major drivers for biodiversity loss (MEA (2005, p. 96);
Sala et al. (2000); Chapin et al. (2000, p. 234)). In freshwater ecosystems, biotic
exchange in form of species introductions is the most pronounced driver of change
(Sala et al. 2000). The fourth ‘Global Biodiversity Outlook’ (GBO) of the CBD
(UNEP (2014); Leadley et al. (2014)) paints a mixed picture of progress made over
the last years in reducing the direct pressures on biodiversity and consequently also
in the status of biodiversity.
2.3 International cooperation under the United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity
The recognition of the importance of biodiversity paired with its continuous decline
motivates international cooperation for the conservation and sustainable and fair
use of biodiversity under the CBD (Section 2.3.1) and its Nagoya Protocol (Section
2.3.2). Parties to the CBD adopted a ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020’ to
this end (Section 2.3.3).
2.3.1 The Convention on Biological Diversity
The United Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ 27 (CBD) is the most com-
prehensive international agreement on biodiversity. It goes back to an ‘Ad Hoc
26The nine planetary boundaries originally defined by Rockstro¨m et al. (2009) are climate change,
rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine) (= biosphere integrity (Steffen et al. 2015)), in-
terference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles (= biogeochemical flows (Steffen et al. 2015)),
stratospheric ozone depletion, ocean acidification, global freshwater use, change in land use, chemical
pollution (= introduction of novel entities (Steffen et al. 2015)), and atmospheric aerosol loading.
27Ref. footnote 1.
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Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity’, which was summoned by the
‘United Nations Environment Programme’ (UNEP) in June 198728–shortly after
the release of the WCED (1987) report ‘Our Common Future’. It met in 1988
to discuss a potential international convention on biological diversity29. After in-
tense preparatory work (cf. Boisson de Chazournes 2009) the CBD was opened for
signature on 5 June 1992 at the ‘United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development’ (UNCED), the so-called ‘Rio Conference’ or ‘Earth Summit’. The
CBD entered into force on 29 December 1993 and by now counts 195 parties (in-
cluding the European Union)30. The objectives of the CBD are “the conservation of
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including
by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant
technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies,
and by appropriate funding” (CBD, Art. 1 ). Central provisions of the Convention
pertain to the development of national biodiversity strategies and action plans (Art.
6(a)), the mainstreaming of biodiversity (Art. 6(b)), the identification and moni-
toring of the components of biological diversity (Art. 7(a),(b)), the identification
of processes with significant adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable
use of biodiversity (Art. 7(c)), in-situ conservation including the establishment of
protected areas (Art. 8 ), complementary ex-situ conservation (Art. 9 ), sustain-
able use of components of biological diversity (Art. 10 ), economically and socially
sound measures that create incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable
use (Art. 11 ), research and training (Art. 12 ), public education and awareness
(Art. 13 ), and impact assessment and minimisation of adverse impacts (Art. 14 ).
The Convention text includes specific provisions on access to genetic resources (Art.
15 ). Moreover, it covers access to and transfer of technology (Art. 16 ), exchange
of information between parties (Art. 17 ), technical and scientific cooperation be-
tween parties (Art. 18 ), financial resources (Art. 20 ), and a financial mechanism
(Art. 21 ). The Convention also contains provisions on the handling of biotechnology
(Art. 19 ), based on which the ‘Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’ 31 was negotiated.
It entered into force on 11 September 2003 and its objective is to “contribute to
28Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme decision 14/26 “Rational-
ization of international conventions on biological diversity”, 17 June 1987.
29Ref. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity on the Work of
its First Session, UNEP/Bio.Div.1/3.
30Ref. online: www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml, last 03.04.2015.
31United Nations (2000): Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity, Montreal, 29.10.2000.
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ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling
and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may
have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”
(Cartagena Protocol, Art. 1 ).
The ‘Conference of the Parties’ (COP) is the CBD’s governing body. At the
COP, the CBD member states take decisions for the further implementation of the
Convention. The last COP, the twelfth meeting, was held in the Republic of Korea
in October 2014 and the next COP will take place in Mexico at the end of 2016. In-
between the meetings of the COP, the ‘Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and
Technological Advice’ (SBSTTA), the ‘Subsidiary Body on Implementation’ (SBI)
and other expert groups come together to prepare the COP and in particular to
make recommendations for decisions to be taken by the COP. The Secretariat of the
CBD is situated in Montreal, Canada. The ‘Global Environmental Facility’ (GEF)
acts as the financial mechanism of the Convention. Besides the ‘Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety’, a second protocol was adopted under the CBD: the ‘Nagoya Proto-
col on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits
Arising from their Utilization’ (ref. Section 2.3.2).
The COP initiated seven ‘thematic programmes of work’ and a number of ‘cross-
cutting issues’ to advance the implementation of the CBD. The thematic pro-
grammes of work cover agricultural biodiversity, dry and sub-humid lands biodi-
versity, forest biodiversity, inland waters biodiversity, island biodiversity, marine
and coastal biodiversity, and mountain biodiversity. Besides, the ‘Strategic Plan for
Biodiversity 2011-2020’ guides the implementation (ref. Section 2.3.3).
The historic context of the CBD, the Convention’s objectives, and the ‘Strategic
Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020’ show that sustainable development is integral to
the convention. The CBD defines sustainable use as “the use of components of bio-
logical diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline
of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspi-
rations of present and future generations” (CBD, Art. 2 ). It is a “process-oriented
sustainable development convention” (Boisson de Chazournes 2009, p. 3). Although
the ‘Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future
Generations’ of the ‘United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion’ (UNESCO) was adopted some years after the CBD, the CBD already complied
with its provisions on the preservation of life on earth (Art. 4 ) that read “The
present generations have the responsibility to bequeath to future generations an
Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human activity. Each gen-
30 Chapter 2. The Bigger Picture
eration inheriting the Earth temporarily should take care to use natural resources
reasonably and ensure that life is not prejudiced by harmful modifications of the
ecosystems and that scientific and technological progress in all fields does not harm
life on Earth.”
The topic of sustainable and fair use of biodiversity is as important nowadays
under the CBD as it has been in its founding years. In October 2014 the ‘Nagoya
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilization’ entered into force. In the same month, the
ministers participating in the high-level segment of the twelfth COP to the CBD
adopted the ‘Gangwon Declaration on Biodiversity for Sustainable Development’ 32
in the context of the ongoing process of developing a United Nations post-2015
development agenda and ‘Sustainable Development Goals’. Besides, the theme of
the ‘International Day for Biological Diversity 2015’ is “Biodiversity for Sustainable
Development”33.
2.3.2 The Nagoya Protocol
The ‘Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization’ 34 (NP) is a Protocol under the
CBD and addresses the third goal of the CBD. As indicated by the title of the
Protocol, its objective is “the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from
the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic re-
sources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all
rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding, thereby
contributing to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of
its components” (NP, Art. 1 ). The Nagoya Protocol applies to genetic resources
covered by Art. 15 of the CBD and related benefits as well as associated traditional
knowledge and related benefits (NP, Art. 3 ). The Nagoya Protocol gives prece-
dence to specialized international ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (ABS) instruments
that are consistent with the objectives of the CBD and the NP (Art. 4 ). This is so
far only the case for the ‘International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture’ (ITPGRFA).
The precursor to the Nagoya Protocol are the ‘Bonn Guidelines’ 35. Shortly after
32Ref. online: www.cbd.int/hls-cop/gangwon-declaration-hls-cop12-en.pdf, last 03.04.2015.
33Ref. online: www.cbd.int/idb/default.shtml, last 03.04.2015.
34Ref. footnote 2.
35United Nations (2002): Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable
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their adoption, the ‘World Summit on Sustainable Development’ in Johannesburg
in 2002 called on the CBD member states to negotiate an international regime on
ABS of genetic resources under the CBD based on the Bonn Guidelines.36 At its
seventh meeting, the COP of the CBD mandated the ‘Ad Hoc Open-ended Working
Group on Access and Benefit-sharing’ to “elaborate and negotiate an international
regime on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing with the aim of adopting
an instrument\instruments to effectively implement the provisions in Article 15 and
Article 8(j) of the Convention and the three objectives of the Convention” (decision
VII/19 D.137). Six years later in 2010, delegates to the CBD’s tenth COP adopted
the Nagoya Protocol (decision X/138) and established an interim governing body for
the Protocol, the ‘Open-ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya
Protocol’ (ICNP) (decision X/1, II). The ICNP met three times to prepare the first
COP serving as the ‘Meeting of the Parties’ to the Protocol (COP-MOP) prior to
the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol. 90 days after the 50th ratification, the
Nagoya Protocol entered into force on 12 October 2014 and the first COP-MOP
took place immediately afterwards.
The Nagoya Protocol specifies obligations for member states regarding access
to genetic resources (Art. 6 ) and to traditional knowledge associated with genetic
resources (Art. 7 ) as well as to the fair and equitable benefit-sharing (Art. 5 ).
A user has to obtain ‘Prior Informed Consent’ (PIC) for the utilization of a ge-
netic resource and the associated traditional knowledge from the country of origin.
Then, both parties establish ‘Mutually Agreed Terms’ (MAT) on ABS of the respec-
tive resources. The benefits from the utilization of genetic resources and associated
traditional knowledge as well as from its subsequent applications and from a poten-
tial commercialization have to be shared fairly and equitably. To facilitate ABS,
countries have to create legal certainty, clarity and transparency of their domestic
ABS legislation. Domestic ABS legislation should also provide for the fair and equi-
Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/24.
36Ref. A/CONF.199/20, Resolution 2 ‘Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development’, Annex, Chapter IV, par. 44(o): “Negotiate within the framework of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, bearing in mind the Bonn Guidelines, an international regime to
promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of ge-
netic resources”, online: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1725899.27911758.html, last 07.03.2015;
as well as United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/260, 20 December 2002, A/RES/57/260,
par. 8, online: www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/57/260, last 07.03.2015.
37UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/19, D.1, online: www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-07/cop-07-dec-
19-en.pdf, last 07.03.2015.
38UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1, online: www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-10/cop-10-dec-01-
en.pdf, last 07.03.2015.
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table sharing of benefits based on mutually agreed terms with indigenous and local
communities holding genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. The
Nagoya Protocol requests the treaty parties to consider the need for a ‘Global Multi-
lateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’ (GMBSM) for transboundary genetic resources
and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources or for such genetic re-
sources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources for which no
PIC is possible (Art. 10 ). It explicitly encourages transboundary cooperation with
regard to ABS (Art. 11 ).
The Nagoya Protocol includes regulations on tools to facilitate the implementa-
tion of ABS: model contractual clauses (Art. 19 ), codes of conduct, guidelines, and
best practices and/or standards (Art. 20 ), awareness-rising (Art. 21 ) and capacity
building (Art. 22 ), technology transfer, collaboration, and cooperation (Art. 23 ).
The Nagoya Protocol calls upon member states to promote research that contributes
to biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use (Art. 8(a)). Parties shall also
consider health emergencies (Art. 8(b)) and the role of genetic resources for food
security (Art. 8(c)) in the implementation of ABS.
Moreover, the Nagoya Protocol defines compliance obligations (Art. 15 - 18, 30 ).
Member states have to ensure that genetic resources utilized within their territory
have been obtained in compliance with the obligations under the Nagoya Protocol,
notably PIC and MAT. They have to establish procedures for dealing with cases of
non-compliance. Parties shall provide for access to justice. They shall cooperate in
cases of compliance ambiguity and violation. Besides, parties have to take measures
to monitor and to increase transparency regarding the utilization of genetic resources
and associated traditional knowledge. At the first COP-MOP, the members to the
Nagoya Protocol adopted cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms to
promote compliance with the Nagoya Protocol.39
The Nagoya Protocol provides for some institutional arrangements to facilitate
the implementation of ABS. Parties have to specify a ‘National Focal Point’ (NFP)
for collaborating with the Secretariat and for providing official information on ABS
provisions of their country (Art. 13 ). Parties can in addition create ‘Competent
National Authorities’ (CNAs) for granting access, otherwise the NFP is responsi-
ble for this task as well (ibid.). The Nagoya Protocol establishes an ‘Access and
Benefit-sharing Clearing-House’ (ABS CH) to share information on ABS and the
parties’ domestic implementation of the Protocol’s provisions (Art. 14 ). The CBD
39UNEP/CBD/NP/COP-MOP/DEC/1/4, online: www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/NP-MOP-01/np-
mop-01-dec-04-en.pdf, last 07.03.2015.
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Secretariat is also the Secretariat for the Nagoya Protocol (Art. 28 ) and subsidiary
bodies under the CBD can also serve under the Nagoya Protocol (Art. 27 ). Like-
wise, the financial mechanism for the Nagoya Protocol is the same as for the CBD,
the GEF (Art. 25 ).
2.3.3 Biodiversity targets of the Convention on Biological Diversity
The ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity’ of the CBD promotes the implementation of
the Convention’s three goals (ref. Section 2.3.1). The sixth COP adopted the first
‘Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity’ in 2002, ten years after
the entry into force of the Convention (decision VI/2640). In this strategic plan the
parties committed themselves “to a more effective and coherent implementation of
the three objectives of the Convention, to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction
of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level as
a contribution to poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life on earth” (ibid.,
Annex, par. 11). The aim to significantly reduce biodiversity loss by 2010 was
also included in the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs)41. In 2010 the third
edition of the GBO assessed the progress towards the 2010 biodiversity target and
its 21 sub-targets (UNEP 2010). It attested the international community to have
failed to meet the overall target as well as all sub-targets globally–although some
have been partially or locally achieved (ibid., p. 17).
Following up on the lessons learned, the tenth COP endorsed the ‘Strategic Plan
for Biodiversity 2011-2020’ (decision X/242). The vision of the current strategic
plan is “Living in harmony with nature”, whereby “by 2050, biodiversity is valued,
conserved, restored and wisely used, maintaining ecosystem services, sustaining a
healthy planet and delivering benefits essential for all people” (ibid., II). Its mission
is to
“take effective and urgent action to halt the loss of biodiversity in order to
ensure that by 2020 ecosystems are resilient and continue to provide essential
services, thereby securing the planet’s variety of life, and contributing to human
well-being, and poverty eradication. To ensure this, pressures on biodiversity
are reduced, ecosystems are restored, biological resources are sustainably used
and benefits arising out of utilization of genetic resources are shared in a fair
40UNEP/CBD/COP/6/26, online: www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=7200, last
07.03.2015.
41MDG 7c ‘Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss’,
ref. online: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm, last
07.03.2015.
42UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2, online: www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-02-
en.pdf, last 07.03.2015.
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and equitable manner; adequate financial resources are provided, capacities are
enhanced, biodiversity issues and values mainstreamed, appropriate policies are
effectively implemented, and decision-making is based on sound science and the
precautionary approach” (ibid., III).
To achieve its mission, the strategic plan sets out five strategic goals with twenty
targets for 2015 and 2020, the ‘Aichi Biodiversity Targets’ (ibid., IV). Strategic
Goal A focuses at addressing “the underlying causes of biodiversity loss by main-
streaming biodiversity across government and society”. The third Aichi Target, for
example, calls to eliminate, phase out or reform “by 2020, at the latest, incentives,
including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity [...] in order to minimize or avoid neg-
ative impacts, and positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity are developed and applied”. Strategic Goal B envisions to “reduce the
direct pressures on biodiversity and promote sustainable use”, inter alia through
the fifth Aichi Target, which states that “by 2020, the rate of loss of all natural
habitats, including forests, is at least halved and where feasible brought close to
zero, and degradation and fragmentation is significantly reduced”. Strategic Goal C
aims “to improve the status of biodiversity by safeguarding ecosystems, species and
genetic diversity”. Aichi Target eleven requests that “by 2020, at least 17 per cent
of terrestrial and inland water areas, and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas,
especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services,
are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representa-
tive and well connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-based
conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscapes and seascapes”.
Aichi Target twelve demands that “by 2020 the extinction of known threatened
species has been prevented and their conservation status, particularly of those most
in decline, has been improved and sustained” and Aichi Target thirteen that by
the same year “the genetic diversity of cultivated plants and farmed and domesti-
cated animals and of wild relatives, including other socio-economically as well as
culturally valuable species, is maintained, and strategies have been developed and
implemented for minimizing genetic erosion and safeguarding their genetic diver-
sity”. Strategic Goal D addresses the enhancement of benefits for everyone from
biodiversity and ecosystem services and includes inter alia Aichi Target sixteen on
the entering into force and implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. Strategic Goal E
covers the “implementation through participatory planning, knowledge management
and capacity building”. It includes inter alia Aichi Target eighteen requesting that
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“by 2020, the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and
local communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity,
and their customary use of biological resources, are respected, subject to national
legislation and relevant international obligations, and fully integrated and reflected
in the implementation of the Convention with the full and effective participation
of indigenous and local communities, at all relevant levels”. The strategic goals
and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets should be achieved globally, but also serve as a
framework for national targets.
Bibliography
Baillie, J., C. Hilton-Taylor, and S. Stuart (Eds.) (2004). 2004 IUCN Red List of
Threatened Species. A Global Species Assessment. Gland, Switzerland / Cam-
bridge, UK: IUCN.
Balmford, A., A. Bruner, P. Cooper, R. Costanza, S. Farber, R. E. Green, M. Jenk-
ins, P. Jefferiss, V. Jessamy, J. Madden, K. Munro, N. Myers, S. Naeem,
J. Paavola, M. Rayment, S. Rosendo, J. Roughgarden, K. Trumper, and R. K.
Turner (2002). Economic reasons for conserving wild nature. Science 297, 950–
953.
Balvanera, P., A. B. Pfisterer, N. Buchmann, J.-S. He, T. Nakashizuka, D. Raf-
faelli, and B. Schmid (2006). Quantifying the evidence for biodiversity effects on
ecosystem functioning and services. Ecology Letters 9, 1146–1156.
Barnosky, A. D., N. Matzke, S. Tomiya, G. O. U. Wogan, B. Swartz, T. B. Quental,
C. Marshall, J. L. McGuire, E. L. Lindsey, K. C. Maguire, B. Mersey, and E. A.
Ferrer (2011). Has the earth’s sixth mass extinction already arrived? Nature 471,
51–57.
Baron, J. and M. Spranca (1997). Protected values. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes 70 (1), 1 – 16.
Bateman, I. J., G. M. Mace, C. Fezzi, G. Atkinson, and K. Turner (2011). Eco-
nomic analysis for ecosystem service assessments. Environmental and Resource
Economics 48 (2), 177–218.
Baumga¨rtner, S. (2007). The insurance value of biodiversity in the provision of
ecosystem services. Natural Resource Modeling 20 (1), 87–127.
36 Chapter 2. The Bigger Picture
Benson, D. A., K. Clark, I. Karsch-Mizrachi, D. J. Lipman, J. Ostell, and E. W.
Sayers (2014). Genbank. Nucleic Acids Research 42 (Database issue), D32–D37.
Boisson de Chazournes, L. (2009). Convention on Biological Diversity and its Proto-
col on Biosafety. United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. Online
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpbcbd/cpbcbd.html (01.02.2015).
Boyd, J. and S. Banzhaf (2007). What are ecosystem services? The need for stan-
dardized environmental accounting units. Ecological Economics 63 (2-3), 616–626.
Cardinale, B. J., D. S. Srivastava, J. E. Duffy, J. P. Wright, L. Downing, A.,
M. Sankaran, and C. Jouseau (2006). Effects of biodiversity on the functioning of
trophic groups and ecosystems. Nature 443, 989–992.
Chan, K. M. A., T. Satterfield, and J. Goldstein (2012). Rethinking ecosystem
services to better address and navigate cultural values. Ecological Economics 74,
8–18.
Chapin, F. S. I., E. S. Zavaleta, V. T. Eviner, R. L. Naylor, P. M. Vitousek, H. L. I.
Reynolds, D. U. Hooper, S. Lavorel, O. E. SalaI, S. E. Hobbie, M. C. Mack, and
S. Dı´az (2000). Consequences of changing biodiversity. Nature 405, 234–242.
Costanza, R., R. d’Arge, R. de Groot, S. Farber, M. Grasso, B. Hannon, K. Limburg,
S. Naeem, R. V. O’Neill, J. Paruelo, R. G. Raskin, P. Sutton, and M. van den
Belt (1997). The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital.
Nature 387 (6630), 253 – 260.
De Groot, R. (1992). Functions of Nature: Evaluation of Nature in Environmental
Planning, Management and Decision Making. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.
De Groot, R. S., M. A. Wilson, and R. M. J. Boumans (2002). A typology for
the classification, description and valuation of ecosystem functions, goods and
services. Ecological Economics 41 (3), 393–408.
Fisher, B., I. J. Bateman, and R. K. Turner (2011). Valuing ecosystem services: Ben-
efits, values, space and time. United Nations Enviornment Programme Ecosystem
Services Economics (ESE) Working Paper Series 3, 1–11.
Fisher, B., R. K. Turner, and P. Morling (2009). Defining and classifying ecosystem
services for decision making. Ecological Economics 68 (3), 643–653.
Chapter 2. The Bigger Picture 37
Folke, C., C. S. Holling, and C. Perrings (1996). Biological diversity, ecosystems,
and the human scale. Ecological Applications 6 (4), 1018–1024.
Freeman, A. (2003). The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values:
Theory and Methods (2 ed.). Washington: Resources for the Future.
Gepts, P. (2004). Who owns biodiversity, and how should the owners be compen-
sated? Plant Physiology 134, 1295–1307.
Go´mez-Baggethun, E. and R. de Groot (2010). Natural capital and ecosystem ser-
vices: The ecological foundation of human society. In R. Hester and R. Harrison
(Eds.), Ecosystem Services, Volume 30 of Issues in Environmental Science and
Technology, pp. 118–145. Royal Society of Chemistry Cambridge.
Gren, I.-M., C. Folke, K. Turner, and I. Batemen (1994). Primary and secondary
values of wetland ecosystems. Environmental and Resource Economics 4 (1), 55–
74.
Heal, G. M., E. B. Barbier, K. J. Boyle, A. P. Covich, S. P. Gloss, C. H. Hershner,
J. P. Hoehn, C. M. Pringle, S. Polasky, K. Segerson, and S.-F. K. (2005). Valuing
Ecosystem Services. Toward better environmental decision-making. Washington:
The National Academies Press.
Helm, D. and C. Hepburn (2012). The economic analysis of biodiversity: An assess-
ment. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28 (1), 1–21.
Holling, C. S. (1973). Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review
of Ecology and Systematics 4 (4), 1–23.
Hooper, D. U., E. C. Adair, B. J. Cardinale, J. E. K. Byrnes, B. A. Hungate, K. L.
Matulich, A. Gonzalez, J. E. Duffy, L. Gamfeldt, and M. I. O’Connor (2012). A
global synthesis reveals biodiversity loss as a major driver of ecosystem change.
Nature 486, 105–108.
Hughes, J. B., G. C. Daily, and P. R. Ehrlich (1997). Population diversity: its extent
and extinction. Science 278, 689–692.
IUCN (2000/2012). IUCN Red List Categories and Criteria. Version 3.1 Second
edition, As approved by the 51st meeting of the IUCN Council Gland, Switzerland.
Kill, J. (2014). Economic Valuation of Nature. The Price to Pay for Conservation?
A critical exploration. Brussels: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.
38 Chapter 2. The Bigger Picture
Laird, S. and R. Wynberg (2012). Bioscience at a Crossroads: Implementing the
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing in a Time of Scientific, Technolog-
ical and Industry Change. Montreal: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity.
Leadley, P. W., C. B. Krug, R. Alkemade, H. M. Pereira, U. R. Sumaila, M. Walpole,
A. Marques, T. Newbold, L. S. L. Teh, J. van Kolck, C. Bellard, S. R. Januchowski-
Hartley, and P. J. Mumby (2014). Progress towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets:
An assessment of biodiversity trends, policy scenarios and key actions. Technical
Series 78, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal.
Lerch, A. (1998). Property rights and biodiversity. European Journal of Law and
Economics 6, 285–304.
Mace, G., H. Masundire, and J. Baillie (2005). Biodiversity. In R. Hassan, R. Scholes,
and N. Ash (Eds.), Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and Trends,
Volume 1, The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Series, Chapter 4, pp. 77–122.
Washington, DC: Island Press.
Mace, G. M., K. Norris, and A. H. Fitter (2012). Biodiversity and ecosystem services:
A multilayered relationship. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 27 (1), 19–26.
Ma¨ler, K.-G., S. Aniyar, and A˚. Jansson (2009). Accounting for ecosystems. Envi-
ronmental and Resource Economics 42, 39 – 51.
Maslow, A. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological review 50, 370 –
396.
May, R. M. (1992). How many species inhabit the earth? Scientific Ameri-
can 267 (4), 42–48.
Mazzotta, M. J. and J. Kline (1995). Environmental philosophy and the concept of
nonuse value. Land Economics 71 (2), 244–249.
MEA (2005). Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Biodiversity Synthesis. Millen-
nium Ecosystem Assessment. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
Meinard, Y., S. Coq, and B. Schmid (2014). A constructivist approach toward a
general definition of biodiversity. Ethics, Policy & Environment 17 (1), 88–104.
Chapter 2. The Bigger Picture 39
Mittermeier, R. A., G. P. Robles, M. Hoffmann, J. D. Pilgrim, T. Brooks, C. G.
Mittermeier, J. Lamoreux, and G. A. B. da Fonseca (2004). Hotspots revisited:
Earth’s biologically richest and most endangered ecoregions. Mexico City: CE-
MEX.
Munda, G. (2004). Social multi-criteria evaluation: Methodological foundations and
operational consequences. European Journal of Operational Research 158 (3), 662
– 677.
Murphy, G. E. P. and T. N. Romanuk (2014). A meta-analysis of declines in local
species richness from human disturbances. Ecology and Evolution 4 (1), 91–103.
Myers, N., R. A. Mittermeier, C. G. Mittermeier, G. A. B. da Fonseca, and J. Kent
(2000). Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities. Nature 403, 853–858.
Nakamura, Y., G. Cochrane, and I. Karsch-Mizrachi (2013). The international nu-
cleotide sequence database collaboration. Nucleic Acids Research 41 (Database
issue), D21–D24.
OECD (2013). Scaling-up Finance Mechanisms for Biodiversity. OECD Publishing.
Oldham, P., S. Hall, and O. Forero (2013). Biological diversity in the patent system.
PLoS One 8 (11), e78737.
Pascual, U. and C. Perrings (2007). Developing incentives and economic mecha-
nisms for in situ biodiversity conservation in agricultural landscapes. Agriculture,
Ecosystems and Environment 121, 256–268.
Purvis, A. and A. Hector (2000). Getting the measure of biodiversity. Nature 405,
212–219.
Rockstro¨m, J., W. Steffen, K. Noone, A. Persson, F. S. Chapin, E. F. Lambin,
T. M. Lenton, M. Scheffer, C. Folke, H. J. Schellnhuber, B. Nykvist, C. A. de Wit,
T. Hughes, S. van der Leeuw, H. Rodhe, S. So¨rlin, P. K. Snyder, R. Costanza,
U. Svedin, M. Falkenmark, L. Karlberg, R. W. Corell, V. J. Fabry, J. Hansen,
B. Walker, D. Liverman, K. Richardson, P. Crutzen, and J. A. Foley (2009). A
safe operating space for humanity. Nature 461, 472–475.
Sala, O. E., F. Stuart Chapin, III, J. J. Armesto, E. Berlow, J. Bloomfield, R. Dirzo,
E. Huber-Sanwald, L. F. Huenneke, R. B. Jackson, A. Kinzig, R. Leemans, D. M.
Lodge, H. A. Mooney, M. Oesterheld, N. L. Poff, M. T. Sykes, B. H. Walker,
40 Chapter 2. The Bigger Picture
M. Walker, and D. H. Wall (2000). Global biodiversity scenarios for the year
2100. Science 287 (5459), 1770–1774.
Sandler (1993). Tropical deforestation: Markets and market failures. Land Eco-
nomics 69 (3), 225–233.
Schei, P. J. and M. W. Tvedt (2010). “Genetic Resources” in the CBD: The wording,
the past, the present and the future. Submission to the Executive Secretary of
the Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/INF/1.
Schwartz, M. W., C. A. Brigham, J. D. Hoeksema, K. G. Lyons, M. H. Mills, and
P. J. Mantgem (2000). Linking biodiversity to ecosystem functioning: Implications
for conservation ecology. Oecologia 122 (3), 297–305.
Sedjo, R. A. (1992). Property rights, genetic resources, and biotechnological change.
The Journal of Law and Economics 35 (1), 199–213.
Simpson, R. D. (2011). The “ecosystem service framework”: A critical assess-
ment. The United Nations Environment Programme Ecosystem Services Eco-
nomics (ESE) Working Paper Series 5, 1–20.
Solow, A., S. Polasky, and J. Broadus (1993). On the measurement of biological
diversity. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24, 60–68.
Steffen, W., K. Richardson, J. Rockstro¨m, S. E. Cornell, I. Fetzer, E. M. Bennett,
R. Biggs, S. R. Carpenter, W. de Vries, C. A. de Wit, C. Folke, D. Gerten,
J. Heinke, G. M. Mace, L. M. Persson, V. Ramanathan, B. Reyers, and S. So¨rlin
(2015). Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet.
Science 347 (6223).
TEEB (2010). The Eocnomics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Ecological and Eco-
nomic Foundations. London and Washington: Earthscan.
Tilman, D. (1999). The ecological consequences of biodiversity: A search for general
principles. Ecology 80 (5), 1455 – 1474.
Toman, M. (1998). Why not to calculate the value of the world’s ecosystem services
and natural capital. Ecological Economics 25 (1), 57–60.
UNEP (2010). Global Biodiversity Outlook 3. Montre´al: United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Chapter 2. The Bigger Picture 41
UNEP (2014). Global Biodiversity Outlook 4. Montre´al: United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
WCED (1987). Our Common Future. World Commission on Environment and
Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, K. J., A. Ford, D. F. Rosauer, N. De Silva, R. Mittermeier, C. Bruce,
F. W. Larsen, and C. Margules (2011). Forests of East Australia: The 35th
biodiversity hotspot. In F. E. Zachos and J. C. Habel (Eds.), Biodiversity Hotspots.
Distribution and Protection of Conservation Priority Areas, Berlin/Mannheim,
pp. 295–310. Springer.
Wilson, E. O. (1997). Biodiversity II: Understanding and Protecting Our Biological
Resources, Chapter Introduction, pp. 1–3. Joseph Henry Press.
Winands, S., K. Holm-Mu¨ller, and H.-P. Weikard (2013). The biodiversity conser-
vation game with heterogeneous countries. Ecological Economics 89, 14–23.
WWF (2014). Living Planet Report 2014: Species and spaces, people and place.
Gland, Switzerland: World Wide Fund For Nature.

Part I
Modelling Cooperation for
Biodiversity Conservation
43

Chapter 3
The Biodiversity Conservation Game with
Heterogeneous Countries
Abstract: Biodiversity is an essential resource, which we classify as conditionally-
renewable. In order to achieve conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity
virtually all nation states signed the United Nations ‘Convention on Biological
Diversity’. In this chapter we investigate how the heterogeneity of countries in
regard to ecosystems and wealth influences the stability of international biodi-
versity conservation agreements both without and with transfers. We further
examine the effect of different degrees of ecosystem substitutability. We model
a coalition formation game with players that have a continuous conservation
choice. The conservation benefit is dependent on wealth and ecosystem quality.
Aggregation of global benefits respects differences in ecosystem substitutabil-
ity. In case of transfers, a fund redistributes coalition benefits according to a
sharing rule. The main finding is that in the absence of transfers, compared
to the homogeneous situation, heterogeneity in ecosystems and wealth reduces
the size of a stable coalition. The destabilising effect is stronger the higher the
ecosystem substitutability. Optimal transfers facilitate a large stable coalition.
3.1 Introduction
Biodiversity is an essential resource as its marginal benefits approach infinity with in-
creasing depletion. Indeed, biodiversity is the backbone of human life. The need for
Chapter 3 has been published as: Winands, S., K. Holm-Mu¨ller, and H.-P. Weikard (2013).
The biodiversity conservation game with heterogeneous countries. Ecological Economics 89, 14-23.
A first analysis can be found in Winands (2011), which has partly been published in Winands
(2012).
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its (partial) conservation enjoys a wide consensus among individuals and countries
worldwide. Unfortunately, goodwill and the rising costs associated with increasing
depletion are insufficient for conservation. As many services of biodiversity exhibit
characteristics of global public goods, international cooperation is needed to prevent
suboptimal conservation levels. The challenge and aspiration of such international
environmental agreements (IEAs) are to be self-enforcing in the absence of a world-
wide government while assuring real cooperation. The ‘Convention on Biological
Diversity’ 1 (CBD) is an IEA that achieves (nearly) full cooperation and codifies the
sovereignty of nation states over their biological resources.2 A common pitfall for
agreements, which also applies to the CBD, is to codify more or less an outcome
which is unilaterally beneficial. The game theoretic model result of Barrett’s (1994)
Biodiversity Supergame seems to confirm that the CBD is unable to improve much
upon global welfare compared to the non-cooperative scenario. We argue, however,
that Barrett’s disillusioning result originates from his restrictive model assumptions.
From Weikard (2009, p. 578) we know that “Barrett’s results do not generalize to
cases where players differ with respect to their marginal benefits of the public good”.
Beyond doubt, countries do not benefit equally from biodiversity conservation.
Our main objective is to contribute to the game theoretic modelling and thereby
enhance the understanding of cooperation incentives and coalition stability in in-
ternational biodiversity conservation cooperation. Specifically, we investigate how
heterogeneity in ecosystems3 and wealth impact the stability of international biodi-
versity conservation agreements among differing participants. We model competitive
land use between biodiversity conservation and other activities such as agriculture,
but do not consider the specific case of biological diversity of agriculturally used
crops and their governance regimes (Droege and Soete 2001). Our Biodiversity
Game is an international biodiversity conservation game with heterogeneous players
and benefit sharing. Some form of fund, which functions as the financial mechanism,
redistributes coalition benefits according to a specific sharing rule. We solve the Bio-
diversity Game sequentially in three stages. In the analysis, we examine a “real world
1United Nations (1992): Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 Int’l Leg. Mat. 818, Rio de
Janeiro, 05.06.1992.
2Biological resources are defined by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, Art. 2)
as “genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of
ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity”, and biological diversity as “the
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and
other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part: this includes diversity
within species, between species and of ecosystems”.
3For simplification, we focus on the ecosystem level (omitting the levels species and genetic
diversity).
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scenario” as base scenario, reproduce a “Barrett scenario”, and subsequently vary
parameters to better understand the impact of biodiversity quality, ecosystem sub-
stitutability and countries’ wealth. Formally, we mainly differ from Barrett’s (1994)
Biodiversity Supergame by assuming non-identical countries (different ecosystems
and wealth), explicitly considering local benefits, assuming an ecosystem resilience
threshold, and most notably by respecting the imperfect substitutability between
biodiversity services. To our knowledge, the consideration of imperfect ecosystem
substitutability or even imperfect complementarity is unique in stability analyses of
biodiversity conservation agreements.
The chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the key model charac-
teristics of heterogeneity in the attributes ‘ecosystems’ and ‘wealth’. In Section 3
we present the model, first the rationale of the general Biodiversity Game, and then
formally the stages of the Biodiversity Game using a general specification. Next in
Section 4, we provide a numerical appraisal of the Biodiversity Game for specific
functional forms and parameters, together with a sensitivity analysis and discussion
of the results. With Section 5 we conclude.
3.2 Model characteristics: heterogeneity in attributes
We consider a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of countries with n equal to the number of in-
ternationally recognised countries that participate in the Biodiversity Game. These
countries are heterogeneous in the two dimensions ‘wealth’ and ‘biodiversity rich-
ness’, other aspects being identical. Coalition formation is influenced on the supply
side by differences in ecosystems (Section 3.2.1) and on the demand side by wealth
heterogeneity (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Heterogeneity in ecosystems
In this subsection we focus on the supply side differences of the biodiversity con-
servation game. Supply of biodiversity conservation is influenced by the general
reproduction dynamics of biodiversity and differences in biodiversity richness be-
tween countries, both natural and human-induced such as forest clearing.
The reproduction dynamics of biodiversity are decisive for economic exploitation
and conservation decisions. Biodiversity is a stock resource, as its present use de-
termines its future availability. Biological resources naturally reproduce themselves.
Nevertheless, they are exhaustible under certain circumstances: the reproduction is
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contingent on human exploitation levels and certain environmental conditions such
as soil, air, solar and climate characteristics. We classify biological resources as
‘conditionally-renewable’. If a certain critical minimum resource share (here ecosys-
tem size in hectare) is conserved, they are renewable; otherwise, they become extinct.
We discuss differences in the countries’ biodiversity richness in terms of ecosys-
tem heterogeneity. An ecosystem of some country i belongs to a particular ecosystem
type e with e ∈ {1, ...,m}. An ecosystem type e provides a distinct set of ecosystem
services. The ‘Millennium Ecosystem Assessment’ (MEA) assigns these services
to the four broad service categories: supporting, provisioning, regulating and cul-
tural services (MEA 2005, p. 19), similar to those used by Barbier et al. (1994,
p. 45). Generally these biodiversity services arise from biological resources. Bio-
logical variability in turn ensures their elastic and robust provision (cf. Purvis and
Hector 2000, p. 216). These services, because valued by humans, translate into
benefits. An ecosystem type e is characterised by its quality qe in terms of biological
diversity, and its productivity ye for other purposes than conservation, where qe and
ye are exogenously given parameters of the model. qe influences local and global
benefits obtained from biodiversity services and ye affects local benefits from non-
conservation uses. Opportunity costs per hectare of conserved land arise, depending
on the ecosystem’s location, from various potential uses; we employ agricultural
use as representative use under which we subsume all other uses. The ecosystems
with the highest parameter values for qe are biodiversity hotspots. Globally 35 bio-
diversity hotspots have been identified (Mittermeier et al. (2004); Williams et al.
(2011))–areas hosting at least 0.5 % of global plant species: these hotspot areas,
despite covering only 1.4 % of the global land area, comprise 44 % of global vas-
cular plant species and 35 % of all vertebrate species (mammals, birds, reptiles,
amphibians).
As the services of different ecosystems are not identical, substitution of ecosys-
tems through other ecosystems or other goods is limited. Tropical rainforests for
example cannot be perfectly substituted by boreal forests. Substitution through
other goods is especially limited in case of life-support functions. Perfect artificial
substitutes of biodiversity services are not available.
3.2.2 Heterogeneity in wealth
In this subsection we address the demand side differences of the biodiversity conser-
vation game. In our model demand side differences stem from wealth discrepancies
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between countries. Wealthy countries are assumed to have both a high gross domes-
tic product and an advanced technological development.
Wealth heterogeneity influences the demand side through differences in valuing
biodiversity. A country’s demand for biodiversity largely influences its degree of
cooperation in global biodiversity conservation. It is a function of the inhabitants’
demand viz. preference for biodiversity conservation, which in turn is dependent
on their need of biodiversity. Individuals value biodiversity services on the basis of
their use–to satisfy, among others, physiological needs (use value). Moreover, they
consider today’s unknown future demand, the potential future value (option value).
The option value as an insurance value addresses inter alia safety needs and as a
quasi-option value information gains for irreversible decisions (Weikard 2003). We
assume a positive option value as the de facto loss of biodiversity is irreversible and
the future costs of such loss are highly uncertain.
Besides the risk preference, wealth influences the valuation. Wealthy countries
will attach, for example, higher recreational values to biodiversity. Pimm (1997,
p. 231) reports that an assumption of Robert Costanza and his colleagues in their
seminal research on ‘the value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital’
is that the cultural values rich countries ascribe to their coasts are 100 times higher
than those of poor countries. Lavoie (2004, p. 639) considers the “principle of subor-
dination of needs” to apply especially to “moral choices or public goods such as the
environment”. There is evidence for lexicographic preferences in biodiversity valua-
tion (Gowdy and Mayumi 2001, p. 228). Only once all fundamental need categories
are fulfilled, a person will perceive and value nature and its biological variability
as a luxury good. Many individuals tend to develop environmental concerns and a
pronounced sense of responsibility for nature, once they are freed from basic living
concerns. Similarly, biological variability increases benefits for variety-loving con-
sumers. Arguably, income viz. wealth is the main determinant of the hierarchy of
needs (Lavoie 2004, p. 646), and thus of the value ascribed to a certain biodiversity
service.
Wealth heterogeneity influences the demand side also through differences in the
countries’ exploitation possibilities of biodiversity. Wealthier countries tend to have
more human resources and to invest more in research and development.
We use parameter ωi to capture the wealth dependent differences in valuing
biodiversity and exploitation possibilities of biodiversity; it increases with rising
wealth and is a multiplier of local and global benefits in the benefit function.
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3.3 The Model
In this section we derive a formal game theoretic model, labelled Biodiversity Game.
It is a three-stage game in which N = {1, 2, ..., n} countries first individually decide
whether to sign a biodiversity treaty or not, secondly the signatories mutually agree
on how much to conserve jointly, and thirdly the non-signatories individually settle
on a conservation choice. The Biodiversity Game thereby determines for each coun-
try i the optimal ecosystem protection (or conservation) share Pe,i of an ecosystem
type e under each coalition K. It then examines which sets of Pe,i’s belong to a
stable coalition.
The section proceeds as follows: In Section 3.3.1 we outline the countries’ options
in making a biodiversity conservation choice. Next, in Section 3.3.2 we describe the
countries’ conservation pay-offs and present the biodiversity conservation outcome.
Finally, we establish the stage game of biodiversity conservation in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Continuous biodiversity conservation choice
Countries decide about the usage of their ecosystems’ status-quo size, each of which
we normalise to 1. They can either choose protection Pe,i or use
4 Ue,i of an ecosystem
of type e: Pe,i + Ue,i = 1, where Pi depicts the vector Pi = (P1,i, P2,i, ..., Pm,i), P
the vector P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn), Ui the vector Ui = (U1,i, U2,i, ..., Um,i), and U the
vector Ui = (U1, ..., Un). The conservation share of an ecosystem Pe,i in terms of
size, e.g. hectares, is the control variable of the Biodiversity Game. Conservation
Pe,i = 1− Ue,i is a continuous choice Pe,i ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity we assume that all
countries are identical in size, which allows us to compare Pe,i’s of different countries.
The exhaustion of country i’s ecosystem e is a reduction of that ecosystem’s
size below a threshold Pe,i,Min, where the ecosystem loses its specific functionality
(cf. Folke et al. 1996). The ecosystem is only resilient5 above this threshold. De-
termining the correct Pe,i,Min requires perfect information on ecosystem behaviour,
interdependencies with other systems, thresholds and feedback loops. Ecological
uncertainty may hence justify an insurance margin. As biodiversity is essential for
human survival, extinction of all ecosystems leads to infinite marginal utility–i.e.
4Agricultural production generates biotic resources which are harvested. For modelling simplic-
ity, we do not differentiate between U and the harvested biotic resources which are produced on
the land U .
5Resilience describes the ability of an ecosystem to retain its structure (organisation and func-
tion) following a disruption (e.g. Holling 1973).
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humankind is willing to pay an arbitrarily high amount to prevent extinction. By
anticipating future extinction for Pe,i < Pe,i,Min in the benefit function, conservation
shares equal to Pe,i,Min must already lead to infinite marginal benefits in the static
benefit function (see Figure 3.1).6
3.3.2 Biodiversity conservation pay-offs and outcome
Biodiversity services have local, regional and global dimensions. Local rainforests,
for example, provide for a significant share of the global oxygen turnover (global
benefit) and contribute to the regional water and temperature circulation, thus pre-
venting droughts (regional benefit).
We define all biodiversity services a nation state can appropriate as local ben-
efits ble,i(Pe,i, qe, ωi). Otherwise we consider the benefit to be global. This cate-
gorisation is justified, because nation states are the level of consideration in the
Biodiversity Game, and because sovereign states exist, which are endorsed with the
power to regulate access. Countries have an incentive to supply appropriable ser-
vices through costly conservation measures, because they alone reap the benefits
from these measures. Local benefits ble,i(Pe,i, qe, ωi) from biodiversity for an ecosys-
tem type e depend on the control variable conserved ecosystem share Pe,i, and the
parameters biodiversity quality qe and wealth ωi. The function B
l
i(Pi) denotes the
total ble,i(Pe,i, qe, ωi) of a country i additively aggregated over all ecosystem types e.
The function bge,i(Pe, qe, ωi) describes the benefits from services a country can-
not appropriate. Non-appropriable services belong to the categories public goods
and common pool resources. Non-exclusion implies that countries benefit from the
services generated by those countries, who have engaged in costly conservation mea-
sures. Hence, there is too little incentive for biodiversity conservation. This leads to
an under-supply of biodiversity services in the absence of international cooperation.
Global benefits bge,i(Pe) arise from biodiversity for each ecosystem type e being the
sum of all countries’ ecosystems of type e. For example, global benefits from the
ecosystem type ‘rainforest’ are the aggregated benefits generated from the rainforest
of each country that hosts the ecosystem rainforest. Global benefits bge,i(Pe, qe, ωi)
depend on the control variable conserved ecosystem share Pe, and the parameters
biodiversity quality qe and wealth ωi. B
g
i (P ) denotes the total b
g
e,i(Pe, qe, ωi) of coun-
try i additively aggregated over all ecosystem types e. Total benefits from biodiver-
sity services comprise both local and global benefits. Here, the benefits represent
6This presupposes that humans weigh the future with a discount factor greater than zero, i.e.
they are not perfectly myopic.
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discounted present values for a certain time horizon.
The agriculturally used land U generates local benefits from logging and harvest-
ing for each ecosystem e in country i. These are opportunity costs of biodiversity
conservation, ze,i(Ue,i, ye). They have the properties ‘easy exclusion’ and ‘high sub-
tractability’, and are thus private goods. Opportunity costs ze,i(Ue,i, ye) depend on
the variable agriculturally used land share Ue,i and the parameter soil quality ye.
Opportunity conservation costs are ecosystem and country specific. Zi(Ui) denotes
the sum of ze,i(Ue,i, ye) over all ecosystem types e of country i. They represent dis-
counted present values for a certain time horizon. Note that the conservation costs
in this model only cover opportunity costs of conservation due to forgone logging
and harvest of primary production factors. The small costs arising from conserva-
tion efforts (wild nature largely cares best for itself) such as potential fencing of a
protected area are negligible.7
The following equation describes the i-th country’s pay-off:
pii(Pi, Pj∈N\{i}) = Bli(Pi) +B
g
i (P ) + Zi(1− Pi) , (3.1)
where 1 is the vector (1,1,...,1) and Ui = 1 − Pi. Countries obtain local benefits
from their own, appropriable services; global benefits from services not appropriable
by any country; and benefits from agriculturally used land within their country.
The aggregate pay-off is the sum of the individual pay-offs of a country i and other
countries j ∈ N \ {i}:
piN (P ) =
∑
i∈N
[pii(Pi, Pj∈N\{i})] . (3.2)
The global biodiversity conservation outcome depends on the countries’ max-
imisation behaviour. Without cooperation, countries realise a Nash-equilibrium by
unilaterally solving the following maximisation problem for a given Pj∈N\{i}:
max
Pi
pii(Pi, Pj∈N\{i}) . (3.3)
7Inamdar et al. (1999) give estimates of opportunity costs of protected areas and management
investment.
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The social optimum is achieved by full cooperation according to
max
P
∑
i∈N
pii(Pi, Pj∈N\{i}) . (3.4)
The social optimum can be reached entailing a Pareto improvement if the model
includes transfers. Often however, a coalition achieves only partial cooperation.
The coalition size, its composition and the strategies of signatories to the coalition
and non-signatories are determined by solving the stage game (Section 3.3.3).
3.3.3 The stage game of biodiversity conservation
The general modelling approach of the Biodiversity Game follows established envi-
ronmental game theoretic models. In the international environmental agreements
literature, problems are generally analysed by a two-stage game (e.g Barrett (2003);
Hoel (1992)). The Biodiversity Game is analogously solved by backward induction,
however played in three stages8. In contrast to the pollution-game it is not an aggre-
gate effort game as ecosystems are imperfect substitutes whereas pollution of differ-
ent countries is considered a perfect substitute. In addition, the Biodiversity Game
contains a threshold Pe,i,Min below which the ecosystem loses its functionality–Pe,i
equal to Pe,i,Min yielding infinite marginal benefits.
The first stage of the game requires N = {1, 2, ..., n} countries, with n ≥ 2, to
take the binary decision of treaty signature under individual rationality. K denotes
the set of treaty members. Thereby K = N is full cooperation, the grand biodi-
versity conservation coalition. In the second stage, all signatory countries mutually
settle on a joint total conservation choice, whereby protection shares can differ be-
tween signatory countries. We model the coalition as a single player. It decides on a
protection level 0 < Pe,i ≤ 1. In stage three, the non-signatories individually choose
their protection level. The countries thus engage in a Stackelberg competition. Se-
quential moves seem plausible as the biodiversity-conserving coalition, by definition,
aims to be a first mover in biodiversity conservation. The coalition is the quantity
leader and the non-signatories are quantity-followers.
Solving the three-stage game by means of backward induction gives a subgame-
8In the pollution game (e.g. Barrett 2003), stages two and three can be amalgamated: the
dominant strategy for non-signatories is always Pollute, i.e. no influence is exerted by the previous
two stages on the behaviour of non-signatories. In the Biodiversity Game however ’no conservation’
will not be a dominant strategy due to the characteristics of the benefit function (non-linear, includes
local benefits). Thereby it seems probable that some conservation will be undertaken by the non-
signatories.
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perfect equilibrium. Both the coalition and the non-signatories maximise their pay-
off. Non-signatories behave individually rationally, signatories by contrast reason
collectively. The coalition being the Stackelberg leader considers the non-signatories’
pay-off maximisation problem to make an optimal conservation choice. Thus, we
solve the profit-maximisation problem of the non-signatories (step three) first. An
interior solution results for a concave benefit and a convex cost function. The interior
solution is determined by:
0 =
∂pii(Pi, Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, PKk )
∂Pe,i
=
∂Bli(Pi)
∂Pe,i
+
∂Bgi (Pi, Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, P
K
k )
∂Pe,i
+
∂Zi(1− Pi)
∂Pe,i
∀i ∈ N \K and ∀e.
(3.5)
Non-signatories take into account the other players’ conservation choice, i.e. of
other non-signatories j ∈ N \ {{i} ∪ K} and coalition members k, but as given
parameters Pj∈N\{{i}∪K} and PKk , the conservation vector for all signatories for
each ecosystem. As the non-signatories react to the coalition’s conservation choice,
their pay-off maximisation problem is reformulated into the reaction function:
Pe,i∈N\K = re,i∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, PKk ) . (3.6)
The reaction function re,i∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, PKk ) determines the conservation
choice of the non-signatories Pe,i∈N\K .
Stage two establishes the optimal strategy of the coalition. Signatories maximise
their aggregate pay-off
∑
i∈K pii subject to the reaction function (Eq. 3.6):
max
∑
i∈K
pii(Pi, Pj∈K\{i}, rj∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, PKk )) , (3.7)
where the set j ∈ K \ {i} refers to other coalition members. The interior solution is
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determined by:
0 =
∑
i∈K
∂pii(Pi, Pj∈K\{i}, rj∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, PKk ))
∂Pe,i
=
∑
i∈K
(
∂Bli(Pi)
∂Pe,i
+
∂Bgi (Pi, Pj∈K\{i}, rj∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, P
K
k ))
∂Pe,i
+
∂Zi(1− Pi)
∂Pe,i
)
∀e, (3.8)
where the reaction function rj∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, PKk ) gives the conservation level
for all ecosystems: rj∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, PKk ) = [r1,j∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, P
K
k ),
r2,j∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, PKk ), ..., rm,j∈N\K(Pj∈N\{{i}∪K}, P
K
k )]. The coalition, as a
Stackelberg leader, likewise takes into account the non-signatories’ conservation
choice Pe,i∈N\K . However, for the coalition the non-signatories’ choice is not a given
parameter, but a consequence of its own conservation choice. Maximising the coali-
tion pay-off subject to the reaction function (Eq. 3.6) expresses this relationship.
The maximisation outcome is the coalition’s optimal conservation choice. Substitut-
ing the coalition’s optimal conservation choice into the reaction function (Eq. 3.6)
gives the non-signatories’ optimal conservation choice. A unique equilibrium conser-
vation vector PKN associated with a total pay-off pi
K
N = pi
K
k + pi
K
k
for all signatories
and non-signatories belongs to every possible coalition, where piKk =
∑
i∈K pii is the
coalitions’ total pay-off and piK
k
=
∑
i/∈K pii the non-signatories’ total pay-off. Both
pay-offs depend on the coalition actually formed. Non-signatories’ pay-off increases
with increasing coalition size due to the partially global character of benefits bge,i(Pe).
The coalition can redistribute its aggregate pay-off piKk to its members so that:∑
i∈K
ϕKi = pi
K
k , (3.9)
where ϕKi denotes a coalition member’s pay-off after redistribution. This distribu-
tion constitutes a per-member-partition function, which assigns pay-offs to coalition
members subject to a sharing-rule. The sharing rule applied within the coalition
depends on the inter-country symmetry and countries’ claims9. Weikard (2009) has
shown that coalition stability requires that signatories receive at least their “outside
9In case of symmetric countries without prior claims, the individual pay-offs are also symmetric:
pii∈K =
pik
k
.
Thus no transfers are needed.
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option”. Note that we assume an efficient protection and pay-off distribution within
the coalition by special treaty mechanisms (and do not explicitly define any sharing
rule).
At stage one we analyse the stability of the obtained coalition. The conservation
vector PKN is a stable equilibrium if it satisfies both internal and external stability.
In the stability analysis we consider the pay-offs of individual coalition members
and of non-signatories, which are provided by the per-member-partition-function:
in the stable equilibrium no signatory is better off by leaving the coalition (internal
stability), and no non-signatory by acceding to the coalition (external stability).
This requires the pay-offs of signatories (Eq. 4.3) and non-signatories (Eq. 4.4) to
satisfy:
ϕKi ≥ piK\{i}i ∀i ∈ K (3.10)
piKi ≥ ϕK∪ii ∀i ∈ N \K . (3.11)
3.4 Numerical appraisal
In this section we apply the formal model to a concrete parametrization in order to
obtain a numerical evaluation of the Biodiversity Game. Countries in the Biodiver-
sity Game differ in the two dimensions ‘wealth’, with ωi ∈ [0, 10], and ‘biodiversity
richness’, with quality qi ∈ [0, 1] and productivity yi ∈ [0, 10], other aspects being
identical. They thereby belong to one of four distinct country types:
(i) countries with biodiversity hotspots, which are poor (shorthand HP),
(ii) countries with biodiversity hotspots, which are rich (shorthand HR),
(iii) countries without biodiversity hotspots, which are rich (shorthand LR),
(iv) countries without biodiversity hotspots, which are poor (shorthand LP).
The different groups of countries are typified by one representative country, thus
N = 4. To illustrate, the HP country reflects countries such as Bolivia (‘Tropi-
cal Andes Hotspot’ ) or Liberia (‘Guinean Forest of West Africa Hotspot’ ), the HR
country countries such as Australia (‘Queensland Wet Tropics Hotspot’ and ‘South-
west Australia Hotspot’ ) or New Zealand (‘New Zealand Hotspot’ ), the LR country
countries such as Norway or Germany, and the LP country countries such as Mali
or Mongolia. Each representative country consists of exactly one ecosystem and no
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country is identical in type. In Section 3.4.1 we describe the model specification and
implementation. Next, in Section 3.4.2 we present the model results together with
a sensitivity analysis. Finally, we discuss the results in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Model application
Solving the Biodiversity Game is a non-linear optimisation problem. We solve it
by backward induction as described in Section 3.3.3. It demands a solution to the
economic question of how much land should be optimally conserved by each of four
different profit maximising countries while allowing for cooperation. We solve the
maximisation problem of the Stackelberg leader (Eq. 3.7) with GAMS, the General
Algebraic Modelling System (Brooke et al. 2010), subject to the analytically derived
first order conditions.
In game stages three and two we calculate an optimal conservation result for
every coalition and the corresponding pay-offs for every country. The calculation
demands a specification of the benefit and cost functions together with their first
derivatives. A root function describes local benefits from biodiversity conservation
bli(Pi):
bli(Pi) = ωiqi
1
v
(Pi − Pi,Min)θ , (3.12)
where 0 < θ < 1 and v is a scale parameter; it allows to downscale the local benefits
without changing the global benefits (cancelled via multiplication with v in global
benefit function), in order to elucidate the cooperation incentives more clearly. We
choose the root exponent θ to equal 1/3 in order to influence the curvature such that
the Nash-players’ solution space lies in the interval [0:1]. A crucial assumption is that
countries do not want an ecosystem to become extinct. As the size of the ecosystem
Pi approaches a certain minimum level Pi,Min, marginal benefits ∂b
l
i(Pi)/∂Pi will
approach infinity.
A country-specific ‘Constant Elasticity of Substitution’ (CES) benefit function
aggregates the non-appropriable benefits generated by the ecosystems of all countries
to global biodiversity conservation benefits of the respective country. The CES func-
tion allows one to consider varying degrees of substitutability between ecosystems
(see Section 3.2.1). It takes the general form of
bgi (Pi, Pj∈N\{i}) = ωi[αA(vb
l
A)
ρ + αB(vb
l
B)
ρ + αC(vb
l
C)
ρ + αD(vb
l
D)
ρ]1/ρ, (3.13)
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where ωi influences the magnitude of a country’s global benefits, α is a share parame-
ter, ρ the substitution parameter, and HP = A,HR = B,LR = C, and LP = D for
better readability. We stipulate equal benefit shares originating from each country,
αA = αB = αC = αD = 0.25, which sum up to one. The parameter ρ indicates how
easily one ecosystem can compensate for the services generated by another ecosys-
tem, i.e. it integrates the elasticity of substitution σ: ρ = (σ − 1)/σ. In the later
analysis we consider perfect substitutability (ρ = 1.0), imperfect substitutability
(ρ = 0.2), and imperfect complementarity (ρ = −1.0). For simplicity, we assume
the quality of an ecosystem to be decisive for both local and global benefits, i.e. that
there is a correlation between the two types of benefits.
Land use benefits rise for simplicity proportionally with an increase in land used
for agricultural production in the model application; a linear function represents the
local opportunity cost from local land use benefits zi(1− Pi):
zi(1− Pi) = yϑi (1− Pi) . (3.14)
We attenuate the pronounced effect of yi on the level of marginal costs by setting ϑ =
1/2 to account for decreasing marginal returns to land use in our model application.
In game stage one we examine coalition stability10. First, we analyse stabil-
ity of a coalition without pay-off relocation: we compare the pay-offs of individual
coalition members, which are provided by the per-member-partition-function, with
their outside-option (internal stability); and contrast the pay-offs of non-signatories
with the pay-offs they would receive if they acceded to the coalition (external sta-
bility). For example, the coalition ABD is stable without transfers, if the following
conditions hold:
piABDA ≥ piBDA , piABDB ≥ piADB , piABDC ≥ piABCDC , and piABDD ≥ piABD . (3.15)
Allowing for transfers generally increases the chance for a coalition to be stable.
Intra-coalition pay-off reallocation eases the stability requirements. Any coalition
stable without transfers is also internally stable when there is a transfer scheme in
place. For a coalition otherwise not internally stable, we inquire whether every non-
profiting coalition member can be compensated by the coalition members, which
profit from the given coalition. This is possible if the compensating coalition mem-
bers are not worse off than under the coalition without the non-profiting members.
10A detailed exposition of the stability analysis is available in Supplementary Material S.3.1.
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Thereby, they compensate the non-profiting members at most by the difference be-
tween their pay-off under the given coalition and the pay-off under the coalition
without the non-profiting coalition members. If the sum of the transfers from all
profiting coalition members exceeds the loss endured by the non-profiting coalition
members, the coalition is internally stable. In other words, the coalition pay-off
must exceed the sum of the outside option pay-offs (optimal sharing, cf. Weikard
(2009, p. 577)). To give an example, assume that the described coalition ABD is
not internally stable without transfers, because country A has an incentive to leave
the coalition. The coalition ABD is internally stable with transfers if the subsequent
condition holds:
(piABDB − piBDB ) + (piABDD − piBDD ) ≥ (piBDA − piABDA )
⇐⇒ piABDA + piABDB + piABDD ≥ piBDA + piBDB + piBDD . (3.16)
The coalition pay-off with country A being a coalition member must be greater
than the pay-off these countries realise in case country A is a non-signatory. It is
possible to examine external stability indirectly by proving that the coalition is not
internally stable with any additional member joining from the set of non-members
(for a formal proof refer to Weikard (2009, p. 581)).
3.4.2 Model results
In this subsection we present the results of our numerical model application. We
first describe the results11 of a “Real World Scenario” that will serve as the base
scenario in the sensitivity analysis (see Section 3.4.3). Subsequently, we reproduce
the assumptions of Barrett’s (1994) Biodiversity Supergame as close as possible in
a “Barrett Scenario”. Table 3.1 shows the stable coalitions of the two scenarios.
Table 3.1: Stable coalitions of the “Real World Scenario” and the “Barrett Scenario”
ρ = 1.0 ρ = 0.2 ρ = −1.0
Scenario without with without with without with
transfers transfers transfers transfers transfers transfers
Real World Scenario HR+LR
Grand
HR+LR
Grand
HR+LR
Grand
coalition coalition coalition
Barrett Scenario LR+LR
Grand
LR+LR
Grand Grand Grand
coalition coalition coalition coalition
11Detailed model results are available in Supplementary Material S.3.2.
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3.4.2.1 “Real World Scenario” results.
The real world (base scenario) is characterised by strong heterogeneity between
countries in terms of ecosystems and wealth. Table 3.2 presents the parameter
values of this scenario for the four countries HP, HR, LR, and LP; Pi,Min = 0.01
represents a threshold below which the ecosystem becomes extinct.
Table 3.2: Parameter values of the base scenario “Real World Scenario”
Parameter qi yi ωi v Pi,Min
qA, qB qC , qD yA, yB yC , yD ωA, ωD ωB , ωC
Value 1.0 0.1 6 3 2.0 8.0 10 0.01
Fig. 3.1 illustrates the extent of the countries’ heterogeneity with the local
benefit functions.
Figure 3.1: Local benefits from biodiversity conservation bli(Pi)
Applying the stability conditions of Section 3.3.3 we find: A coalition of country
HR and country LR is stable without transfers in the “Real world scenario”. Coali-
tion stability can be explained by Heckscher-Ohlin comparative advantages relating
to endowments: The coalition HR+LR is stable due to the presence of both a com-
parative advantage on the supply side (biodiversity quality) and a relative stronger
one on the demand side (biodiversity benefits):
HP HR LR LP
comp. advantage supply side: x – x – – – – –
comp. advantage demand side: – – – x – x – –
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Country HR benefits from both comparative advantages, country HP from a com-
parative advantage on the supply side, and country LR from one on the demand
side. The stable coalition of the “Real world scenario” comprises the two countries
with the strongest comparative advantages. With transfers full cooperation is stable.
The coalition formation is independent of the degree of substitutability.
The total pay-off declines for a reduction in substitutability under the Nash-
equilibrium and the grand coalition. The higher the substitutability the better
countries can exploit the comparative advantages on the demand (biodiversity ben-
efits) and supply side (biodiversity quality). Figure 3.2 shows that for achieving the
Figure 3.2: Benefit isoquants with respect to conservation level
same global benefit level, countries have to conserve more the less substitutable the
ecosystems (except for Px = Py).
The total Nash conservation share declines for a decrease in substitutability,
because for a ρ < 1.0, received global benefits due to own conservation are under-
proportional to private local benefits of this conservation. The total grand coalition
conservation share, though, is highest under imperfect substitutability, lower under
perfect substitutability and lowest under imperfect complementarity. Two different
effects, which both reduce conservation in low quality countries, cause this result:
a comparative advantage effect and a complementarity effect. First, the better the
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substitutability, the higher the comparative advantage with respect to biodiversity
quality, and the less conservation is conducted in low quality countries. As one
unit of conservation yields higher benefits in high quality countries, and as global
benefits are the sum of local benefits, conservation efforts will be shifted to hotspot
countries. The land in low quality countries is used predominantly agriculturally
(comparative advantage effect). Secondly, the worse the substitutability, the more
conservation needs to be done in low-quality countries where conservation is less
efficient (complementarity effect). This reduces the comparative advantage and im-
pacts on the conservation-harvest trade-off. Harvest becomes more attractive for
all countries. Conservation is especially traded off against harvest benefits in low
q-countries. For medium degrees of ecosystem substitutability (imperfect substi-
tutability), both dynamics are relatively weak so that full conservation is realised.
3.4.2.2 “Barrett Scenario” results.
In the Barrett Scenario we assume parameter values for qi, yi, ωi, v, Pi,Min, and
ρ which approach the scenario as far as possible to Barrett’s (1994) Biodiversity
Supergame. Table 3.3 presents these parameter values.
Table 3.3: Parameter values of the “Barrett Scenario”
Parameter qi yi ωi v Pi,Min ρ
qA, qB qC , qD yA, yB yC , yD ωA, ωB ωC , ωD
Value 1.0 0.001 0.6 0.267 2.0 8.0 120 0 1.0
Barrett models no cross-heterogeneity of ecosystems and wealth: in the Biodiver-
sity Supergame, biodiversity hotspots are correlated with poverty and poor-quality
ecosystems with wealth. Thus, not four but only two country types exist: HP
and LR. Developed countries LR do not engage in conservation themselves, but pay
developing countries HP for their conservation measures. In order to reduce the con-
servation activities of developed countries as far as possible, the biodiversity quality
takes the value qLR = 0.001 and the soil quality yLR = 0.267. Barrett considers
only global conservation benefits explicitly. Therefore, we scale down local benefits
to v = 120 in the “Barrett Scenario”. As ecosystems are identical and conservation
efforts completely substitutable in developing countries, only ρ = 1.0 results are of
interest in this scenario. Barrett considers no resilience threshold of ecosystems;
therefore Pi,Min = 0.
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The model results are as follows: The small coalition of the two countries LR is
stable without transfers, and the grand coalition with transfers. The total pay-off
under coalition LR+LR amounts to 40.1% of the pay-off under the grand coalition
(
∑
i∈N pi
CD
i /
∑
i∈N pi
ABCD
i ). This is a relatively low share compared to other anal-
ysed scenarios. Transfers are thus crucial in the “Barrett Scenario”. In the Nash
equilibrium countries conserve close to nothing (
∑
i∈N P
Nash
i = 0.0004), whereas
in the social optimum half of the land is protected. The resulting welfare enhanc-
ing potential of the grand coalition with respect to the Nash equilibrium is 249.7%
(
∑
i∈N pi
ABCD
i /
∑
i∈N pi
Nash
i ). Clearly, these results do not match those reached
by Barrett in the Biodiversity Supergame. Barrett (1994, p. 120) concludes that
“Where the agreement can sustain the full cooperative outcome, global net benefits
will be only slightly larger than in the non-cooperative outcome.” The local benefit
root function of our model application largely contributes to the positive results:
it ensures that countries engage in some degree of conservation. We discuss the
stability of the grand coalition in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.3 Parameter analysis and discussion
Parameter variations impact coalition formation, as well as total pay-off and total
conservation share. In Appendix 3.A we provide the parameter values of different
model runs. Table 3.4 gives an overview of the results in the form of general trends in
parameter impact. Based on these trends, in this subsection we assess the existence
of comparative advantages on both (a) the supply side with respect to biodiversity
quality (parameter qi and yi) and on (b) the demand side with respect to biodiversity
benefits (parameter ωi), (c) the influence of the ecosystem substitution elasticity ρ,
(d) the influence of the ecosystem resilience threshold Pi,Min, (e) the influence of the
magnitude of local benefits (parameter v), and (f) the robustness of the stability of
the grand coalition with transfers.
(a) The comparative advantage on the supply side. Analysis of the co-
evolving quality parameters qi and yi (parallel variation) under constant ωi. In a
world without transfers and with perfect ecosystem substitutability, partial coopera-
tion between the countries HP and HR is stable for medium and large heterogeneity
in biodiversity quality (the grand coalition is stable for small degrees of hetero-
geneity). The HP-HR-coalition is–with ωi being set equal–essentially a coalition
of two hotspot countries H. The quality of their biodiversity is higher and higher
quality translates into higher conservation benefits. As countries only undertake
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Table 3.4: General trends in parameter impact. The number of arrows indicates the rel-
ative strength of the trend. For * no ranking is possible, because at least one of the total
conservation shares has reached a corner solution.
Parameter ρ
] Coalition
members
without
transfers
total Nash
pay-off
total social
optimum
pay-off
total Nash
conserva-
tion share
total social
optimum
conserva-
tion share
hetero-
geneity
in qi ↑
ρ 1.0 ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓
ρ 0.2 constant ↓ ↓ ↓ constant
ρ -1.0 constant ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓
hetero-
geneity
in ωi ↑
ρ 1.0 ↓↓↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓
ρ 0.2 ↓↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ constant
ρ -1.0 ↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓
v ↑
ρ 1.0 ↓↓↓ ↑↑↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ *
ρ 0.2 ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑↑↑ ↑↑↑ ↑ *
ρ -1.0 ↓ ↑ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑ *
Pi,Min ↑
ρ 1.0 constant ↓ ↓↓↓ ↑ ↑ *
ρ 0.2 constant ↓ ↓↓ ↑ ↑ *
ρ -1.0 constant ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ *
conservation measures when conservation of land is more profitable than its use,
the formation of a hotspot country coalition confirms the existence of a Heckscher-
Ohlin comparative advantage with respect to biodiversity quality. This comparative
advantage rises with increasing quality heterogeneity: the total pay-off under the
coalition between HP and HR approaches the total pay-off under the social opti-
mum for increasing heterogeneity. The importance of this comparative advantage
becomes evident in a world with transfers: Low quality countries join the coali-
tion, because they are now also able to exploit the comparative advantage on the
supply side by paying hotspot countries for conservation measures. With transfers,
full cooperation is always stable. The comparative advantage with respect to bio-
diversity quality is highest under perfect ecosystem substitutability and decreases
with reduced ecosystem substitutability: With reducing ecosystem substitutability
replacing conservation of one ecosystem by conservation of another ecosystem be-
comes increasingly limited, i.e. the minimum conservation share of each ecosystem is
more and more imperative. When the value of ρ in the CES function decreases, the
lowest local benefits increasingly dominate the global benefits. Restrictions in the
substitution possibility demand a minimum conservation share of each ecosystem, if
benefits are not to decrease substantially. Higher quality does not translate linearly,
but rather under-proportionally, into higher global conservation benefits.
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(b) The comparative advantage on the demand side. Ceteris paribus
analysis of the wealth parameter ωi. In a world without transfers and with perfect
substitutability, the initial full cooperation under equally-rich countries breaks down
with increasing wealth inequality and is replaced by partial cooperation between
the countries HR and LR. This coalition is–as biodiversity richness is identical–
essentially a coalition of wealthy countries R, which benefit more from one unit of
conservation than poor countries. The direction of the impacts and dynamics of the
comparative advantage on the demand side is identical with the previously analysed
comparative advantage on the supply side. However, the magnitude of the decrease
of the comparative advantage on the demand side with declining ecosystem substi-
tutability is less pronounced than on the supply side, because the parameter ωi is
additionally a factor of a countries’ global benefit function. This multiplication of
global benefits by ωi also results in a stronger impact of heterogeneity in wealth on
coalition formation. In contrast to the results from the analysis of heterogeneity on
the supply side, already a slight increase in wealth heterogeneity leads to the coali-
tion of HR and LR countries being the only stable one in a world without transfers
and perfect substitutability; under imperfect substitutability and imperfect comple-
mentarity, the grand coalition is longer stable without transfers. With transfers the
grand coalition is always stable.
(c) The influence of the ecosystem substitution elasticity. Analysis of
the parameter ρ. The more the ecosystem substitutability decreases (perfect to im-
perfect substitutability to imperfect complementarity), the higher is the chance for
a stable grand coalition both with and without transfers. For imperfect complemen-
tarity, the conservation effort of every country is crucial and the free-riding potential
reduced. The game transforms more and more from an aggregate efforts game into
a weakest link game (cf. Barrett 2007, p. 3 ff.). We discussed the impact of the
ecosystem substitution elasticity on the comparative advantages on the supply and
demand side already under (a, b).
(d) The influence of the ecosystem resilience threshold. The impact
of the parameter Pi,Min on coalition stability is marginal for the considered varia-
tions (Pi,Min values 0.005, 0.01 and 0.05). Still, an increase in Pi,Min affects the total
pay-off (decreases) and the total conservation share (increases). A larger compulsory
minimum stock size leads to a larger total grand coalition conservation share–even
in case Pi,Min is not binding. For Pi,Min = 0.01 and even for Pi,Min = 0.005 the
grand coalition already conserves a share greater than 0.05 of every ecosystem (i.e.
every country in this case) for all three values of ρ. The reason for the fact that an
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increasing Pi,Min leads even to a further increase in the conservation share of biodi-
verse land (and lowers the total pay-off), is that the local benefit root function shifts
to the right as can be seen in Figure 3.3. The conservation potential of the social op-
Figure 3.3: Local conservation and harvesting benefits bli(Pi) + zi(P ) for different Pi,Min
values
timum decreases with increasing compulsory Pi,Min, because the Nash-equilibrium
conservation share more than doubles from Pi,Min = 0.01 to Pi,Min = 0.05, whereas
the grand coalition conservation share does not increase much. Nash conserves close
to Pi,Min. Therefore the realised conservation share under Nash-equilibrium is very
sensitive to an increase in Pi,Min. The grand coalition on the contrary conserves in
a range where marginal benefits are low (and hence not sensitive).
(e) The influence of local benefits. The sensitivity analysis of v confirms
the intuition that the higher the local benefits, the higher the individual interest to
engage in conservation (unilateral action). If local benefits are low, the coalition of
country HR and country LR is stable without transfers. In case of high local benefits,
the coalition of HR is stable without transfers. Unilateral action is plausible for a
wealthy country with high biodiversity richness; it engages in conservation as a
first mover. With transfers the grand coalition is always stable. The total pay-off
and the total conservation share decrease in v (increase in bli(Pi)) for all coalitions
under all substitution elasticities. The importance of local benefits for biodiversity
conservation coalitions is most evident from the magnitude of the conservation and
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welfare enhancing potential of the social optimum. Both are extremely high for low
local benefits, because for small local benefits countries have no incentive to engage
in conservation unilaterally. The free riding problem is stronger. It follows rather
obviously that the total pay-off under the largest stable coalition without transfers
is much smaller than the total pay-off under the grand coalition if the local benefits
are small.
(f) The implications of relaxing the assumptions of the numerical
model appraisal. The most striking result of the model computation is that the
grand coalition is always stable with transfers. This outcome has to be qualified:
full cooperation is sensitive towards the number of players. The restriction of N =
4 is a limitation of the model application. Enlarging the number of players by
one additional player might possibly already destabilise the grand coalition. When
the fifth player accedes, the cooperation gain of the remaining four players rises.
However, their outside option and thereby their free-riding incentive also grow, as
the free-rider benefits from positive global benefit spillovers are generated by the
coalitions’ conservation effort. The relative development of the cooperation gain with
respect to the outside options is important for the stability of the grand coalition.
This relative development depends on the number and type of players that join the
game. If the cooperation gain grows faster than the outside options, full cooperation
is stable. If not, partial cooperation will be stable. In reality, a prisoners’ dilemma
will be present within each country type and thereby on both the donor and the
provider side. This prisoners’ dilemma, however, is absent in case of N = 4, because
only one country belongs to one country type.
A further limitation in the model application is the restriction of one ecosystem
per country. The implication of countries hosting numerous ecosystems for coali-
tion stability depends on the ecosystem substitutability. Imperfect substitutable
ecosystems–the most realistic case–have a stabilising effect on coalition formation.
The third major confinement derives from the very structure of the model:
the Stackelberg assumption. The first mover advantage increases–as the welfare
increasing potential of the grand coalition with respect to the Nash-equilibrium
demonstrates–with the degree of substitutability. The first mover advantage might
barely stabilise a coalition, which in a Nash-game, would not be stable anymore—
especially in a world with well substitutable ecosystems.
Despite the qualification of the full cooperation observation, a major conclusion
can be drawn: transfers are crucial for effective biodiversity conservation IEAs.
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The effect of transfers will be equally visible in a game with N > 4 or a Nash-
game setting. Transfers will in any case be able to sustain an improved partial
cooperation. With N > 4 transfers tend to be the more effective, the higher the
cross-heterogeneity in ecosystems and wealth. For sufficient degrees of heterogeneity
countries can realise gains from trade with transfers.
3.5 Conclusions
With this chapter we enhance the understanding of how heterogeneity in ecosystems
and wealth impact the stability of international biodiversity conservation agree-
ments. The model refinements provide new insights into coalition formation: This
chapter evinces with the numerical application that heterogeneity in the form of
different, imperfectly substitutable ecosystems and wealth asymmetry is decisive for
the stability of biodiversity conservation agreements. Heterogeneity in ecosystems
generates a Heckscher-Ohlin comparative advantage with respect to biodiversity
quality on the supply side, and heterogeneity in wealth one with respect to biodi-
versity benefits on the demand side.
The main result from the numerical model application for four players is that
the grand coalition is always stable with transfers. The effect of transfers will be
equally visible in a game with N > 4 or a Nash-game setting. Transfers might not
be able to sustain full cooperation, but an improved partial cooperation. Even in
the “Barrett Scenario” the importance of transfers is evident. The reason for the
merit of transfers is a joint provision effect of local and global biodiversity benefits,
which lowers the costs of winning over additional coalition members. Global benefits
are spillovers of local biodiversity conservation. A coalition does not need to offer a
transfer amounting to the equivalent of the forgone opportunity cost of conservation,
because the free rider will receive own local benefits from conservation. A free rider
profits from higher own local benefits, from increased global benefits, and from
the transfers, when acceding to a coalition. Transfers are not only crucial for the
stability and effectiveness of an IEA, but also offer the opportunity to achieve a
Pareto improvement if they are well designed. Unfortunately, in reality transfers are
often not well designed because they are difficult to deal with. The outside-option
rule is a first best allocation, but suffers from practical problems. Transfers are hard
to agree on even if the outside-option-rule for transfer allocation is applied, because
of imperfect information on the outside options of other countries. Therefore, we
also investigate coalition formation without transfers.
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Heterogeneity in ecosystems and wealth destabilises the grand coalition without
transfers. The pay-off difference between the stable coalition and the social optimum
is largest at the point, where heterogeneity is so high that the grand coalition breaks,
and only a partial coalition can be maintained. With further rising heterogeneity
this difference diminishes again. The destabilising effect of ecosystem and wealth
heterogeneity is stronger the better the ecosystem substitutability. High local ben-
efits have a decreasing effect on the size of the stable coalition without transfers, as
they increase the incentive for unilateral action.
The continuous action space of the Biodiversity Game is an important reason
for our promising conservation results, because it allows countries to observe the
ecosystem resilience threshold and conserve some (however little) of their biodiver-
sity. These conclusions are striking because they are the first to show the importance
of asymmetric countries and different, imperfectly substitutable ecosystems with a
resilience threshold in a biodiversity conservation game.
The model application presented in this chapter, however, still suffers from some
limitations: the restriction of the number of players to four, the stipulation of one
ecosystem per country, and the assumption of a linear relationship between local
and global benefits. Nonetheless, this chapter portrays a biodiversity conservation
game with higher empirical relevance than previous models.
Our findings highlight that poverty reduction can contribute to effective global
biodiversity conservation. This results from the fact that wealthier countries assign
higher values to biodiversity services, and that coalition formation is eased in a world
with low wealth heterogeneity between countries. Reduced heterogeneity in wealth
and biodiversity quality stabilises the grand coalition. As redistribution of ecosystem
quality is impossible, redistribution of wealth can be one measure to increase the
size of a stable coalition. If the latter is not possible and heterogeneity remains
high, transfers become imperative. This result resonates with Gatti et al.’s (2011,
p. 625) finding in a cooperative bargaining setting, that transfers “based upon
the essential characteristics between the parties” and thereby addressing fairness
concerns are crucial for long-term stability. Transfers that are perceived as legitimate
are important for the long-term effectiveness of a multilateral fund (Rosendal and
Andresen 2011).
The CBD is a milestone in the endeavour to conserve biodiversity on a global
scale–despite its small conservation impact. It has to be honoured as the first inter-
national environmental agreement (IEA), which addresses biological resources in the
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aggregate, achieves (nearly) full cooperation, and codifies the sovereignty of nation
states over their biological resources. Instead of an ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’
(ABS) mechanism, we employ some form of fund in our Biodiversity Game, which
functions as financial mechanism and redistributes coalition benefits according to a
specific sharing rule. ABS increases the locally appropriable benefits from biodiver-
sity conservation, but Kamau et al. (2010, p. 248) attest that the ABS-mechanism
performs poorly in regard to implementation and functioning. The way it works to-
day, only part of the potentially appropriable benefits of biodiversity are captured.
Moreover, biodiversity is a mixed good that comprises service goods on the entire
continuum of private to public goods. All biodiversity benefits that are not appro-
priable by a nation state need other, more comprising means of funding. With the
‘Global Environment Facility’ (GEF) a fledgling institution of a multilateral fund for
biodiversity conservation already exists. Our model provides a good tool to further
investigate the possible role of a multilateral trust that allocates transfers such that
the social optimum is stable.
Moreover further research is needed to consider more complex game structures
with sub-coalitions and different coalition designs. In 1996 the megadiverse coun-
tries of the Andean Community passed community law on ABS (Decisio´n 391 on
a ‘Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources’ 12) and in 2002 the ‘Group
of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries’ formed in Mexico to facilitate intensified
communication. Understanding the incentives for and design of these coalitions
of megadiverse countries is necessary to improve the conservation outcome of the
current ABS mechanism or find institutional solutions beyond bilateral ABS trade.
Appendix
3.A Parameter values of the analysis runs
3.A.1 Ecosystem quality parameters qi and yi:
The co-evolving quality parameters qi and yi are varied simultaneously.
∑
i∈N qi
and
∑
i∈N yi are constant and equal to the respective sums of the base scenario. All
12Comision del Acuerdo Cartagena (1996): Decisio´n 391: Re´gimen Comu´n sobre Acceso a los Re-
cursos Gene´ticos, Gaceta Oficial del Acuerdo de Cartagena, An˜o XII, Numero 213, Lima, 17.06.1996.
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other parameters remain unchanged and the wealth parameter ωi takes the value 5.
Each parameter variation is conducted for all three values of ρ.
Table A.1: Parameter values for qi and yi in the different analysis runs
Analysis run qA,qB qC,qD yA,yB yC,yD
Quality 1 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.45
Quality 2 0.625 0.475 0.475 0.425
Quality 3 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4
Quality 4 0.775 0.325 0.525 0.375
Quality 5 0.85 0.25 0.55 0.35
Quality 6 0.925 0.175 0.575 0.325
Quality 7 1.0 0.1 0.6 0.3
3.A.2 Wealth parameter ωi:
Parameter ωi varies, whereby
∑
i∈N ωi is constant and equal to the sum of the
base scenario. All other parameters remain unchanged and the biodiversity quality
(qi = 0.55 and yi = 0.45) is equal for all countries. Every analysis run is conducted
for all three values of ρ.
Table A.2: Parameter values for ωi in the different analysis runs
Analysis run ωA, ωD ωB, ωC
Wealth 1 5 5
Wealth 2 4 6
Wealth 3 3.5 6.5
Wealth 4 3 7
Wealth 5 2 8
Wealth 6 1 9
3.A.3 Local benefit parameter v:
Parameter v takes three different values in case of high local benefits depending on
the degree of ecosystem substitutability, because the point where the first country
reaches a Nash-conservation-share of 100% varies significantly.
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Table A.3: Parameter values for v in the different analysis runs
Analysis run bli(Pi) v
ρ = 1.0 ρ = 0.2 ρ = −1.0
Local benefits 1 High 3.29 1.51 1.10
Local benefits 2 Base 10
Local benefits 3 Low 120
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Chapter 4
Are Benefit-Sharing Rules Based on the Game-
Theoretic Paradigm Applicable to International
Environmental Agreements? The Case of the
Biodiversity Game.
Abstract: The objective of this chapter is to derive and assess benefit-sharing
rules for the case of biodiversity conservation cooperation and thereby con-
tribute to a discussion on the applicability of standard game-theoretic benefit-
sharing rules for international environmental agreements. To this end I transfer
established optimal sharing rules for general coalition formation games to a
biodiversity game. I argue, though, that ecological uncertainty and economic
valuation problems render their application currently untenable. To assess
this tentative hypothesis and further explore the topic I conduct empirical-
qualitative research. Expert interviews confirm the need for an alternative ap-
proach. Based on the empirical results and a discussion of technical feasibility
and political economy aspects I derive an alternative benefit-sharing rule. It
distributes expected assessable benefits according to environmental conserva-
tion and egalitarian criteria of allocation-based equity. I show how this rule can
be incorporated in the standard game-theoretic framework once countries have
gained sufficient information to form expectations about biodiversity benefits.
4.1 Introduction
Biodiversity is essential for human existence. Yet, protecting it on a global scale and
thereby securing the basis for the continued provision of local to global ecosystem
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services is challenging. International biodiversity conservation relies on cooperation
that needs to be in the self-interest of every member country to be stable. Game
theory can provide important findings for the design of biodiversity conventions as
well as other international environmental agreements (IEAs). It postulates rational
utility maximising players. In this chapter I study the case of the biodiversity
conservation game to discuss whether benefit-sharing1 rules following the game-
theoretic paradigm are (currently) applicable to IEAs.
Sharing benefits from biodiversity between members of a biodiversity conserva-
tion coalition is of growing relevance for global policy making. The international
community cooperates under the United Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diver-
sity’ (CBD)2 to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and share the benefits
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The major financial mechanism to
facilitate achieving these goals is the ‘Global Environment Facility’ (GEF), a trust
fund to which countries make voluntary contributions. Another global multilateral
mechanism that relates to genetic resources is being discussed under the ‘Nagoya
Protocol’ 3 to the CBD. The ‘Global Crop Diversity Trust’, the financing body of the
‘International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ (ITP-
GRFA), also distributes benefits between its members.
A multilateral biodiversity fund–or as well a biodiversity cartel–can be modelled
as a biodiversity conservation game where countries’ pay-offs are dependent on the
other countries’ conservation decisions. A country’s conservation generates local,
regional and global benefits and is thereby also beneficial to other countries; the
biodiversity conservation game is a game with positive externalities. It can be anal-
ysed with a non-cooperative game theoretic model (e.g. Barrett (1994), Winands
et al. (2013) id. Chapter 3). The game’s positive externalities–positive spillovers
1Global biodiversity conservation cooperation is phrased in terms of benefit-sharing following
the debates on ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (ABS) of genetic resources under the United Nations
‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ (CBD). It could also be conceptualised as a cost-sharing game.
Considering two stylised countries, one poor country with low levels of biodiversity A and one rich
country with high levels of biodiversity B: A shares the benefits of biodiversity conservation in B,
which A perceives in terms of e.g. direct (recreational), option, bequest, altruist, and intrinsic
values (TEEB 2010, p. 194 ff.), through supporting conservation efforts viz. costs in B.
2United Nations (1992): Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 Int’l Leg. Mat. 818, Rio de
Janeiro, 05.06.1992.
3United Nations (2010): Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Eq-
uitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Nagoya, 29.10.2010. The Nagoya Protocol requests the treaty parties in Art. 10 to consider the
need for a ‘Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’ (GMBSM) for transboundary genetic
resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources or for such genetic resources
and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources for which no prior informed consent is
possible.
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from cooperation to protect biodiversity–generate free-riding incentives which im-
ply that full cooperation may not always be realised. The intra-coalition pay-off
distribution, first introduced by Thrall and Lucas (1963), is tailored to such game
as it assigns pay-offs to all coalitions and non-member states. A per-member parti-
tion function allocates pay-offs to all signatories and non-signatories. The coalition
stability depends much on the intra-coalition pay-off partition.
My objective in this chapter is to derive and assess benefit-sharing rules for the
biodiversity conservation game that are relevant for international decision-making
and governance. I consider the case of biodiversity cooperation as pars pro toto
for IEAs; in contrast to climate change, biodiversity conservation negotiations are
not confined to the ministerial level and stakeholders are approachable–i.a. for the
expert interviews that are part of this research. For general coalition formation
games, established sharing rules are the benefit surplus sharing rule (e.g. Carraro
et al. 2006) and the ‘optimal sharing’ rule based on the outside option (Weikard
2009). Eyckmans et al. (2012) use the latter concept also for the valuation func-
tion of their ‘Proportional Surplus Sharing Scheme’. I transfer these per-member
partition functions to the biodiversity conservation game. My presumption, though,
is that the information requirements for game-theoretic per-member partition func-
tions are too demanding in case of biodiversity cooperation. I consider even the
application of rules based on expected benefits currently untenable due to lacking
ecological information and economic valuation problems. To assess my presumptions
and appraise the game-theoretic rules, I conduct semi-structured expert interviews
with decision makers from countries, which host large parts of global biodiversity
and are thereby crucial members of a biodiversity benefit-sharing cooperation. The
empirical-qualitative research confirms the need for an alternative approach. Based
on the interview results and technical feasibility and political economy considerations
I derive an alternative rule. It distributes expected assessable benefits according to
environmental conservation and egalitarian criteria of allocation-based equity. I
outline how this rule can be integrated in the standard game-theoretic model once
countries have sufficient information to assess (or form expectations on) their own
and others’ status-quo pay-offs and the coalition pay-off, their own and others’ pay-
off under every possible coalition structure. Sharing rules are usually the product of
purely theoretical work; I differ in basing them on empirical-qualitative research.
The chapter proceeds as follows: I introduce the biodiversity conservation game
and basic definitions in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 I transfer established per-member
partition functions to the biodiversity conservation game and discuss their applica-
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bility. Next, I provide insights from qualitative expert interviews in Section 4.4. In
Section 4.5 I discuss technical and political-economy requirements for an alterna-
tive benefit-sharing rule and show how it can be incorporated in the game-theoretic
model. With Section 4.6 I conclude.
4.2 The game-theoretic model
The conceptual framework of the further analysis of benefit-sharing rules for biodi-
versity conservation games is a game theoretic model with heterogeneous countries
developed by Winands et al. (2013) (id. Chapter 3).4 I present the model setting
in Section 4.2.1, the partition function and the per-member partition function in
Section 4.2.2, and coalition stability in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 The setting
The biodiversity game by Winands et al. (2013) (id. Chapter 3) is a three stage non-
cooperative coalition formation game, whereby a coalition is characterised by joint
welfare maximisation. N = {1, 2, ..., n} countries, with n ≥ 2, decide about joining a
biodiversity conservation coalition K. K is a subset of N that consists at least of two
countries, whereby K = N is the grand coalition and K = ∅ the Nash-equilibrium
structure without coalition formation. Subsequently the signatories jointly agree on
the coalition’s ecosystem protection share. Then each non-signatory chooses its own
share. The game is solved by backward induction.
A country i can choose between protection Pi and land use Ui of its total area
Ai, whereby Pi + Ui = Ai. Protection is a continuous choice Pi ∈ [0, 1]. Countries
are pay-off maximising agents. They are heterogeneous in biodiversity richness and
wealth. A country can appropriate local conservation benefits; aggregated over all
its ecosystems, they are denoted by Bli(Pi). An ecosystem gives also rise to global
ecosystem services, which are not directly appropriable by the country hosting the
ecosystem. A country’s share of total global benefits aggregated over all ecosystems
of all countries is given by Bgi (P ). Besides, agriculturally used land Ui generates
local benefits from logging and harvesting. A country’s aggregated land use benefits
are Zi(Ai − Pi). Hence, the i-th country’s pay-off reads:
4It differs from Barrett’s (1994) ‘Biodiversity Supergame’ in that it considers four types of
countries varying in ecosystems and wealth, explicitly includes local benefits, and regards imperfect
substitutability between biodiversity services.
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pii(Pi, Pj∈N\{i}) = Bli(Pi) +B
g
i (P ) + Zi(Ai − Pi) , (4.1)
where P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn).
4.2.2 The partition function and per-member partition function
The coalition K’s and the non-signatories’ pay-offs depend on the coalition formed.
A partition function allocates these pay-offs for all coalition structures:
Definition 1. Partition function: A partition function assigns the pay-offs to the
coalition K and its associated respective non-signatories under each coalition struc-
ture of the set Ξ = {K1,K2, ...Ko}.
A country’s pay-offs are dependent on all countries protection decisions through
global benefits (ref. Eq. 4.1). The per-member partition function, by some scholars
also called valuation function, ψKi assigns a pay-off to all countries–signatories and
non-signatories.
Definition 2. Per-member partition function: A per-member partition function ψKi
assigns the i’th country a pay-off under a coalition K ∈ Ξ for all countries in and
outside the coalition.
A coalition member receives a certain share of the aggregate biodiversity coalition
pay-off piK after redistribution ϕKi . The coalition pay-off can be shared in various
ways either spontaneously or according to a pre-defined rule. The shares have to
add exactly up to the total pay-off:
Definition 3. Efficiency property:∑
i∈K
ϕKi =
∑
i∈K
piKi =: pi
K . (4.2)
4.2.3 Coalition stability
A coalition structureK belongs to the set of stable coalition structures if no signatory
of the coalition structure profits from leaving the coalition and if no non-signatory
of the coalition structure gains from acceding to the coalition; the coalition must be
internally and externally stable (D’Aspremont et al. 1983).
80 Chapter 4. Benefit-Sharing Rules
Definition 4. Stability: A biodiversity coalition K is stable if it is internally (Eq.
4.3) and externally stable (Eq. 4.4):
ϕKi ≥ piK\{i}i ∀i ∈ K (4.3)
piKi ≥ ϕK∪ii ∀i ∈ N \K . (4.4)
4.3 Application and appraisal of established per-member
partition functions
In this section I present the state of the art benefit-sharing rules in the game theoretic
literature on non-cooperative games. All sharing rules have to satisfy the efficiency
property (Def. 3). I transfer the formal representation of outcome-based benefit
surplus sharing rules (Section 4.3.1) and outside-option sharing rules (Section 4.3.2)
to the biodiversity game so that they respect its benefit structure. In Section 4.3.3
I discuss why they might currently, however, not be feasible.
4.3.1 Benefit surplus sharing rule
Outcome-based surplus sharing rules (e.g. Carraro et al. (2006), Weikard et al.
(2006)) distribute the total gain from cooperation SK among the coalition members.
The coalition surplus is the difference between the sum of the signatories’ benefits
and the sum of their pay-offs in the business-as-usual structure without coalition
formation. For the biodiversity conservation game I define this surplus in Eq. 4.5.
Definition 5. Coalition surplus:
SK =
∑
i∈K
[Bli(P
K
i ) +B
g
i (P
K) + Zi(Ai − PKi )]−∑
i∈K
[Bli(P
∅
i ) +B
g
i (P
∅) + Zi(Ai − P ∅i )] . (4.5)
I apply the surplus sharing per-member partition function (first derived by Chander
and Tulkens (1997) for cooperative games) to the biodiversity game in Eq. 4.6.
It is noteworthy for the argument in Section 4.3.3 that the surplus sharing rule is
based on the assumption that the surplus under each coalition structure is public
knowledge.
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Definition 6. Surplus sharing per-member partition function ψK,Si under certainty
about the surplus:
ψK,Si =
pi∅i + λKi ∗ SK ∀i ∈ KpiKi ∀i ∈ N \K , (4.6)
where λKi is the weight according to which coalition members share the surplus.
To exemplify, I present two surplus sharing rules for the biodiversity game
that are likely to be technically feasible, a protected area based surplus sharing
per-member partition function ψK,SPA (Eq. 4.7) and a biodiversity weighed pro-
tected area based surplus sharing per-member partition function ψK,SBPAi (Eq. 4.8).
Whereas the former uses the factor ‘absolute size of a country’s protected area’ to
determine how much each coalition member obtains, the latter additionally respects
the quality of the protected area in terms of biodiversity richness (i.e. size of pro-
tected ecosystems where very diverse ecosystems count more).
ψK,SPAi =
pi
∅
i +
Pi
Ai∑
i∈K
Pi
Ai
∗ SK ∀i ∈ K
piKi ∀i ∈ N \K ,
(4.7)
ψK,SBPAi =
pi
∅
i +
qi∑
i∈K qi
∗
Pi
Ai∑
i∈K
Pi
Ai
∗ SK ∀i ∈ K
piKi ∀i ∈ N \K ,
(4.8)
where qi denotes an aggregated parameter of country i’s biodiversity richness.
In line with Def. 4, the coalition structure K in a biodiversity game with the
surplus sharing per-member partition function ψK,Si is stable if the following internal
and external stability equations hold:
λKi ∗ SK ≥ Bgi (PK\{i}) ∀i ∈ K (4.9)
Bgi (P
K) ≥ λK∪{i}i ∗ SK∪{i} ∀i ∈ N \K . (4.10)
Hence, when employing a benefit surplus sharing rule, the stability of a coalition
structure K depends strongly on the choice of the sharing weight. This is not the
case for the outside option based benefit-sharing rule (Section 4.3.2).
82 Chapter 4. Benefit-Sharing Rules
4.3.2 Outside option based benefit-sharing rule
Weikard (2009) developed a general optimal sharing rule, which is based on the coun-
tries’ outside options, for coalition formation games with asymmetric players and
a supperadditive pay-off function. It requires that every coalition member receives
at least his outside option, the opportunity costs of joining the coalition. Eyck-
mans et al. (2012) build on the outside option rule with their ‘Proportional Surplus
Sharing Scheme’ (PSSS), which is particularly suited for coalition formation games
with positive externalities. The ‘Proportional Surplus Sharing Valuation Function’
(PSSVF) respects the outside options, explicitly distributes the coalition pay-off in
excess of the sum of the members’ outside option pay-offs, and assigns a pay-off
to all signatories and non-signatories. I present the PSSVF in the notation of the
biodiversity game in Eq. 4.11. For the reasoning in Section 4.3.3 it is noteworthy
that Eyckmans et al. (2012) develop the PSSVF assuming that the countries’ outside
options are public knowledge.
Definition 7. Per-member partition function ψK,PSSV Fi under certainty about the
outside options:
ψK,PSSV Fi =
pi
K\{i}
i + λ
K
i ∗ σK ∀i ∈ K
piKi ∀i ∈ N \K ,
(4.11)
where σK is the coalition benefit in excess of all members’ outside options, σK =
piK −∑i∈K piK\{i}i , and λKi the weight according to which the former is shared (Ey-
ckmans et al. 2012, Def. 6).
The weight parameter λKi of the PSSVF remains general in Eyckmans et al.
(2012)–some positive weights which add up to one for each coalition. A biodiversity
game specific choice of the weight parameter adapts the PSSVF to the biodiversity
conservation game. To exemplify I introduce two weights which correspond to the
rules applied for the surplus sharing in Section 4.3.1, a weight based on the countries’
total size of protected ecosystems (λK,PAi , Eq. 4.12) and one based on countries’
total size of protected ecosystems weighed by ecosystem quality (λK,BPAi , Eq. 4.13).
λK,PAi =
Pi
Ai∑
i∈K
Pi
Ai
(4.12)
λK,BPAi =
qi∑
i∈K qi
∗
Pi
Ai∑
i∈K
Pi
Ai
(4.13)
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Weikard (2009, Theorem 1) proves for the case of sharing rules which satisfy
each country’s outside option (‘claim rights condition’) that internal stability does
not depend on the rule the coalition applies to share the benefits in excess of the
sum of the members’ outside options. Eyckmans et al. (2012, Prop. 1) prove that
there exists a stable coalition structure for every PSSVF in a partition function
game. This result is independent of the weight parameter as long as the weights are
positive and all coalition members’ weights add up to one (ref. also Carraro et al.
2006, p. 390). Hence, weight choices are purely of political nature.
4.3.3 Application obstacle: Information uncertainty about biodi-
versity benefits
The outside option rule is, in theory, optimal to achieve the stable welfare maximising
coalition in a general coalition formation game. My presumption, though, is that
it is not feasible in the case of biodiversity. Its fundamental assumption of perfect
knowledge about countries’ pay-offs under different coalition structures piKi is too
far from reality to be a valid model generalisation due to, inter alia, fundamental
ecological uncertainties. Moreover, I presume that lacking scientific information and
economic valuation problems render even the application of rules based on expected
benefits currently untenable. In the following I substantiate this argument.
Far-reaching knowledge constraints with regard to benefits from biodiversity ob-
struct the use of the discussed sharing rules. To estimate or even calculate benefit
predictions countries would have to have considerable knowledge on their portfo-
lio of biodiversity and its market value. We face uncertainty, though, about the
existence of biological and genetic resources, ecosystem behaviour, reproduction,
thresholds, feedback loops and system interdependencies. Sources of uncertainty
can be ‘variability’ (ontological, nature of reality) and ‘limited knowledge’ (episte-
mological, nature of knowledge), whereby the latter partly arises from the former
(Van Asselt and Rotmans 2002, p. 78ff.). Whereas some sources of uncertainty are
fundamental, research may reduce limited knowledge. For example, constantly new
discoveries of biological resources are made; Purvis and Hector (2000, p. 213) give
an idea of the dimension: “An average day sees the formal description of around
300 new species across the whole range of life, and there is no slowdown in sight.”
Whether uncertainty helps or hampers stability of IEAs is an open question in the
game theoretic literature (Kolstad (2007); Finus and Pintassilgo (2013)).
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In addition, the economic valuation of biological and genetic resources is chal-
lenging. A market hardly exists for genetic resources; with only few effective ge-
netic resource trade regimes (‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (ABS) regimes) in place
(Kamau et al. 2010, p. 248), there is no functioning market nor an established
market price. Moreover, most agreements and especially their benefit stipulations
are confidential (Ten Kate and Laird 1999, p. 63). Asymmetric information about
the research process and the contribution of genetic resources to a final product
(Ten Kate and Laird 2000, p. 244) hamper a provider country forming an idea
about potential benefits further. In addition, complementarities, inter alia between
genetic resources and (traditional and local) knowledge (Pastor and Sigu¨en˜as 2008,
p. 15), create negative cross-price elasticities, where benefits are dependent not
only on the resource itself but also on the existence of e.g. associated traditional
knowledge.5 The theoretical potential of genetic resource trade to raise substantial
financial funds is subject to scientific debate (Barrett and Lybbert (2000), Costello
and Ward (2006)). Besides marketed private goods and services, biological and
genetic resources provide non-marketed ones on the whole continuum of private to
public goods. The value of non-marketed goods and services is even more difficult to
estimate (ref., e.g., Freeman (2003) for an overview of non-market valuation meth-
ods and their shortcomings). De Groot et al. (2012, p. 55), for example, find for
the tropical forest biome a considerable range of value estimates of the total set of
ecosystem services varying between a total minimum value of 1,581 Int.$/ha/year
and a total maximum value of 20,851 Int.$/ha/year with a mean value of 5,264
Int.$/ha/year, all at 2007 price levels (based on 96 estimates from the ‘Ecosystem
Service Valuation Database’ 6). For the same biome, Pearce (2001, p. 291) presents
differences in the valuation of various ecosystem services. The value of carbon stor-
age and sequestration, for example, varies much and depends heavily on the existence
and functioning of a carbon market, whereby a price of 10 US-$/tC may result in
more than 2500 US-$/ha for closed primary forest and fluctuate accordingly with
changing carbon prices. Hence, coalition benefits can be divided into assessable piKa
(e.g. genetic resource ABS contracts) and difficult or non-assessable ones piKn , i.e.
piK = piKa + pi
K
n .
Ecological uncertainty and economic valuation problems thus render it impossible
for countries to calculate their status-quo pay-offs pii, let alone the other countries’
5Dependencies on traditional knowledge can be captured by the model through local benefits
that are dependent on the knowledge available to use biological resources. I thank an anonymous
reviewer for this suggestion.
6For details on the database ref. Van der Ploeg et al. (2010).
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status-quo pay-offs pij ∀j ∈ N\{i}. It follows evidently that countries are neither aware
of the coalition pay-off SK under every possible coalition structure nor of their own
pay-off piKi under every possible coalition structure nor of the other countries’ pay-
offs piKj ∀j ∈ N \{i} under every possible coalition structure–which would be necessary
for the outcome-based surplus sharing rule (Eq. 4.6) and the PSSVF outside option
based benefit-sharing rule (Eq. 4.11). For such knowledge a country would have to
be able to calculate the monetary implication of differences in coalition membership
(itself or another country joins or leaves the coalition) or of changes in the benefit-
sharing rule on its benefits.
In any case, countries would use their perceived viz. expected benefits to apply
the outcome-based surplus sharing rule or the PSSVF outside option based benefit-
sharing rule. Eq. 4.6 and Eq. 4.11 under uncertainty read respectively:
Definition 8. Expected value of the surplus sharing per-member partition function
ψK,Si under uncertainty about biodiversity benefits:
Ei[ψK,Si ] =
Ei[pi∅i ] + λKi ∗ Ei[SK ] ∀i ∈ KEi[piKi ] ∀i ∈ N \K , (4.14)
Definition 9. Expected value of the per-member partition function ψK,PSSV Fi under
uncertainty about biodiversity benefits:
Ei[ψK,PSSV Fi ] =
Ei[pi
K\{i}
i ] + λ
K
i ∗ Ei[σK ] ∀i ∈ K
Ei[piKi ] ∀i ∈ N \K ,
(4.15)
Once countries gain sufficient information to be able to determine their status-quo
benefits (the equation’s element soonest to be observable), Ei[pi∅i ] in Eq. (4.14)
becomes pi∅i and the surplus sharing per-member partition function turns out to be
preferable to the PSSVF. Even more so, when potential coalition members are able
to establish a joint, and through deliberations improved, estimate of the coalition
surplus, i.e. when Ei[SK ] = EK [SK ] ∀i ∈ K, Eq. 4.14 becomes:
Ei[ψK,Si ] =
pi∅i + λKi ∗ EK [SK ] ∀i ∈ KEi[piKi ] ∀i ∈ N \K , (4.16)
and thereby involves less uncertainty than Eq. 4.15. The question therefore is how
much information countries have and whether they are likely to form expectations
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based an them, i.e. to embark on the difficult task of estimating, if not guessing,
their benefits from various coalition structures, Ei[piKi ]. And–if they do so–whether
they are able to produce estimates they are convinced of to the extend that they
will base decisions on them.
In addition, asymmetric information about the other countries’ expected biodi-
versity benefits further complicates the issue. Countries face the challenge to convey
their expected benefits credibly while at the same time the benefit-sharing rules dis-
cussed create incentives for (some) countries not to reveal their expected benefits
correctly, such that Ei[piKj ] 6= Ej [piKj ]. Jakob and Lessmann (2012) develop signalling
strategies to stabilise mutually desirable cooperation under asymmetric information
for climate change mitigation games. However, they assume perfect information
about own benefits–and a strong cooperation spirit among countries. In the case
of biodiversity cooperation, countries are left with their own benefit expectations,
which in the light of the described range of uncertainties are likely to be vague. In
such a situation, countries might be susceptible to be guided by a subjective under-
or over-appreciation of their objectively expectable biodiversity richness Eobj [piKi ],
whereby Ei[piKi ] 6= Eobj [piKi ]. As a consequence the stability of a coalition–if ini-
tially stable at all–is fragile and likely to break up or restructure once countries
realise that Ei[piKj ] 6= Ej [piKj ] and that Ei[piKi ] 6= Eobj [piKi ]. High transaction costs in
re-negotiating might lead to a break-up rather than a restructuring.
These arguments motivate the tentative hypothesis that decision makers are cur-
rently likely to decide about their countries’ membership in a multilateral biodiver-
sity conservation fund or a biodiversity cartel based on expected assessable coalition
benefits, EK [piKa ], whereby I assume that a joint estimate by coalition members is
possible. Moreover, I presume that countries consider the fairness of the sharing
rule for these benefits. I expect the international and domestic policy considerations,
social aspects, as well as environmental concerns to play a major role. Besides, bio-
diversity might have an intrinsic value for some decision makers that prevents them
to consider nature in (purely) monetary terms. If the tentative hypothesis and its
rationale were true, the game theoretic assumption of players comparing their pay-
offs under different coalition structures is not an acceptable model abstraction. The
calculation of benefit-sharing rules based on the outside option would give no valid
real-world prediction on coalition stability and conservation outcome. To assess the
argument and further explore the topic I conducted empirical-qualitative research.
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4.4 Insights from empirical-qualitative research
Given the lack of empirical research applicable to study the adequacy of game-
theoretic benefit-sharing rules, I conducted empirical-qualitative research to evalu-
ate the assumptions from Section 4.3.3 and further explore the subject. A fortunate
coincidence for this research is the fact that the need for and modalities of a ‘Global
Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’ (GMBSM) are currently debated inten-
sively under the ‘Nagoya Protocol’ (NP) of the CBD (ref. NP, Art. 10 ). Users
of genetic resources would contribute to this still theoretical mechanism and con-
tributions would be earmarked for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
Studying the case of genetic resources is illustrative for other types of biodiversity
benefit-sharing agreements as it considers benefit sharing with regard to one element
of biodiversity: genetic diversity, one of the three components of biodiversity and
arguably the most interesting one to consider for the derivation of benefit-sharing
rules as it is the most complex diversity dimension; it describes both the tangible
(genetic resource as material (ref. CBD, Art. 2 )) and intangible components (ge-
netic resource as information). In Section 4.4.1 I describe the data collection and
analysis. In Section 4.4.2 I present the results.
4.4.1 Data collection and analysis
I conducted fourteen explorative expert interviews in November 2013 with sixteen
experts from eight biodiversity rich ‘Latin American and Caribbean’ (LAC) bio-
diversity rich countries in the context of a workshop on ABS7. The experts were
competent stakeholders8 in the ABS process of the CBD and its NP. The interviews
were conducted in the preferred language of the interviewee as semi-structured in-
terviews with a pretested topic guideline9 (twelve Spanish, two English). I asked
open questions related to (i) a country’s past experiences and satisfaction with ABS,
(ii) how easy or difficult it is to estimate (potential) monetary benefits from genetic
resource trade, (iii) the country’s attitude towards a GMBSM and comprehensive
global ABS (iv) how benefits from genetic resources should be distributed by a biodi-
versity conservation fund among countries, and (v) how important benefits and costs
7The Science-Policy Workshop on Access and Benefit-Sharing for non-commercial academic re-
search in LAC was facilitated by the International Council for Science, DIVERSITAS, the Swiss
Academy of Sciences, the International Union of Biological Sciences, Bonn University, and the
Ministry of Environment of Peru.
8Inter alia ABS national focal points in the ministries.
9Ref. Supplementary Material S.4.1.
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are for negotiating international agreements on genetic resource trade. The experts
had considerable flexibility in answering and directing the interlocution. The open
interview concept allowed me to ask specific detailed questions in response to the
experts’ statements and thereby explore the topic thoroughly. All but two interviews
were recorded (for one notes were taken and the other was a written submission)
and interview protocols were drafted after each interview to increase the quality of
the analysis. The interview statements are particularly authentic as the GMBSM is
a real option which is currently being discussed internationally10.
I transcribed the interview statements verbatim with only very few and brief
exceptions in case of repetitions or obvious digressions. For the interviews recorded
in Spanish the transcription included a translation into English. The recordings
were played several times to verify the transcript’s accuracy. Content analysis and
interpretation are suitable methods to analyse verbal, qualitative data. I followed an
inductive analysis approach (similar to Mayring (2010)). First, I studied the textual
data line by line and coded it by highlighting relevant passages in different colours
(codings). Next, I assorted the codings to question headers. Then, I transferred the
codings to meta-documents that contain all codes from different interviews which
have the same header. I analysed relevant code compilations in detail while the
others served to generate background knowledge as situative context information.
To ensure internal validity as far as possible in the qualitative analysis, the soundness
of the analysis was appraised by assessing potential differences in interpretation
nuances. External validity was achieved through a representative choice of experts,
a ‘theoretical sample’ (Bortz and Do¨ring 2006, p. 335): The interviewees were
pre-selected by the organizers of a workshop on ABS who have inside knowledge
about relevant stakeholders in the ABS process. The final selection focused on
policy makers–whereas the workshop had two target groups, researchers and policy
makers–and aimed to achieve a coverage of different country backgrounds.
4.4.2 Results
The results from the expert interviews have to be appraised in the context of ABS
of genetic resources. Countries’ preferences and decision making with regard to
benefit sharing of genetic resources, though, will share marked parallels to the case
10Prior to the interviews, the GMBSM had already been discussed at the second and
third meeting of the ‘Open-ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Pro-
tocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Aris-
ing from their Utilization’ (ICNP): ICNP-2: www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=icnp-02; ICNP-3:
www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=ICNP-03, last accessed 03.01.2014.
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of a more general sharing of biodiversity benefits as explained in the introduction
to this Section. In the following I present the results.
Past experiences and satisfaction with ABS. The interview results show that
the experience with monetary benefit sharing is very limited. Peru has signed no
commercial ABS contract, Colombia one, Bolivia two to three out of ten solicitations,
and Cuba a few. In Mexico the first commercial permit was being processed and
in Ecuador the first commercial contract negotiated at the time of the interview.
Costa Rica issued between thirty and forty permits for investigation with commercial
potential, but no explicitly commercial contract has been signed. Brazil concluded
98 commercial contracts in the period 2004-2013. More progress has been made
with non-commercial research contracts. Consequentially, the countries received
few monetary benefits11. Bolivia obtained payments from one contract, Brazil and
Cuba12 from some, and Costa Rica from non-commercial contracts. The other four
countries have not obtained any monetary benefits. The governments’ expectations
of monetary benefits have not been met.13 According to the experts, monetary
benefits are more important than non-monetary ones for two of the eight countries,
non-monetary for one, and equally important for four.
Benefit estimation feasibility. Several experts mentioned that due to the lack
of practical experience, it is very complicated to estimate the monetary benefits a
country can obtain from genetic resource trade. Only one expert from Costa Rica
stated that the Costa Rican ‘National Biodiversity Institute’ (INBio) is confident
about negotiating commercial contracts with monetary benefits; the capacity has
increased because they have gained some negotiation experience. This was also
mentioned by one expert from Brazil for her14 country.
Attitude towards global multilateral benefit sharing. The experts’ attitude
towards global benefit sharing ranged from being opposed over being sceptical or
unsure to being open for the idea and positive about it. As a detailed exposition of
the statements would be beyond the scope of this chapter, I limit the presentation to
the comments on multilateral benefit sharing that are related to the benefit-sharing
11For clarification, these can be payments from international as well as national users.
12According to the Cuban expert the case of Cuba is special as research departments of companies
and universities are publicly financed and thus most of the benefits flow back to the state.
13Six out of eight countries, one no information, one no high benefit expectations at the beginning.
14We refer to all experts in the female gender for anonymity reasons.
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rule. An expert from Peru was sceptical about a multilateral benefit-sharing fund
because she feared that achieving a just and equitable distribution would be too
complicated and thus “in the end, at the producer of these genetic resources very
little would arrive”–and “because of transaction costs”, her colleague added. She
elaborated that “if the objective is conservation and sustainability of these resources,
those who carry out the conservation have to receive the benefits.” Another Peruvian
expert mentioned that if resources are not related to traditional knowledge, where
one has to consider the local communities in designing a fund, “the fund would
be ideal”. An Ecuadorian expert favoured regional benefit-sharing programs whose
funds are used for “strengthening of institutions in topics of technology transfer
and higher involvement of indigenous communities so that the defence of traditional
knowledge can be stronger”.
Benefit-sharing rules. A Colombian expert explained that due to the little so-
licitations with commercial aims, they are “not yet thinking of the benefits; so these
criteria, they are not yet established”. This seemed to be the case for a number of
experts I interviewed. An Ecuadorian expert stressed the need to start discussing
benefit sharing between countries, although this would be much more complex than
the distribution of benefits within one country, which she already considered to be
very complex. A Peruvian expert stated that the benefit distribution should be fair
in the sense that it respects the countries’ conservation efforts. However, a Bolivian
and a Mexican expert had doubts about a rule that distributes benefits according to
countries’ conservation efforts. The Mexican expert stated that such idea would not
be bad, but cautioned, “we would need to take care when deciding how to measure it:
having protected areas does not necessarily mean that those areas are actually being
conserved or that those areas have the most diversity in the country.” The Bolivian
expert considered such rule to be less attractive for the Latin American countries
than an equitable rule. She stated that the distribution of benefits has to be based
on equity principles, on the solidarity and sovereignty of countries.15 A Cuban ex-
pert, however, could not imagine a fund that equally distributes money, but rather
payments for conservation projects. She and the Mexican expert stressed that the
benefits from a fund should only be used for conservation projects and that there
should be clear rules for selecting and evaluating these projects. The Cuban expert
15To illustrate, the she gave an example, “which could work and which is not very far from
imagining, there are five million dollars for an access to genetic resources, an economic projection,
which is perhaps made mutually,–five million, if we are five countries, we would get one million”.
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added that this selection should be based on equality of conditions. An expert from
Ecuador was also of the opinion that the fund should invest in projects. She stated
that “we have to regard it [the benefit-sharing payments] differently, in a sustainable
manner. If we look at it from a financial point of view (...) this might even generate
corruption.” The experts from Costa Rica, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico and Ecuador all
stated that the communities have to be consulted and their needs considered. One
Peruvian expert said that initial payments are important and that they could at
first be determined based on the project budget and should then be readjusted as
the project progresses. She explained that the determination of a payment has to
take into account in-kind transfers already made by the project. Furthermore, she
stressed that a mechanism has to allow every state to negotiate. Four experts from
four different countries stated that the benefit-sharing rule(s) should be negotiated
case by case rather than be based on a global agreement. A Bolivian expert pointed
out that “in many cases, in which it [the value of the genetic resource] is not un-
derstood, it can probably be started by negotiating genetic resources in a generic
manner–but I believe it is case by case.” She argued that a case by case negotiation
is needed to respect the different geographic, social, environmental and ecological
characteristics of the origin of the genetic resources. A Colombian expert explained
that “the distribution of benefits will be case by case depending on the solicitation,
on what will be made, where he will work and with whom”.
Importance of monetary factors in negotiations. The picture of the impor-
tance of economic versus political, social, and environmental aspects in international
negotiations about the design of an IEA is very mixed. Four experts considered
them more or less equally important, two regarded the monetary aspects to be more
significant, whereas two purported that only non-monetary aspects are relevant in
international negotiations. Two other experts explained that it depends on the
respondent; one opined that politicians tend to see the economic arguments and
researchers the other factors, while the other believed that negotiators are more
idealistic while the communities demand monetary benefits.
In conclusion, the results show that the experts, who were all political stakehold-
ers in the ABS processes of LAC countries, could so far only gain little experience
with commercial benefit-sharing contracts. Consequentially they feel rather unsure
in dealing with monetary benefits–to estimate them and to negotiate them. Mon-
etary benefits tend to be important, but not necessarily more than non-monetary
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benefits. Likewise, in international negotiations about a benefit-sharing rule eco-
nomic benefits and costs are only one aspect countries consider besides political,
social and environmental ones. The use of benefits for conservation projects, for
example, would imply too much conservation from a rational utility maximising
perspective as increasing conservation costs reduce the overall benefits. The results
thus confirm that benefit-sharing rules that consider rational utility maximisers who
are at least aware of expected biodiversity benefits are currently not a feasible model
abstraction.
4.5 An alternative appraoch to benefit-sharing rules
In this Section I outline an alternative approach to benefit-sharing rules which takes
the current real-world constraints of ecological and biological uncertainties, limited
information on biodiversity benefits, unease to form benefit expectations, and asym-
metric information about expected benefits into account. A benefit-sharing rule can
currently only be based on expected assessable coalition benefits EK [piKa ] (ref. Sec-
tion 4.3.3). Benefit-sharing determinants fi(·) specify the weight λi according to
which the expected assessable coalition pay-off is distributed among the coalition
members:
pii = λi(f
1
i , f
2
i , ..., f
N
i ) ∗ EK [piKa ] ∀i ∈ K,
∂λi
∂f ji
≥ 0 ,
∑
λi = 1 . (4.17)
In the following, I develop a benefit-sharing determinant that is relevant for inter-
national decision-making and governance and that can also be incorporated into
the established game-theoretic rules. In Section 4.5.1 I discuss requirements for its
technical operability and political economy feasibility based on which I propose a
tentative determinant in Section 4.5.2.
4.5.1 Technical and political economy feasibility requirements
Benefit-sharing determinants fi(·) have to meet technical and political economy
requirements to be employable in practice–not only in the case of IEAs. For technical
operability the determinants need to be adequate and measurable. Their data ideally
satisfies the following criteria:
(i) Data observability
(ii) Reasonable data collection cost
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(iii) Formal accuracy of collected data
(iv) Data validity
(v) Data comparability between countries
‘Data observability’ (i) refers to whether the data is theoretically measurable. The
criteria ‘reasonable data collection cost’ (ii) considers whether the data is afford-
able or whether data acquisition costs are prohibitively high. ‘Formal accuracy of
collected data’ (iii) requires that no measurement errors are made. The criteria
‘data validity’ (iv) ensures that the data measures what it is supposed to measure,
so that the benefit-sharing determinant leads to the intended benefit distribution.
This includes the possibility that a measurement method may have certain flaws as
long as they are acknowledged and accepted by all stakeholders. ‘Data compara-
bility between countries’ (v) points to the necessity that measurements are taken
in a standardised manner. An example of a technically feasible determinant is the
total size of conserved ecosystems of a country i, Pi. The data is observable (i) and
available at negligible cost (ii), because the creation of protected areas includes their
measurement. The formal accuracy of the data is also likely as the measurements are
usually made using the ‘Global Positioning System’ (GPS) (iii). Actual data validity
depends on the enforcement of the areas’ protection state (iv). It is likely to require
special consideration given the variation in the enforcement of protected areas by
countries’ executives (ref. the respective statement made by a Mexican expert, Sec-
tion 4.4.2). The data measurements are presumably comparable between countries
as most conservation sites are classified according to or inspired by the protected
area criteria16 of the ‘International Union for Conservation of Nature’ (IUCN) (v).
Moreover, the determinant is directly related to biodiversity conservation efforts and
thus arguably adequate for a sharing rule for biodiversity benefits. Following the
same line of argument, further possibly technically feasible determinants f(·) for the
benefit-sharing weight, which fulfil the criteria (i) to (v) to a certain degree, are:
(1) Size of protected ecosystems of a country i relative to the size of protected
ecosystems of all countries:
f1i
(
Pi∑
i∈K Pi
)
, f ′(·) > 0;
(2) Number of endemic species x of a country i relative to the number of endemic
species of all countries (data in e.g. Groombridge and Jenkins (2002)):
16Online: www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/gpap home/gpap quality/gpap pacategories/,
last 15.05.2014.
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f2i
(
xi∑
i∈K xi
)
, f ′(·) > 0;
(3) Number of endangered species y of a country i relative to the number of endan-
gered species of all countries (IUCN Red List of Threatened Species: “endan-
gered” and “critically endangered”):
f3i
(
yi∑
i∈K yi
)
, f ′(·) > 0;
(4) Population size of a country i relative to the population size of all countries:
f4i
(
Ωi∑
i∈K Ωi
)
, f ′(·) > 0;
(5) Size of a country i’s area A relative to the total size of all countries’ areas:
f5i
(
Ai∑
i∈K Ai
)
, f ′(·) > 0;
(6) Equal shares for all provider countries:
f6i =
1
K
, f ′(·) = 0.
Determinants (4) to (6) are not directly related to biodiversity whilst still being ad-
equate; adequacy can be justified by countries’ preferences–for example preferences
for the most simple and transparent parameter. This highlights the importance of
political economy aspects.
The results from the expert interviews show that for the interviewed political
stakeholders environmental considerations are important in the context of benefit
sharing of genetic resources. Several experts stated that the benefits from genetic
resource trade should be earmarked for conservation projects (ref. Section 4.4.2).
This is more broadly also reflected by the popularity of the concept of ‘Good Living’,
which depicts a deep respect for nature in several Latin American countries (Gudy-
nas 2011, p. 231). The results from the expert interviews show that the interviewed
policy makers pay attention to fairness concerns such as the acknowledgement of
conservation efforts, the consideration of indigenous and local communities, as well
as other social aspects. The perception of receiving a fair and equitable benefit share
seems to be crucial for a self-enforcing coalition. Distributional justice can result
from allocation-based, outcome-based, and process-based equity criteria (Rose et al.
1998). Allocation-based equity refers to the fairness of the benefit-distribution deter-
minants. A very important criteria is that the allocation rule respects the countries’
‘sovereignty’. Other criteria are ecological and egalitarian criteria, which were also
voiced prominently by the experts (ref. Section 4.4.2) and include those discussed
above. Outcome-based equity considers whether the achieved benefit distribution is
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just; it is a teleological-consequentialist ethical concept, to which i.a. the outside-
option rule belongs17. However, outcome-based equity was not in the focus of the
experts’ statements. Process-based equity refers to rule-based ethical considerations
and thus deontological ethics. This includes for example the criteria fairness of the
international negotiations, which was mentioned by several experts, in particular in
the context of including indigenous and local communities in deliberations about a
benefit-sharing rule. Thus equity considerations are very important in decisions on
whether to participate in a biodiversity coalition or not.
4.5.2 A tentative determinant for the benefit shares
The previous considerations of technical feasibility and political economy aspects
together with the results from the expert interviews prepare the ground for my
proposal of a determinant f∗i for the weight λi according to which the expected
assessable coalition pay-off is distributed among the coalition members. I consider
the determinant “size of protected ecosystems of a country i relative to the size
of protected ecosystems in all other countries, weighed by a country’s biodiversity
richness and population density” to be adequate:
f∗i
(
Pi
Ai∑
i∈K
Pi
Ai
∗ qi∑
i∈K qi
∗
Ωi
Ai∑
i∈K
Ωi
Ai
)
, f ′(·) > 0. (4.18)
The parameter values for Pi, qi, and Ωi are taken at a certain reference date prior
the point of coalition formation.18 I substantiate my proposal in the following.
The tentative determinant f∗i (Eq. 4.18) is, arguably, suitable as it embraces the
political economy considerations of the previous section and those voiced during the
expert interviews. The interviews revealed the importance of environmental and fair-
ness concerns. f∗i consists of two allocation-based equity criteria, an ‘environmental
conservation’ and an ‘egalitarian’ component. It implies that protection in countries
with a high biodiversity richness and a high population density counts more. The
reason for the former is the higher contribution to global biodiversity benefits. The
rationale for the latter are opportunity costs rising with population density; more
land is needed for food, housing, public infrastructure, and recreation. Outcome-
based equity concerns were not expressed dominantly by the experts. The tentative
17The outside-option corresponds to Rose et al.’s (1998, p. 30) ‘compensation’ criteria.
18It is crucial that the reference date is prior to coalition formation. Taking the observed share of
protected area during coalition formation would lead to strategic interactions as it is the strategy
variable in the underlying basic biodiversity game (ref. Eq. 4.1).
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determinant viz. sharing rule has to withstand practical scrutiny and should be
regarded as a substantiated proposal. It may feed into discussions about a multilat-
eral benefit-sharing fund. Thereby process-based equity, which cannot exist at this
stage, may evolve through inclusive, open and fair deliberations.
Besides being adequate, f∗i needs to fulfil the technical feasibility criteria (i) to
(v) (ref. Section 4.5.1). The data on protected areas is available in the ‘World
Database on Protected Areas’ (WDPA)19. It is publicly accessible as ‘terrestrial
and marine areas protected, percentage of terrestrial area and territorial waters’ 20.
The data on a country’s biodiversity richness can easily be obtained from, e.g.,
Groombridge and Jenkins’s (2002) ‘World Atlas of Biodiversity’ (Diversity Index
DI as mean of richness and endemism) or the ‘Global Environment Facility’ s (GEF)
benefits index for biodiversity21. The ‘World Development Indicator’ (WDI) of the
World Bank22 supplies free online data on population density in terms of ‘people
per square kilometre of land area’. Thereby all required data can be obtained from
public databases (i) at low cost (ii) and high degree of accuracy (iii). Data validity
(iv) is likely for the data on population density, whereas biodiversity richness is more
likely to vary slightly with indicator choice and the validity of the data on protected
areas is, as discussed previously, dependent on a state’s enforcement of the protection
status. Countries might be willing to accept these potential deviations and agree to
use standardised official data (e.g. from UN, GEF, World Bank, etc.) nevertheless–
if not, a governance indicator could be included to capture the latter concern. To
illustrate, I provide an numerical example for several LAC and ‘European Union’
(EU) countries in Fig. 4.1. Brazil and Ecuador, for example, will appropriate
a high benefit share. Brazil profits from the highest biodiversity richness, which
even outweighs its relative low population density. Ecuador is biodiversity rich
although not as much as Brazil according to the indicator and benefits strongly
from its relative high land surface with protected areas. For Bolivia the tentative
19The WDPA is provided by the ‘United Nations World Conservation Monitoring Centre’
(UNEP-WCMC) and the IUCN ‘World Commission on Protected Areas’ and contains all protected
areas for which the location and extent is known. It is the most comprehensive global dataset for
protected areas and was used for the 2013 ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs) Report and
for reports towards the achievement of the CBD ‘Aichi Targets’. Online: www.protectedplanet.net,
last 04.04.2014.
20Ref. www.wdpa.org/resources/statistics/2013 MDG National stats Indicator 7 6.xlsx, last
04.04.2014. It can also be accessed through the ‘World Development Indicator’ (WDI) databank of
the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.PTD.TOTL.ZS, last 04.03.2015.
21Ref. http://www.thegef.org/gef/GEF-4 benefits index, last 04.03.2015. It can also be ac-
cessed through the WDI databank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.BDV.TOTL.XQ, last
04.03.2015.
22Ref. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST, last 04.04.2014.
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determinant is not favourable as the country has a very low population density paired
with medium levels of both protected areas and biodiversity richness. Biodiversity
richness is low for the EU countries reducing their share of benefits. Germany raises
its otherwise even lower determinant’s value slightly by a good performance in the
extent of protected areas.
Figure 4.1: Numerical application example: Tentative determinant for the benefit shares
The cells are coloured to indicate the relative contribution of the determinant’s dimensions to the
level of a countries determinant f∗i as well as the performance of a country compared to other
countries in one determinant’s dimension and the determinant itself.
Source: Own compilation with data from the WDI 2008 data series “Terrestrial and marine pro-
tected areas (% of total territorial area)” (ER.PTD.TOTL.ZS) based on WDPA data, “GEF benefits
index for biodiversity” (ER.BDV.TOTL.XQ) based on GEF data, “Population density (people per
sq. km of land area)” (EN.POP.DNST) based on FAO and World Bank data.
The determinant f∗i can be included as determinant for λ
K
i in the established
per-member partition functions discussed in Section 4.3. Distributing the coalition
benefit according to the determinant is in design close to the outcome-based ben-
efit surplus sharing rule. The important difference, though, is that countries do
not take the decision of joining the coalition based on the outcome but on the fair
distribution of the expected assessable coalition benefit and thus also on the deter-
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minant itself–allocation- and process-based equity are important. Once countries
gain more information, the outcome-based benefit surplus sharing rule with f∗i as
determinant for λKi will become an acceptable game-theoretic model abstraction.
Experts from Costa Rica and Brazil, for example, mentioned that information on
benefits increased because they have gained some experience with commercial ABS
(ref. Section 4.4.2). Extensive further additional information might eventually also
enable the application of the outside option based benefit-sharing rule.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I provide an analysis of benefit-sharing rules for biodiversity coalition
formation games to open and enrich a discussion on the applicability of standard
game-theoretic benefit-sharing rules for IEAs. To this end I transfer established
benefit-sharing rules to a biodiversity conservation game with heterogeneous coun-
tries, discuss potential application impediments and assess these through empirical-
qualitative research. The information requirements for game-theoretic per-member
partition functions are too demanding in case of biodiversity cooperation–even the
application of rules based on expected benefits is currently untenable–due ecological
uncertainties and economic valuation problems. Based on the empirical results I
propose an alternative benefit-sharing rule. It distributes the expected assessable
coalition pay-off among the coalition members. I derive a tentative determinant for
the benefit-sharing weight from technical and political economy considerations and
the empirical findings. It distributes benefits according to the relative size of pro-
tected ecosystems weighed by a country’s biodiversity richness and population den-
sity. It is flexible in that it can be incorporated into the established game-theoretic
benefit-sharing rules and be applied to different states of the world of informational
constraints on benefits.
An assessment of the relevance of game-theoretic assumptions is crucial for valid
game-theoretic descriptive and predictive analyses of international environmental
cooperation. Additional empirical research is needed both to further explore coun-
tries’ preferences with regard to the modalities of multilateral sharing of benefits
from biodiversity and to broaden the scope of the analysis by addressing other IEAs.
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Chapter 5
Eco-regional Cooperation on the Genetic Re-
source Market and the Case of the Andean Com-
munity
Abstract: The United Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ codified
state sovereignty over genetic resources and subsequently bilateral contracts
over genetic resource use evolved. However, countries currently obtain only
few benefits from bilateral contracts, largely due to high transaction costs. In
this chapter, we consider eco-regional cooperation by megadiverse countries in
physical genetic resource trade. The main objective is to investigate whether
such cooperation can increase benefits for provider countries and in-situ con-
servation of biodiversity. The Andean Community’s access legislation serves as
a case study. Our main finding is that eco-regional cooperation has the poten-
tial to significantly reduce transaction costs for both supplying countries and
customers. It can thereby decrease prices for customers and increase demand,
conservation levels and providers’ benefits. Countries with a relatively higher
biodiversity richness and a comparatively better institutional environment are
able to appropriate a higher share of cooperation induced benefits. Collusion
on the physical genetic resource market will not lead to high benefits as market
power is limited by substitutes in form of ex-situ resources and freely avail-
able genetic information. The Andean Community realises few of the potential
cooperation advantages.
Chapter 5 has been published as Discussion Paper as: Winands, S. and K. Holm-Mu¨ller (2014).
Eco-regional Cooperation on the Genetic Resource Market and the Case of the Andean Community.
ILR Food and Resource Economics Discussion Paper 2014 (2), updated version, 1-32.
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5.1 Introduction
Genetic resources and their diversity are valuable for R&D in many industries. Nu-
merous discoveries rely on in-situ conservation of genetic resources. Countries en-
gage in costly active conservation by setting aside land as protected areas. Genetic
resources are also passively conserved in-situ if countries lack the capital or human
resources to exploit the land or if transaction costs are too high. Active and passive
conservation create positive externalities for genetic resource users. A remuneration
for passive and especially active conservation can be achieved through payments for
the use of genetic resources. Thereby the positive externalities of conservation that
accrue to genetic resource users can–at least partly–be internalised.
The ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ 1 (CBD) and its ‘Nagoya Protocol on
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Aris-
ing from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ 2 (NP) are the
global institutional framework for payments for genetic resource use. With its entry
into force, the CBD codified the sovereignty of states over their genetic resources.
Subsequently, countries started to regulate access to their genetic resources in order
to receive payments for the use of genetic resources and the associated traditional
knowledge from bilateral ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (ABS) contracts. The Nagoya
Protocol, which came into effect last year, specifies countries’ ABS obligations.
As countries within an eco-region share many genetic resources, they may benefit
from joint access regulation. The member countries of the Andean Community3
(‘Comunidad Andina’, CAN) were the first to opt for such special regulation. They
decided to pass community law, Decisio´n 391 4, to govern access to their genetic
resources already in 1996.
In this chapter we discuss advantages of eco-regional cooperation for the inter-
nalisation of positive conservation externalities accruing to genetic resource users.
We study the scope of eco-regional cooperation to improve upon the currently com-
mon bilateral contracts with a view (a) to achieving payments for physical genetic
1United Nations (1992): Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 Int’l Leg. Mat. 818, Rio de
Janeiro, 05.06.1992.
2United Nations (2010): Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Eq-
uitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Nagoya, 29.10.2010.
3The Andean states established the Andean Community with the Cartagena Accord in 1969.
Chile was a member until 1976, Venezuela from 1973 until 2006.
4Decisio´n 391 on a ‘Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources’ (Comision del Acuerdo
Cartagena (1996): Decisio´n 391: Re´gimen Comu´n sobre Acceso a los Recursos Gene´ticos, Gaceta
Oficial del Acuerdo de Cartagena, An˜o XII, Numero 213, Lima, 17.06.1996).
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resource use and thereby (b) to increasing conservation. In our analysis we consider
a continuum of cooperation from loose cooperative behaviour to collusion. In light
of transaction cost economics, we study on a generic level how general dimensions
of cooperation impact on economies of scale and other institutional factors–and
thereby on the volume of trade, the monetary and non-monetary benefits of coop-
erating countries, and conservation levels. Moreover, we analyse how a country’s
characteristics influence its share of cooperation induced benefits. We discuss the
potential of collusion and its impact on conservation. The CAN serves as a case
study and adds empirical insights to our theoretical analysis.
Economic and legal research have focused mainly on strong regional cooperation–
cartelization on the genetic resource market–to increase the revenues of countries
rich in biodiversity. From an economic perspective, Vogel et al. (i.a. 1995, 2000,
2007) have argued since long for an international cartel over genetic resources that
also covers natural information5. Besides, they propose the conversion of traditional
knowledge associated with genetic resources into trade secrets and the formation of
local cartels over these, which may merge into regional and subsequently a global
cartel. Others have touched upon genetic resource cartels and are more sceptical of
their success (Reid et al. (1996, p. 169); Richerzhagen (2011, p. 2254)). Asebey
and Kempenaar (1995) and Tilford (1998) provide legal studies of cartelization on
the biodiversity market. We differ from the above mentioned cartelization literature
in that we explicitly focus on regional cooperation over physical genetic resources,
analyse a continuum of loose cooperation to collusion, and additionally consider
implications for the level of biodiversity conservation. A related proposition by
Winter (2009) are common pools of genetic resources, whereby countries of the
same biogeographical region form corporations.
With regard to the CAN, Rosell (1997), Ten Kate (1997), Mariaca (1999), Tafur-
Dominguez (2000), Ruiz (2003), and Bucher (2008) review the content of Decisio´n
391 from a legal perspective; we add an economic analysis with our case study.
The chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 6.2 we provide a background on the
genetic resource market under the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol. In Section 5.3 we
introduce the dimensions of eco-regional cooperation in genetic resource trade. We
analyse eco-regional cooperation advantages in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5 we study
the CAN community access regulation. With Section 5.6 we conclude.
5Natural information is an even wider category than genetic information, including also, for
example, biomimicry (Vogel et al. 2011, p. 55).
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5.2 The genetic resource market under the CBD and
its Nagoya Protocol
The CBD and its Nagoya Protocol established an ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’
(ABS) mechanism to govern genetic resource use and the fair sharing of the re-
sulting benefits. The CBD defines genetic resources as “genetic material of actual
or potential value”, whereby “genetic material means any material of plant, animal,
microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity” (Art. 2 ). The
predominant, though not uncontested (ref. Schei and Tvedt 2010, p. 18), interpre-
tation is that the CBD applies only to genetic material, not to genetic or natural
information. We focus on physical genetic resources in this chapter.
The Nagoya Protocol entered into force in October 2014 and specifies the ABS
mechanism, which member countries have to implement.6 It regulates countries ac-
cess (Art. 6, 7 ), benefit sharing (Art. 5 ), and compliance obligations (Art. 15 - 18,
30 ) with regard to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. A user
entity has to ask a provider country for access to its genetic resources and/or tra-
ditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, i.e. to obtain ‘Prior Informed
Consent’ (PIC). If granted, user and provider country negotiate the terms of access
and benefit sharing, the ‘Mutually Agreed Terms’ (MAT). The benefit sharing can
take various forms and may include monetary (e.g. up-front payments, royalties)
and non-monetary benefits (e.g. joint R&D, technology transfer) (ref. Annex NP).
The benefits finally agreed upon in bilateral ABS mirror the relative negotiation
power of provider and customer, but also costs of providers and benefits for users.
Many countries, such as Brazil, are both provider and user countries.
The Nagoya Protocol foresees the creation of a ‘National Focal Point’ with inter-
national information and cooperation duties and a ‘Competent National Authority’
for granting access in member countries (Art. 13 ). A global ‘Access and Benefit-
sharing Clearing-House’ shall facilitate the information sharing (Art. 14 ). More-
over, the Nagoya Protocol provides for the development of model contractual clauses
(Art. 19 ), codes of conduct, guidelines, and best practices and/or standards (Art.
20 ), as well as awareness-rising (Art. 21 ), capacity building (Art. 22 ), and tech-
nology transfer, collaboration, and cooperation (Art. 23 ).
The Nagoya Protocol explicitly encourages transboundary cooperation (Art. 11 )
6The Nagoya Protocol is based on the 2002 ‘Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Re-
sources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization’
(UNEP/CBD/COP/6/24).
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and prompts a discussion on a ‘Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’ for
shared genetic resources or for resources for which PIC is not possible (Art. 10 ).
Genetic resources are important production factors for many industries, i.a.
pharmaceutical and cosmetic firms, biotechnology, and food and beverage indus-
tries (Ten Kate and Laird 1999, p. 9). Physical genetic resources are, for example,
accessed to be exported into another country for proliferation. They may also be ac-
cessed because of the genetic or natural information contained within them. Mostly,
it is the information that is commercially used (Stone (1994, p. 597); Schei and
Tvedt (2010)). Richerzhagen (2011, p. 2248) describes the current genetic resource
market as oligopsonistic. Ten Kate and Laird (2000, p. 245) explain that “life sci-
ence titans such as Monsanto, Novartis and Aventis evolve alongside a host of small
research biotechnology companies”. The supply-side concentration on the market
for physical genetic resources depends on the type of screening. Only for random
screening do all countries with reasonable biodiversity richness compete against each
other. Most screening, though, is knowledge-based, be it ‘biorational’, ‘chemotaxo-
nomic’ or ‘ethnobotanical’ (Ten Kate and Laird 2000, p. 249 f.). In this case, users
search for specific genetic resources–which reduces the number of suppliers before-
hand. Hence, we describe the market for physical genetic resources as a bilateral
oligopoly.
So far, bilateral bioprospecting falls behind expectations in terms of contract
numbers and magnitude of realised benefits (Boisvert and Vivien (2005, p. 466 f.);
Pastor and Ruiz (2009, p. 8)). Currently difficult access regulations from provider
countries raise transaction costs for users, which reduces the demand for access
to genetic resources (Ferna´ndez Ugalde 2007, p. 7). Also for providers, bilateral
contractual ABS involves–so far–considerable transaction costs for administration,
monitoring, and enforcement (Vogel 2007, p. 59 ff.). For most resource-rich coun-
tries, especially monitoring of contract compliance is a challenge (Ten Kate and
Laird 2000, p. 244). They face asymmetric information regarding the commer-
cial research process in the purchasing country and the sources of a final product’s
components. Detection of genetic resources taken without prior consent of the host
country or of resources acquired through illegal trade is similarly difficult. In addi-
tion, many countries implemented national legislation ineffectively and inefficiently
(Kamau et al. 2010, p. 248). Besides, the bilateral approach covers access to phys-
ical genetic resources and may also be applied to genetic information not yet in
the public domain; it cannot, however, capture the bulk of intangible genetic and
natural information in the (semi-)public domain.
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It has to be seen, whether and how far the Nagoya Protocol, which came into
force recently, changes bilateral contractual ABS and whether and how Art. 11, NP,
on transboundary cooperation and Art. 10, NP, on a ‘Global Multilateral Benefit-
Sharing Mechanism’ are implemented.
It is in this setting that we study the scope of eco-regional cooperation to improve
upon the currently common bilateral contracts with a view to achieving payments
for physical genetic resource use and thereby to increasing conservation.
5.3 Dimensions of eco-regional cooperation
In the following, we introduce different elements of eco-regional cooperation in phys-
ical genetic resource trade. Megadiverse countries can cooperate rather loosely by,
for example, coordinating information they reveal to third parties. Or in the other
extreme, they may collude in prices and reallocate benefits and thereby be close
to maximising their joint benefit. In the following we present general degrees of
cooperative behaviour from cooperation ((i)-(v)) to collusion (vi):
(i) Public notification of all bioprospecting processes.
(ii) A public register of genetic resources within the eco-region.
(iii) Coordination of access to genetic resources.
(iv) A regional competent authority.
(v) Reallocation of benefits according to a pre-defined rule.
(vi) Coordination in prices.
Public notification of bioprospecting processes (i) and a public register of biological
or genetic resources within the eco-region (ii) are forms of loose cooperation between
countries. They can vary in their set-up and comprehensiveness. The register might
be similar to or make use of existing genetic barcode databases7.
A stronger form of cooperation is the coordination of access to physical genetic
resources within the eco-region or even a joint access regulation (iii). Besides the
CAN’s Decisio´n 391, there are other regional frameworks of more or less coordinated
access: The ‘African Union’ has developed a non-binding ‘Model Legislation for
7For example: GenBank of the National Library of Medicine of the United States of
America (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ genbank/, last 19.09.2014), European Nucleotide Archive ENA
(www.ebi.ac.uk/ena, last 19.09.2014), DNA Data Bank of Japan (www.ddbj.nig.ac.jp, last
19.09.2014).
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the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for
the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources’ in 2001 to assist its members in
drafting national legislation (Munyi and Jonas 2013, p. 219 f.). The ‘Association
of South East Asian Nations’ has developed a ‘Framework Agreement’ on ABS,
which “leaves each Member State to determine the nature of the country’s access
instrument” (Cabrera Medaglia et al. 2012, p. 25) and is still a draft (ASEAN
Centre for Biodiversity 2013). The ‘Central American Commission on Environment
and Development’ has drafted a ‘Central American Protocol on Access to Genetic
and Biochemical Resources and the associated Traditional Knowledge’, which has
been signed but not ratified by its member countries (Cabrera Medaglia et al. 2012,
p. 80).8
A regional authority (iv) may coordinate joint action and represent the group
of cooperating countries. The member countries decide upon the range and depth
of its competencies; it might be responsible for or merely streamline information,
communication, negotiation and/or trade.
An even more intense form of cooperation is the redistribution of monetary and
possibly non-monetary benefits from genetic resource trade among members sharing
the same genetic resources within their eco-region (v). Monetary benefits might, for
example, be shared through a fund and non-monetary benefits through joint training
workshops or cooperation in R&D.
Cooperation merges into a collusion if countries agree on and are able to en-
force higher prices for physical genetic resources (vi). There are parallels to the
industrial economics literature, which we transfer and adapt to eco-regional state-
run collusion9. Most industrial cartels coordinate both in prices and market shares
(Harrington 2006, p. 5).10 Coordinating market shares typically implies agreeing
on trade volumes (quota) or allocating bioprospecting agents (e.g. per industry sec-
tor) according to a pre-defined rule. Considering genetic resource collusions, such
rule could prohibit undercutting prices of another member country that is already
8The Himalayan Region might develop a regional framework as well (Prasad Oli and Das Gupta
2008). The ‘Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries’ is not (yet) a cooperation in the sense
of this chapter as it does not (yet) comprise entire eco-regions.
9State-run cartels are not identical to industrial cartels. Levenstein and Suslow (2006, p. 49)
stress that “their goals are more complex than private cartels, including not only the maximization
of joint profits, but national economic stability and international political influence as well”.
10For example, the lysine cartel coordinated on one price, the citric acid cartel on two, and the
electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products cartel had many prices. The citric acid
cartel additionally introduced a global sales quota for each firm, the lysine cartel a minimum sales
target differentiated between the global and the European market, and the chlorine-chloride cartel
followed the home-market-principle (Harrington 2006, p. 6, 24-26, 33).
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negotiating with a customer. A quota, however, is not feasible because physical
genetic resources accessed to obtain the contained information can only be sold once
as the information is then likely to enter the public domain (Vogel et al. 2000, p.
105 f.). Hence, genetic resource collusions are likely to coordinate in prices. Fixing
explicit prices is easier if the collusion can focus on comparable goods like several
endemic species11. When a collusion’s product is too heterogeneous, internal compli-
ance control is difficult (Carlton and Perloff 2005, p. 135). Prices can be monetary
or non-monetary benefits (ref. Section 6.2). Besides coordination in prices (vi),
collusion may as well include all or some of the above described elements (i)-(v).
It might facilitate public notification (i) and a resource register (ii). If a collusion
enjoys cartel power and trust among its members exists, it might have an incentive
to increase bioprospecting rates via pro-active genetic resource advertising. Benefit
reallocation (v) among collusion members may include all or only collusion induced
benefits. In contrast to the latter, the former implies that countries obtain benefit
shares which would otherwise accrue exclusively to a neighbouring country. Such
total benefit redistribution is the strongest collusion type.
5.4 Eco-regional cooperation advantages
In this section we discuss eco-regional cooperation advantages arising from differ-
ent degrees of cooperation. We analyse on a generic level how the different design
elements (i)-(vi) contribute to economies of scale (Section 5.4.1) and other insti-
tutional factors (Section 5.4.2) as well as market power and bargaining strength
(Section 5.4.3). To address the entire amplitude of cooperation advantages in our
analysis, we refer in the following to a far-reaching eco-regional cooperation covering
the elements (i) to (vi). Table 5.1 summarises these impacts at the end of these three
sections.
Once we have shown the impact of eco-regional collaboration elements on economies
of scale, transparency, communal spirit, and market power and bargaining strength,
we then discuss their impact on transaction costs as well as monetary and non-
monetary benefits–and thereby on profits of cooperating countries (Section 5.4.4)
and on the level of biodiversity conservation (Section 5.4.5).
11Endemic species are species that are unique to a confined geographic location.
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5.4.1 Economies of scale
Economies of scale in administration, monitoring, and enforcement may arise from
cooperation and mutual exchange of information, especially if facilitated by a re-
gional competent authority (iv). The information complexity can be distributed
over all cooperating countries. Besides, knowledge spillovers occur, which lessen
each country’s information burden share even further. This includes information on
the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, international negotiations, national ABS regulations,
the reliability of customers, as well as information on genetic resources and related
knowledge. Public notification of ABS processes (i) further contributes to economies
of scale in monitoring a customer’s usage of genetic material and information as well
as products developed thereof. Especially with advancing technologies, economies
of scale in monitoring are increasingly important. Public notification additionally
generates economies of scale in enforcement by increasing transparency about cus-
tomers (ref. Section 5.4.2). A regional authority also lowers the enforcement costs
by discouraging non-compliance by customers via a higher threat of detection. Co-
ordination of access regulation (iii) will facilitate the work of a regional competent
authority and raise the described economies of scale.
Economies of scale in advertising may arise if a regional competent authority
(iv) increases the visibility and effectiveness of marketing campaigns; a public re-
source register (ii) will support these activities. Coordination in access (iii) generates
economies of scale in advertising as other countries will communicate identical or
similar access conditions to customers–even in absence of a regional authority.
Economies of scale in biotechnological development may result from exchange
of information through a regional authority (iv) as well. Cooperation increases the
chance that the worldwide unevenly distributed information on genetic resources
and biotechnological knowledge reaches a country. It also reduces the degree of
uncertainty inherent in this information as it can be verified with cooperating coun-
tries. A public resource register (ii), public notification of ABS processes and the
genetic resources involved (i), and benefit reallocation of non-monetary benefits in
form of joint R&D (v) contribute to economies of scale in biotechnological devel-
opment. They may occur even for the most developed country; it will gain from a
wider research network with an increased rate of innovations.
Additional side-benefits from a regional authority (iv) are possible regarding the
management of ‘cross-border affairs’ such as invasive alien species and effectiveness
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of regional policies such as nature conservation zones.12
5.4.2 Other institutional advantages
Eco-regional cooperation influences institutional aspects within the member coun-
tries. Neighbouring countries that build comparable institutions enable institutional
learning and adaptation and thereby enhance institutional functioning. A regional
authority (iv) is likely to reinforce institutional capacity. Joint action–in whichever
form–may create communal spirit and trust. Trust among cooperating countries
might enable pro-active resource advertising to increase bioprospecting rates. More-
over, a country’s property rights over genetic resources will enjoy a stronger enforce-
ment as other cooperating countries have an incentive to respect them in expectation
of reciprocal enforcement of their property rights over genetic resources.
Cooperation reduces the information asymmetry problem on both resource de-
mand and supply side. A genetic resource supply country has higher chances to
dispose over knowledge about the bioprospecting firm from other countries, espe-
cially in case of public announcement of ABS processes (i). This diminishes the
principal-agent-problem of moral hazard, i.e. the threat that a prospecting firm un-
dermines a contract by, for example, using the genetic material for R&D other than
agreed upon. In turn, a prospecting firm enjoys access to detailed public information
on a countries’ genetic resources and access requests by competitors. Moreover, a
genetic resource register (ii) eases the identification of one or several countries of ori-
gin. Coordination of access (iii) lowers information costs on access requirements of
different potential supply countries. A regional competent authority (iv) further in-
creases transparency for customers and suppliers. Transparency in genetic resource
trade lowers transaction costs in form of monitoring and enforcement costs for the
host countries and in form of search costs for the prospecting firms.
Countries belonging to an eco-regional cooperation may build up reputation.
As it is a transaction-specific expenditure and much dependent on the customer’s
perception, the return–becoming a preferable trading partner–is incalculable. Repu-
tation generates “idiosyncratic exchange relations” that withstand trade disruptions
better (Williamson 1979, p. 240 f.).
Eco-regional cooperation in physical genetic resource trade can influence some,
although probably not the most important components of the institutional environ-
12We thank a reviewer from the 2nd International Conference on Environment and Natural Re-
sources Management in Developing and Transition Economies (enrmdte), Clermont-Ferrand, 17. –
19.10.2012, for mentioning these additional side-benefits.
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ment. The institutional environment refers to a country’s political and economic
setting, which is simultaneously dependent on many factors such as corruption,
delinquency, unemployment, and trust (Davis and North 1970, p. 133). More specif-
ically, eco-regional cooperation cannot, for example, provide remedy for poor statal
enforcement such as control of illegal trade in genetic resources or even stealing of
resources. Similarly, eco-regional cooperation does not have a direct impact on the
deficiencies of national biodiversity governance institutions (e.g. those referred to
by Kamau et al. (2010, p. 248)). It might give an additional (needed) stimulus,
though, and reduce transaction costs of implementing these institutions.
5.4.3 Market power and bargaining strength
Collusion in prices of physical genetic resources (vi) may generate cartel profits, an
economic rent besides the remuneration of provision costs of a resource. Economic
rents are only possible in case of endemic resources, imperfect competition, or search
costs. Achieving economic rents through collusion requires cartel power. Cartel
power consists of the two related components ‘market power’ which is defined by
“the ability to price profitably above the competitive level” (Carlton and Perloff
2005, p. 8) and ‘bargaining strength’13 which describes the cartels ability to speak
with one voice, act as one, and commit credibly (Komorita 1977, p. 68).
Market power depends on the market share and the demand elasticity. The mar-
ket share for physical genetic resources rises in the share of global biodiversity, the
estimated share of unknown species, and the number of endemic species represented
by the eco-regional genetic resource cartel. The effectiveness of the cartel’s power
in rising prices hinges on the demand elasticity, i.e. it being inelastic. Empirically
estimated demand elasticities can currently not be obtained; the amount of avail-
able prices for and quantities of genetic resources is insufficient due to few and often
confidential bioprospecting contracts. Reid et al. (1996, p. 168 f.) assume an elastic
demand for biochemical resources for the pharmaceutical industry and a less elastic
one for genetic resources for agricultural use. The demand elasticity rests upon the
ease of substituting physical genetic resources as well as random or specific screening.
The most important substitute is the increasing importance of genetic and natural
information (ref. Section 6.2). It is a very imminent external factor threatening
eco-reginal collusion in physical genetic resource trade. Besides, genetic resources
that have been obtained prior to the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol are
13Also termed ‘tactical advantage’ by Komorita (1977, p. 68).
116 Chapter 5. Eco-regional Cooperation
substitutes as the obligations under the Protocol do not apply to them. In combi-
nation, these substitutes challenge the benefits and thus the impact of eco-regional
collusion. Hence, there might, if at all, only be a short window of opportunity for
colluding in prices of physical genetic resources before the continuously increasing
stock of substitutes in form of freely available genetic and natural information as
well as ex-situ resources nullifies market power. However, if any, market power, is
likely to be weak due to already existing substitutes.
The lower the market share the more important is bargaining strength. Cartel
members acting credibly as one may be able to appropriate a higher percentage
of a potential price differential between the buyers willingness-to-pay and the own
willingness-to-sell. Credibly implemented joint access regulation (iii) and a regional
authority (iv), which is equipped with competences to negotiate binding trade agree-
ments, are important elements for establishing bargaining strength. The cooperat-
ing countries will have to find a way of assuring the regional authority’s credibility,
for example, by agreeing on guidelines that balance freedom of authority and own
sovereignty. This balancing act is tricky. The competent authority will negotiate
every deal anew as there are no standardised products and prices, and will thereby
accumulate considerable knowledge. This knowledge lead may erode the power of
the countries and make them dependent on the regional authority.
For successful collusion, potential rents have to outweigh transaction costs of
collusion. The latter include notification, coordination, and negotiation costs among
collusion members, costs for enforcing the collusive agreement internally, as well as
costs for commitment devices. Moreover, there are costs of compromises as the
agreement might deviate from the individual optimum.
5.4.4 Impacts on the profits of cooperating countries
The profits of cooperating countries depend on the level of transaction costs and the
amount of monetary and non-monetary benefits. Economies of scale (ref. Section
5.4.1) and other institutional advantages such as transparency and mutual trust (ref.
Section 5.4.2) reduce transaction costs for biodiversity rich provider countries. New
transaction costs associated with cooperation, e.g. coordination costs, attenuate the
transaction cost reduction, but are arguably by far smaller than the transaction cost
reductions from cooperation advantages. Thus, there is most likely a net transaction
cost reduction for supply countries under eco-regional cooperation–raising profits.
Profits may also rise due to benefits induced by cooperation through an in-
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Table 5.1: Eco-regional cooperation advantages from cooperation elements (i) - (vi)
Public Public Access Regional Benefit Price
Benefit type notifi- resource coordi- autho- reallo- coordi-
cation register nation rity∗ cation nation
Economies of scale
Administration x† x
Monitoring x x† x
Enforcement x x† x
Advertising x x x
Biotechnological development x x x x•
Cross boarder affairs x
Other institutional advantages
Communal spirit/trust x x x x x
Transparency for suppliers x x
Transparency for customers x x x x
Reputation. x x
Market power and bargaining strength vis-a`-vis customers
Better trade conditions x x x
∗ The benefits realised through creating a regional authority are conditional on its institutional compe-
tencies. We consider a regional authority with far-reaching competencies.
† Indirect through facilitating economies of scale from a regional competent authority.
• In case of non-monetary benefits.
 Communal spirit manifests itself inter alia in the mutual recognition of property rights.
. Much dependent on the behaviour of the suppliers and expectations of the customers.
crease in the volume of trade. The reduction in transaction costs that arises for
customers (ref. Section 5.4.2) is likely to increase the eco-region’s attractiveness for
bioprospecting agents and, thus, to raise demand for physical genetic resources and
thereby benefits for supply countries. In addition, collusion induced benefits are
theoretically possible (ref. Section 5.4.3). In both cases, benefits may be monetary
and non-monetary.
Cooperating countries profit to different degrees from the increase in benefits. In
the following, we analyse factors that largely determine the distribution of potential
cooperation induced benefits. The benefit distribution is influenced by the countries’
characteristics and cooperation design. We first consider eco-regional cooperation
without benefit redistribution. Once the eco-region has attracted a trading partner,
countries within the eco-region compete against each other in the process of finalising
the contract between the customer and one of themselves. A country is the more
attractive the higher its relative biodiversity share and the lower the transaction
costs for the customer, i.e. the better the institutional environment.14 If coun-
14We consider customers from CBD Parties who have an interest in complying with the CBD. 194
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tries decide to redistribute benefits (v) as part of their eco-regional cooperation,
the relative distribution of the total benefit among these countries depends on the
respective allocation rule. A more in-depth analysis of a rule for the redistribution
of benefits and internal benefit spillovers or of market share allocation regulations is
beyond the scope of this chapter. In the end, though, these rules mirror the relative
negotiation power of countries as they are the result of a negotiation process. The
relative negotiation power assumably depends on the countries’ relative biodiversity
richness and relative political power, which tends to be correlated with the relative
institutional environment.
A cooperating country’s benefit share thus, arguably, generally depends on the
country’s (a) respective institutional environment and (b) relative level of biodiver-
sity and number of species endemic in its territory as compared to the other countries
of the eco-region. We give an overview of relative benefit shares in Table 5.2. Ceteris
Table 5.2: Cooperating countries’ relative benefit shares
Relative biodiversity richness
low high
Relative institu- unfavourable + ++
tional environment favourable +++ ++++
paribus, a relatively favourable institutional environment in comparison to other
countries leads to higher benefits. The same applies to a ceteris paribus relatively
higher biodiversity richness. The country with an institutional trade advantage or
an Hecksher-Ohlin comparative advantage relating to biodiversity endowments will
thus obtain the contract. Richerzhagen and Holm-Mu¨ller (2005) emphasize the im-
portance of the institutional environment for attracting genetic resource trade. A
cooperating country with the comparatively best institutional environment and the
highest biodiversity richness will reap the highest benefits (++++). It can appro-
priate the largest share of cooperation induced benefits. Considering eco-regional
cooperation among several biodiversity rich countries, we assume that a relatively
favourable institutional environment is more decisive for the magnitude of the benefit
share. Hence, a country characterised by a relatively good institutional environment
and a relatively low biodiversity richness (+++) will, arguably, gain (slightly) more
from eco-regional cooperation than a country with a relatively high biodiversity rich-
ness and a relatively unfavourable institutional environment (++). If biodiversity
countries are Parties to the CBD. (Online: www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list, last 11.07.2014).
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richness differs much among countries of the same eco-region, the ordering of these
two country types is likely to reverse. The country with the poorest institutional
environment and the relatively lowest biodiversity richness will hardly obtain any
benefits from eco-regional cooperation (+).
5.4.5 Indirect effects on the level of biodiversity conservation
The level of active and passive in-situ conservation of genetic resources depends on
many factors. Passive conservation results from the inability to exploit the land cost-
efficiently. Pressure on undeveloped land rises with increasing economic development
and human capital. Active conservation efforts may be grounded in intrinsic motives.
Besides, they may be induced by the prospect of income and job creation trough eco-
tourism and other direct benefits from conservation. Payments for access to physical
genetic resources are another factor that provides in-situ conservation incentives.
The payments internalise positive conservation externalities accruing to users of
physical genetic resources. Compared to the bilateral contractual approach, demand
is higher in case of eco-regional cooperation of megadiverse countries as prices for
customers are lower (ref. Section 5.4.2). A higher demand for physical genetic
resources should lead to an increase in conservation of physical genetic resources
and especially be an incentive for in-situ biodiversity conservation through its option
value for future bioprospecting contracts.
The case of strong cooperation in form of collusion (vi), though, is special. Suc-
cessful collusion would reduce demand for genetic resources compared to an ABS
mechanism with equal levels of transaction costs. Higher prices, though, might
create an incentive for in-situ conservation through the option value of profitable
bioprospecting contracts. Moreover, compared to the status-quo ABS successful
collusion does not necessarily reduce demand as the total access price might not
increase if collusion simultaneously leads to a reduction in a customer’s transaction
costs. If access is much more streamlined, explicit and transparent after collusion,
this reduction in transaction costs might overcompensate the rise in access price.
Thus, the effect of collusion on the level of biodiversity conservation might also be
positive, but is at least unclear.
A summary of this Section is provided by Figure 5.1, which illustrates the
described interlinkages: the impact of eco-regional cooperation on economies of
economies of scale (ref. Section 5.4.1), other institutional factors such as trans-
parency and communal spirit (ref. Section 5.4.2), and market power and bargaining
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strength (ref. Section 5.4.3), and their impact on transaction costs as well as mone-
tary and non-monetary benefits–and thereby on profits of cooperating countries (ref.
Section 5.4.4) and on the level of biodiversity conservation (ref. Section 5.4.5).
Figure 5.1: Eco-regional cooperation advantages
5.5 Case Study: The Andean Community’s cooperation
in genetic resource trade
The Andean Community15 (CAN) was the first eco-region that decided to regulate
access to its genetic resources by community law. In 1996 it passed Decisio´n 391 16 on
a ‘Re´gimen Comu´n sobre Acceso a los Recursos Gene´ticos’. The Andean countries’
motivation to collectively regulate access to genetic resources might be of monetary
and non-monetary nature. Ruiz (2003, p. 11) reports that perceptions of excessive
biopiracy and the related expectation of high potential commercial gains from genetic
resource trade largely influenced the drafting of Decisio´n 391 ; those involved thought
of bioprospecting as a “fountain of considerable richness”. This might also explain
15For information on the Andean Community ref. footnote 3.
16Ref. footnote 4.
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the–as we will expound–restrictiveness of the framework. But the CAN does not
refer to itself as a collusion. It intends with Decisio´n 391 to “establish the conditions
for just and equitable participation in the benefits of the access” (Art. 2a) and to
“strengthen the negotiating capacity of the Member Countries” (Art. 2e).
In this section we analyse the CAN’s Decisio´n 391 together with Resolucio´nes
414 17 and 415 18 detailing an application form and a model contract in light of
the previously discussed advantages of eco-regional cooperation in physical genetic
resource trade. In Section 5.5.1 we describe the characteristics of Decisio´n 391 and
in Section 5.5.2 we evaluate the cooperation advantages for the CAN members.
5.5.1 The Andean Community’s access regulation
Decisio´n 391 is embedded in the political-institutional environment of the CBD and
the Cartagena Agreement19. It directly applies in Colombia; Peru, Ecuador, and
Bolivia drafted special national legislation (Dı´az 2000, p. 10). Access regulation
is thus streamlined, but not uniform. In the following, we analyse Decisio´n 391 in
light of the cooperation characteristics introduced in Section 5.3.
Public notification of all bioprospecting processes. Decisio´n 391 includes the
notification of all other ‘Competent National Authorities’ (Art. 48, 49 ) and the
public of ABS processes (Art. 18, 21, 27, 28 ). It stipulates short time limits for the
Competent National Authorities to notify the public after application entry (5 days,
Art. 28 ), to evaluate the application after registration (30 days, Art. 29 ), and to
inform the applicant after the evaluation has been completed (5 days, Art. 30 ).
Public genetic resource register. Art. 50n calls upon the Competent National
Authorities to keep a national genetic resource register. Columbia created such
inventory (Law 99, Art. 5). Yet Art. 50n neither requires additional screening and
collecting activities nor public access to the inventory.
Coordination of access to genetic resources. Decisio´n 391 provides detailed ge-
netic resource access regulation (Art. 16 - Art. 47 as well as Resolucio´n 414 and
Resolucio´n 415 ). It includes access to in-situ and ex-situ resources as well as their
17Comision del Acuerdo Cartagena (1996): Resolucio´n 414: Adopcio´n del modelo referencial
de solicitud de acceso a recursos gene´ticos, Gaceta Oficial del Acuerdo de Cartagena, An˜o XIII,
Numero 217, Lima, 05.08.1996.
18Comision del Acuerdo Cartagena (1996): Resolucio´n 415: Adopcio´n del modelo referencial de
contrato de acceso a resursos gene´ticos, Gaceta Oficial del Acuerdo de Cartagena, An˜o XIII, Numero
217, Lima, 05.08.1996.
19The CAN is based on the Cartagena Agreement signed in 1969.
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by-products and intangible components20 (Art. 1, 3 ). The CAN requires that: CAN
nationals have to be part of the research, research in the country of origin has to be
supported, knowledge transfer mechanisms have to be established, state of the art
knowledge about the resource and method in question have to be transferred, and
the institutional development in the country of origin as well as the competencies of
local communities have to be supported (Art. 17a-f ). Moreover, prospectors have
to supply duplicates of collected resources, the research results, and the conditions
of material transfer contracts signed with other parties to the Competent National
Authority (Art. 17g-i). Only if the prospector provides the state of the art infor-
mation about the resource, its uses, and the associated risks, access will be granted
(Art. 22 ). Art. 35 requires a benefit sharing agreement as annex to the access
contract.
Regional competent authority. Decisio´n 391 inaugurates the ‘Andean Committee
on Genetic Resources’ with Art. 51. Alongside general coordination and recommen-
dation tasks, it is responsible for proposing an outline of a joint database for access
applications and contracts (Art. 51c) as well as a joint warning system for access
problems (Art. 51g), for promoting joint research and technology transfer (Art.
51d), and for management and control of access to shared resources (Art. 51f ).
The Andean Committee functions as umbrella organisation of the Competent Na-
tional Authorities. The latter keep their sovereignty over granting access and draft
national access regulation subject to the CBD and CAN Decisio´n 391 (Art. 5 )21.
Benefit reallocation. The CAN members do not redistribute benefits. The Com-
petent National Authority viz. country that attracts a bioprospector enters into
contract with the agent and obtains–if existent–the entire benefits.
Coordination in prices. Neither Decisio´n 391 nor the model contract contained
in Resolucio´n 415 specify a classification and assignment of genetic resources to
benefit-sharing requirements.
5.5.2 Analysis of the Andean Community’s cooperation advantages
We analyse the CAN’s theoretical advantages from jointly regulating access by De-
cisio´n 391 in form of transaction cost reductions and of an increase in benefits due
to additional demand (Section 5.5.2.1) as well as the distribution of cooperation
20Intangible components refer to “all individual or collective knowledge, innovations and practices
associated with a particular genetic resource or its derived products, whether or not protected by
intellectual property regimes” (Glowka 1997, p. 250).
21Decisio´n 391 has precedence over national law (Bucher 2008, p. 112).
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induced benefits among CAN members (Section 5.5.2.2). Subsequently, we contrast
them with realised cooperation advantages (Section 5.5.2.3).
5.5.2.1 Potential cooperation advantages for the Andean Community
In the following we discuss advantages, which the CAN members could theoreti-
cally realise through eco-regional cooperation as set out in Decisio´n 391 as well as
associated indirect impacts on conservation.
Economies of scale. CAN collusion members are to inform each other about all
ABS related aspects including in cases of defraud (Art. 48, 49 ). Thereby they profit
from a reduction in information costs regarding monitoring and enforcement activ-
ities. The CAN may achieve economies of scale in administration with Resolucio´n
414 specifying a model application form and Resolucio´n 415 outlining a model con-
tract. Besides, the CAN is likely to realise economies of scale in biotechnological
development. It aims to foster exchange and development of technologies and sci-
entific and technological knowledge (Art. 2d, 8, 9 ). To this end CAN members are
to organise subregional trainings (Art. 10 ), coordinated by the Andean Committee
(Art. 51d). Art. 17c requires mechanisms to transfer state of the art knowledge
about resources, which customers demand, and the methods they use. Moreover,
economies of scale may arise from cooperation in conservation (Art. 10 ).
Other institutional advantages. The CAN stipulates “national, and not dis-
criminatory, treatment” among members regarding access (Art. 11 ). Decisio´n 391
acknowledges the property rights of “the native, Afro-American and local commu-
nities” (Art. 7 ) and requires the recognition of suppliers in access contracts (Art.
34 ). If implemented, these regulations have the potential to ease national as well as
regional societal distress. However, there is also a risk that indigenous communities
generally refuse the marketing of genetic resources they perceive as sacred. Decisio´n
391 is likely to increase transparency in genetic resource trade on the demand and
the supply side. A CAN member country should know about prospecting activities
of, compliance by, and sanctions for an agent by other CAN members (Art. 48,
49 ). Information on all ABS processes and contracts has to be made public (Art.
18, 21, 27 )–access applications and approvals are published in the newspaper (Art.
28, 38)–and hence the CAN members can possibly count on additional information
about a customer from the public domain. The prospecting firm has to inform the
CAN contract party about the requested genetic resource (Art. 22 ). The high dis-
covering probability created by joint CAN action and strict disclosure provisions has
124 Chapter 5. Eco-regional Cooperation
the potential to reduce the threat of moral hazard. Similarly, the prospecting firm is
supposed to enjoy transparency about the access procedure, the terms of the model
contract (Resolucio´n 415 ), and potential rival applicants22 (Art. 18, 21, 27, 28,
38 ). Art. 15 calls for “clear, effective, well-grounded and lawful” access processes
and Art. 28, 29, 30 ensure timewise procedural certainty. Furthermore, Decisio´n
391 includes a “national inventory of genetic resources and their by-products”(Art.
50n), however does not mention whether bioprospectors can obtain access to it.
Market power and bargaining strength. The Andean countries host two biodi-
versity hotspots, the ‘Tropical Andes Hotspot ’ and the ‘Tumbes-Choco´-Magdalena
Hotspot ’ (Mittermeier et al. 2004), as well as important wilderness areas. The Trop-
ical Andes Hotspot is acknowledged in the community’s name and the leading of the
35 world biodiversity hotspots23 (Mittermeier et al. (2004); Williams et al. (2011)).
It has the highest estimated number of endemic plant and vertebrate species and
the second largest remaining primary vegetation area (Mittermeier et al. 2004, p.
32 f.). The current CAN members and Venezuela24 cover 25% of global biodiversity
(CAN 2002, p. 13). The CAN’s high share of global biodiversity together with
joint access regulation in form of Decisio´n 391 and the ‘Andean Committee on Ge-
netic Resources’ as a regional authority are promising cooperation characteristics
for building up market power and bargaining strength. However, substitutes for ge-
netic resources qualify the high market share and reduce market power (ref. Section
5.4.3). Moreover, the Andean Committee is equipped with only few competences.
It lacks, for example, the authorization to negotiate binding trade agreements (Art.
5 ). CAN member countries continue to negotiate unilaterally, not as a block with
the other countries of the eoc-region. Decisio´n 391 is therefore also unlikely to
improve much upon the bargaining strength of the CAN countries.
Impacts on the CAN’s profits. The profits of the CAN member countries have
the potential to be higher than without cooperation due to transaction cost reduc-
tions and cooperation induced benefits. Considerable economies of scale and other
institutional advantages can theoretically be realised; these would lead to transac-
tion cost reductions and thereby increase the CAN’s profits. As described above,
transaction cost reductions also arise for customers. These are likely to increase
demand for genetic resources of the Andean eco-region. Thereby the CAN is able
22Art. 19 allows for confidential treatment of information that “could be put to unfair commercial
use by third parties” subject to restrictive conditions.
23Biodiversity hotspots are areas hosting at least 0.5% of global plant species as endemic ones
and that have diminished to 30% of its original size (Myers et al. 2000).
24Venezuela was part of the CAN from 1973 until 2006 (ref. footnote 3).
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Table 5.3: Andean countries’ biodiversity richness and endemism∗
Country4 Diversity Deviation Mammals Birds Plants
Index  from expected total endemic threatened total endemic threatened total endemic
richness† no. (%) no. (%)
Argentina 0.196 0.423 320 49 32 (10) 897 19 38 (4) 9,372 1,100
Bolivia 0.239 0.882 316 16 23 ( 7) – 18 27 (–) 17,367 4,000
Chile 0.112 0.229 91 16 21 (23) 296 16 15 (5) 5,284 2,698
Colombia 0.538 1.685 359 34 36 (10) 1,695 67 77 (5) 51,220 15,000
Ecuador 0.353 1.519 302 25 31 (10) 1,388 37 60 (4) 19,362 4,000
Peru 0.369 1.344 460 49 47 (10) 1,538 112 71 (5) 17,144 5,356
Venezuela 0.379 1.398 323 19 25 ( 8) 1340 40 24 (2) 21,073 8,000
∗ Endemism refers here to species endemic to one particular Andean country.
4 Andean countries which are not part of the CAN are written in italics.
 The diversity index is the mean of biodiversity richness and endemism. It ranges from 0 - 1. Globally, Brazil has the highest index
value (0.74). Colombia ranks fifth. The calculation is given in Groombridge and Jenkins (2002, p. 295).
† The relative biodiversity richness with regard to a country’s territorial size. Groombridge and Jenkins (2002, p. 296) use the Arrhenius
equation for this calculation. Globally, Indonesia has the highest relative biodiversity richness with a value of 1.844. Colombia ranks
second, Ecuador third, and Brazil forth with a value of 1.436.
Source: Data from the ‘World Atlas of Biodiversity’ (Groombridge and Jenkins 2002, p. 295 ff.).
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to appropriate cooperation induced monetary and non-monetary benefits. Market
power and bargaining strength, however, are unlikely to be pronounced enough to
raise benefits much beyond the effect of the increase in demand.
Indirect effects on conservation. The theoretically potential increase in profits
is likely to provide an incentive for continued and increased in-situ conservation
of genetic resources. Moreover, economies of scale may arise from the cooperation
mechanism on conservation matters of common interest (Art. 10 ).
5.5.2.2 The distribution of potential cooperation induced benefits
Potential cooperation induced benefits vary between CAN members. Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia are all megadiverse countries, but differ in their rela-
tive biodiversity richness and number of endemic species. They also vary in their
institutional environment. The two factors in combination determine the share each
country can obtain from total cooperation induced benefits (ref. Section 5.4.4).
Relative biodiversity richness. Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru share the ‘Tumbes-
Choco´-Magdalena Hotspot’ in addition to the ‘Tropical Andes Hotspot’, which also
stretches across Bolivia. Table 5.3 presents Groombridge and Jenkins’s (2002)
‘World Atlas of Biodiversity’ figures for biodiversity richness and endemism of the
Andean countries. Not surprisingly, Bolivia has the comparatively lowest diversity
in terms of biodiversity richness and endemism (0.239). Colombia scores highest
(0.538), followed by Peru (0.369) and Ecuador (0.353). Biodiversity richness per
area is important for the screening costs bioprospectors face. Here again, Colombia
ranks first (1.685) and Bolivia last (0.882). Ecuador (1.519), though, has a higher
per area biodiversity richness than Peru (1.344).
Relative institutional environment. We use selected indicators of the ‘Worldwide
Governance Indicators’ 25 (WGI) of the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2010) to com-
pare the institutional environment of the Andean countries. Table 5.4 presents the
WGI 2013 values for the indicators ‘regulatory quality’ (RQ), ‘government effective-
ness’ (GE) and ‘rule of law’ (RL) for these countries. Regulatory quality captures
“perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development”, gov-
ernment effectiveness “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
25Online: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx, last accessed on 29.11.2014.
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Table 5.4: Relative institutional environment of the Andean countries
Country∗ Regulatory Government effec- Rule of Mean
quality (RQ) tiveness (GE) law (RL)
Argentina -0.99 -0.29 -0.73 -0.67
Bolivia -0.79 -0.40 -1.07 -0.75
Chile 1.48 1.25 1.34 1.35
Colombia 0.39 0.04 -0.45 -0.01
Ecuador -0.94 -0.49 -0.95 -0.79
Peru 0.45 -0.14 -0.61 -0.10
Venezuela -1.64 -1.14 -1.79 -1.52
∗ Andean countries which are not part of the CAN are written in italics.
Source: Data from WGI 2013 (ref. footnote 25). The indicator range is -2.5 to 2.5, with higher
values corresponding to better performance.
commitment to such policies”, and rule of law “perceptions of the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence”26. The three indicators are correlated in case
of the Andean countries as can be seen in Figure 5.2. We therefore use the mean
to compare the Andean Countries’ institutional environment. Colombia achieves
the relatively highest mean of the three indicator values (-0.01), closely followed by
Peru (-0.10). Bolivia ranks third (-0.75), closely followed by Ecuador (-0.79). The
ranking should, however, be interpreted cautiously, because the values lie close to
one another, the aggregation level is high, and thresholds are likely regarding the
importance of the relative institutional environment for benefit appropriability.
Relative benefit share. Combining the scores in relative institutional environment
and biodiversity richness, we can deduce a very tentative ranking in benefit shares.
Figure 5.3 shows the CAN members’ performance in these two dimensions. A clear
ranking in benefit shares is not possible. Colombia and Peru have a strict domi-
nance in benefit share appropriability over Bolivia and Ecuador. A ranking between
Colombia and Peru as well as between Bolivia and Ecuador is speculative.
Following our assessment, Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela, which belong to the
same eco-region, but not to the CAN, have lower chances to appropriate benefits in-
duced by eco-regional cooperation than the current CAN members. In the considered
WGI 2013 indicators (ref. Table 5.4), Venezuela performs worst among the Andean
26Online: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/rq.pdf, http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/ge.pdf, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/rl.pdf, last 29.11.2014.
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Figure 5.2: Correlation of WGI 2013 indicator values for the Andean Countries
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Source: Own diagram based on WGI 2013 data of the World Bank, ref. footnote 25.
Figure 5.3: Relative institutional environment and biodiversity richness of the Andean
Community member countries
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Source: Own diagram based on WGI 2013 data (ref. footnote 25) and data from the ‘World Atlas
of Biodiversity’ (Groombridge and Jenkins 2002, p. 295 ff.).
countries (mean: -1.52). The mean of the three WGI indicator values is higher for
Argentina (-0.67) and Chile has the by far highest mean (1.35), but they have com-
paratively very low diversity index scores (Chile 0.122, Argentina 0.196; ref. Table
5.3). The vast majority of the Tropical Andes is in effect located in the current CAN
member states, and the Andes make up only a relatively small part of Venezuela’s,
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Chile’s, and Argentina’s total land size. With in comparison relatively low biodi-
versity richness and endemism (Chile, Argentina) or an comparably unfavourable
institutional environment (Venezuela), the three Andean non-member countries of
the CAN have little chance of attracting numerous bioprospectors. An Andean
country with a low probability to act as contracting party will over-proportionally
shoulder cooperation costs, possibly to the extend that it has no incentive for re-
gional cooperation. This coincidences with the actual composition of the CAN.
5.5.2.3 Realised cooperation advantages
The CAN members admit in their ‘Regional Biodiversity Strategy’ (CAN 2002, p.
34) that there only “exist isolated experiences of sharing of benefits arising from
access to genetic resources” and that they are “confronted by problems hindering
the application of Decisio´n 391; and this Decision, in spite of its importance, has not
so far proven itself to be an effective instrument for achieving the hoped-for sharing
of benefits.” Ruiz (2008, p. 17) compiles eight genetic resource access contracts for
Colombia and five for Bolivia until 2007, whereby we have no information whether
these are commercial contracts. Until early 2013 Peru has been involved in two com-
mercial contract negotiations, but could not conclude them successfully27; Ecuador
records none28. Viewed over one decade, these are few–if not none–commercial con-
tracts and benefits compared to initial expectations and other countries: Costa Rica,
arguably a benchmark for a successful provider country under the status-quo ABS,
has signed about 65 contracts with industries and universities until early 201329,
from which it realised a number of monetary and non-monetary benefits (Ga´mez
2007, p. 85 f.); however, so far no royalties30.
The discrepancy between the potential eco-regional cooperation advantages de-
scribed in Section 5.5.2.1 and the limited ones actually realised by the CAN may
be explained by several factors. There is no cooperation between the national focal
points, no benefit transfer between member countries exists, and the importance of
27Personal communication with the ABS National Focal Point (NFP) under the CBD of Peru on
the occasion of the first meeting of the Plenary of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES-1) in Bonn on 23.01.2013.
28Personal communication with the ABS NFP of Ecuador on the same occasion and date.
29Correspondence with a member of the Biodiversity Commission of the University of Costa Rica
on 04.05.2013.
30Presentation at the “Informal Meeting for the Implementation of Articles 19 and 20 of the
Nagoya Protocol”, Tokyo, 25.–26.03.2013.
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the Andean Committee is limited, because it lacks own finance.31 The scarce im-
plementation of the provisions of Decisio´n 391 implies that economies of scale and
improvements in institutional factors will be limited. It is not clear to what extent
communal spirit and trust prevail among the CAN members. Missing trust could
explain why amendments that improve upon the known deficiencies of Decisio´n 391
or advancements in its implementation are absent. Ruiz (2003, p. 12) contests the
incentives for communitarian action and attests an absence of political will among
the member countries to prioritise the functioning of Decisio´n 391 (ibid., p. 18).
In addition, new transaction costs arise for the CAN members from Decisio´n 391
in form of coordination, notification, and communication costs as well as costs of
compromises. Ruiz (2003, p. 13) reckons that the CAN states have underestimated
the latter ex-ante.
For customers, some reductions in transaction costs may occur due to the time-
wise procedural certainty provided by Decisio´n 391 as well as the model application
form (Resolucio´n 414 ) and the model contract (Resolucio´n 415 ). However, new
transaction costs have been created by Decisio´n 391. Especially the requirements
related to the involvement of ‘subregional nationals’, knowledge transfer and insti-
tutional development listed in Art. 17 are costly for customers to deliver. Addi-
tionally, shared competencies between the Andean Committee, national authorities,
and local communities are perceived as a hindrance (Bucher 2008, p. 147 f.). Taken
altogether, the CAN cannot be described as an example of successful eco-regional
cooperation in genetic resource trade.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we analysed the scope of eco-regional cooperation in physical genetic
resource trade to improve upon the status-quo bilateral approach with a view (a) to
achieving payments for physical genetic resource use and thereby (b) to increasing
conservation. We considered a continuum of cooperation from loose cooperative
behaviour to price determining collusion, but conclude that the benefits of collusion
will be low due to limited market power through the availability of substitutes.
Especially easily distributable and accessible genetic and natural information are
threatening collusion.
We evince eco-regional cooperation advantages on the market for physical genetic
31Personal communication with the ABS NFPs of Peru and Ecuador (ref. footnote 27, 28).
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resources. Our findings suggest that, compared to the status-quo and dependent on
the degree of cooperation, eco-regional coalitions have the potential to significantly
reduce transaction costs for both suppliers and customers. Economies of scale in
information, administration, monitoring, and enforcement together with other insti-
tutional advantages such as transparency and reputation are important advantages
of eco-regional cooperation that lower transaction costs for suppliers. In particular
transparency also reduces transaction costs for customers. Transaction cost reduc-
tions for customers reduce the price for physical genetic resources and thus increase
their demand. An increase in demand of physical genetic resources increases the
volume of benefits for biodiversity rich countries. Cooperating countries with a rel-
atively higher biodiversity richness and–in case of megadiverse countries even more
relevant–a comparatively better institutional environment are able to appropriate
a higher share of these cooperation induced benefits. A higher demand for genetic
resources should also lead to an increase in conservation of genetic resources. It
increases the perceived option value for future bioprospecting contracts and thereby
provides an incentive for in-situ biodiversity conservation. Our case study of the An-
dean Community’s joint access legislation, however, reveals that the CAN members
realise few of these potential cooperation advantages.
A successful implementation of the Nagoya Protocol, which came into force re-
cently, might lower transaction costs of bilateral contractual ABS and thereby the
advantages of eco-regional collusion. It remains to be seen whether and how far
the Nagoya Protocol changes bilateral contractual ABS. Especially an effectively
functioning global ‘Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House’ (NP, Art. 14 ) may
facilitate information sharing. So far, albeit highly promising, the implementation
of the ABS Clearing-House32 finds itself at the beginning. Besides, the provisions
on model contractual clauses (NP, Art. 19 ), codes of conduct, guidelines, and best
practices and/or standards (NP, Art. 20 ), awareness-rising (NP, Art. 21 ), capacity
building (NP, Art. 22 ), and technology transfer, collaboration, and cooperation (NP,
Art. 23 ) have the potential to reduce transaction costs for both providers and users.
Hence, eco-regional cooperation might become less attractive. The Nagoya Proto-
col might, however, just as well increase the relevance of eco-regional cooperation–
depending on whether and how its member countries implement Art. 11, NP, on
transboundary cooperation. Moreover, the situation might change considerably if
countries agree on the need for and modalities of implementation of a ‘Global Multi-
lateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’ (NP, Art. 10 ). The latter might even open up
32Ref. online: https://absch.cbd.int/, last 14.03.2015.
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the possibility to address genetic and/or natural information.
Genetic and natural information are of high and growing importance for com-
mercial users of genetic resources. They limit the scope, relevance, and benefits
of eco-regional cooperation in trade of physical genetic resources. Genetic or nat-
ural information can hardly be included in a regional cooperation agreement due
to their non-excludable nature. The prospect for eco-regional cooperation will thus
be most relevant in the short-run. With technological progress and further growth
of new commercial research fields that predominantly rely on genetic and natural
information, a global mechanism becomes indispensable if one aims at simultane-
ously achieving the three goals of the CBD, namely “the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing
of benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources” (CBD, Art. 1 ). In
any case, regional and global mechanisms need to be designed such that they lead to
marked reductions in transaction costs and thereby create incentives for countries to
continue and deepen cooperation. Moreover, increased transparency for customers
is vital for lowering their transaction costs and rising demand. If demand rises, we
can expect the importance of in-situ conservation among biodiversity rich countries
to follow suit.
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Chapter 6
Bilateral vs. Multilateral? On the Economics
and Politics of a Global Mechanism for Genetic
Resource Use
Abstract: Many industries profit from public biodiversity conservation through
the use of genetic resources in R&D processes. The conservation of biodiver-
sity, though, is an under-provided public good. The aim of this chapter is to
analyse a global mechanism as a policy tool to internalise the positive conserva-
tion externalities accruing to commercial users of genetic resources. The United
Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ (CBD) and its ‘Nagoya Protocol
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Bene-
fits Arising from their Utilisation’ provide a framework for such mechanism.
Our inter- and transdisciplinary research consists of an economic analysis of
the genetic resource market, the study of CBD documents, an online discus-
sion forum launched by the Convention’s Secretariat on a global multilateral
mechanism, as well as expert interviews with important political stakeholders
on genetic resource trade. We find that the economically preferable instrument
of a comprehensive global mechanism is politically not feasible any time soon
due to path dependencies and an arguably narrow understanding of national
sovereignty. Technological progress in genetic resource use, though, might fi-
nally induce countries to establish a confined one in the mid-term future. We
provide substantiated findings on countries’ preferences for its scope and modal-
ities.
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6.1 Introduction
Genetic resources are an important production factor in many industries. They are a
vital input for numerous R&D processes of new products. Novel research techniques
and fields like genomics together with emerging markets such as the functional food
industry indicate a further increasing significance of genetic resources. Biodiversity
conservation maintains the diversity of genetic resources, which is one dimension
of biodiversity1 and essential for R&D, largely through protected areas. Genetic
resource users thus profit from positive conservation externalities2.
In this chapter we explore a global mechanism as a policy tool to internalise
positive conservation externalities accruing to commercial genetic resource users–
agents accessing and using physical genetic resources or genetic information3 for
profit-oriented R&D. Our research is motivated by the obvious and much deplored
under-provision of biodiversity conservation together with the commitment by the
international community to halt biodiversity loss by 2020, a target set in the ‘Strate-
gic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020’ 4 of the ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ 5
(CBD). To fulfil their commitment, parties to the CBD strive to increase the mo-
bilisation of financial resources. However, biodiversity conservation is lower on the
political agenda as the eradication of hunger, malnutrition and poverty, for which
adequate finance is already a challenge. Thus, it will not be easy to rally finan-
cial pledges sufficient to achieve the social optimal level of biodiversity conservation
(currently politically defined in the ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020’ ). A
broader approach is necessary; one that mainstreams biodiversity and includes a
portfolio of policy instruments, such as the elimination of subsidies that are harmful
to biodiversity, the employment of positive incentives for biodiversity conservation
and sustainable use, and the internalization of positive biodiversity conservation ex-
1Biodiversity “includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems”(CBD,Art.2 ).
2Positive externalities are unremunerated benefits for third parties arising from someone’s action.
For an introduction to the concept of externalities refer to, e.g., Varian (2006, p. 626 ff.). In this
paper we focus on a fraction of all positive externalities of biodiversity conservation–those from
which genetic resource users such as pharmaceutical firms profit. The internalisation of other
positive conservation externalities as well as the internalisation of negative externalities through
land use, production, and consumption, are beyond the scope of this paper.
3We focus on genetic information rather than on the wider category of natural information as
our analyses addresses commercial genetic resource users in the context of current debates under
the Nagoya Protocol. The mechanism can nevertheless be broadened by applying it to natural
information, including, for example, users of biomimicry.
4UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2, Annex III.
5United Nations (1992): Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 Int’l Leg. Mat. 818, Rio de
Janeiro, 05.06.1992.
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ternalities to reduce the under-provision of conservation. In this chapter we focus
on the latter.
Correcting market failures caused by externalities through their internalisation
features prominently in the environmental economic literature. This chapter ad-
dresses a less frequent setting, namely the internalisation of positive externalities
that accrue to internationally operating private entities when using physical genetic
resources and genetic information spillovers to the public domain from other firms’
uses. Through the internalisation the demand for genetic resources, and thereby
arguably biodiversity conservation, increases. The policy instrument is a global
mechanism based on an international environmental agreement without a superior
enforcement authority. Commercial users pay a fee for physical genetic resources
and a subsidy is employed to internalise benefits from genetic information spillovers.
The instrument thus follows the user-pays-principle6. It complements others that
address those engaging in the protection of biodiversity more directly according
to the provider-gets-principle such as payments for ecosystem services (e.g. Fer-
raro and Kiss (2002); Wunder (2007)) and auctioning conservation contracts (e.g.
Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997). With our research we build on
and contribute to the existing economic literature. Previous economic studies anal-
ysed multilateral ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (ABS) in the context of economics of
information, transaction cost economics, and cartelization (Vogel (i.a. 1995, 2007,
2011), Ruiz et al. (2010), Winands and Holm-Mu¨ller (2014) id. Chapter 5). Deke
(2004) discusses the internalisation of positive global externalities from protected
areas by multilateral compensation agreements.
The aim of this chapter is twofold: to provide an economic analysis of the genetic
resource market and to explore the political feasibility of a global mechanism that
internalises positive biodiversity conservation externalities accruing to commercial
users of physical genetic resources and genetic information with the objective of in-
creasing biodiversity protection. The analysis is conducted against the background
of the CBD’s history in which the Convention granted much desired state sovereignty
over biological resources and in which the ‘Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utiliza-
6Firms using genetic material individually remunerate the use and the entire society pays an
additional subsidy on resource use to internalise information spillovers. The user-pays-principle
differs from the provider-gets-principle in that the instrument’s point of contact is the beneficiary
of the positive externalities. In the context of the internalisation of negative externalities the
user-pays-principle refers to the “indirect responsibilities of second order” as an extension of the
polluter-pays-principle (Cordier et al. 2014, p. 1).
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tion’ 7 (NP) under the CBD has been implemented as a bilateral, contractual ABS
mechanism where genetic resources are largely understood as physical resources.
Politically, our analysis is timely as we take up a current discussion under the NP
on the need for and modalities of a ‘Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’
(GMBSM) for a set of specific genetic resources for which benefits are then dedi-
cated to conservation and sustainable use (ref. NP, Art. 10 ). We therefore also
study the politically discussed option of a global mechanism restricted to specific
genetic resources. Our analysis is inter- and transdisciplinary; besides the economic
analysis, we study the genetic resource market from the political perspective, draw
on legal texts and studies, and involve stakeholders. The empirical research method-
ology is a triangulation that consists of the study of CBD documents and an online
discussion forum organised by the CBD Secretariat on a global multilateral mecha-
nism as well as expert interviews with important political stakeholders. We consider
this combination of economic theory and actors’ perceptions essential for exploring
appropriate policy tools.
The chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 6.2 we describe the political and
institutional background of the genetic resource market. In Section 6.3 we provide
an economic analysis of this market and motivate a global mechanism that inter-
nalises positive biodiversity conservation externalities accruing to commercial users
of genetic resources. Subsequently, we evaluate the political feasibility of such mech-
anism; in Section 6.4 we outline the empirical research methodology and in Section
6.5 we present the results. We conclude with Section 6.6.
6.2 Political and institutional background
Genetic resources are defined by the CBD as “genetic material of actual or potential
value”, whereby material refers to “any material of plant, animal, microbial or other
origin containing functional units of heredity” (CBD, Art. 2 ). The functional units
of heredity comprise genetic information. Hence, genetic resources have a physical
dimension and an informational dimension. New technologies involve a growing
production and use of digital genetic information, allow research on genetic resources
of increased scope, reduced time and higher precision, and open up new fields of R&D
(Laird and Wynberg 2012).
7United Nations (2010): Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Eq-
uitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Nagoya, 29.10.2010.
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Trade in (physical) genetic resources is governed by the CBD (i.a. state sover-
eignty) and by the NP, which codifies the rules on ABS8: Users have to solicit access
to (physical) genetic resources in a provider country by requesting ‘Prior Informed
Consent’ (PIC). Both parties then negotiate the terms by which access is granted
and benefits are shared (‘Mutually Agreed Terms’ (MAT)). The recipients of the
benefits may use them to whichever end they like; conservation and sustainable
use are merely encouraged (NP, Art. 9 ). However, the NP explicitly interlinks
the Convention’s three aims of biodiversity conservation, its sustainable use, and
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from genetic resource use (CBD, Art.
1 ) in the context of a potential ‘Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’
(GMBSM) for resources “that occur in transboundary situations or for which it is
not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent” (NP, Art. 10 ). In these cases
benefits are earmarked for conservation and sustainable use. It requests parties to
consider the need for and modalities of a GMBSM (ibid.)9. The potential GMBSM
is denominated ‘mechanism’ rather than ‘fund’ to highlight that it may comprise
monetary and non-monetary benefits (Greiber et al. 2012, p. 130). Delegates to
the CBD’s tenth Conference of the Parties (COP), at which the NP was adopted,
decided that the GMBSM of Art. 10 should be considered at the second meeting of
the ‘Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol’ (ICNP-2)10, the interim
governing body for the Protocol. The discussions at ICNP-2 and subsequently at
COP 11, ICNP-3, and the first COP serving as the meeting of the parties to the
Nagoya Protocol (COP-MOP 1) did not resolve the debate over the need for and
modalities of a GMBSM (ref. Section 6.5.1).
An important issue, which has so far not been thoroughly discussed by the
parties to the CBD or to the NP, is whether and how genetic information resources
are addressed. The topic seems to surface under CBD agenda items as an aside from
time to time–apparently without stirring up discussions.11
8The NP builds on the Bonn Guidelines (United Nations (2002): Bonn Guidelines on Access to
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization.
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/24).
9This compromise was reached with the African Union in last-minute informal ministerial nego-
tiations (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 544, p.3, ref. Supplementary Material S.6.2).
10UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1, Annex II, Section B, Item 10, ref. Supplementary Material
S.6.1.
11Among others, as information documents for meetings of the Ad-Hoc Open-Ended Work-
ing Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing in 2005 (Oldham 2004), 2009 (Garrity et al. 2009),
and 2010 (Schei and Tvedt (2010), Singer (2009), CGIAR (2010)), in the online discussion fo-
rum on Art. 10, NP (ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1), and as information document on
synthetic biology in preparation of COP 12 (UNEP/CBD/COP/12/INF/12, par. 172 ff, online:
www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-12/information/cop-12-inf-12-en.pdf, last 24.10.2014).
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A global mechanism that covers more genetic resources than those comprised
under Art. 10, NP, or all genetic resources–physical and informational ones–would
legally be possible under Art. 4, NP, as a specialised international agreement as long
as it harmonises with the objectives of the CBD and the NP (Kamau et al. 2010, p.
258). A multilateral system already exists for genetic material from several crops
governed under the ‘International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture’ (ITPGRFA)12 and listed in its Annex I.
6.3 Economic analysis of the genetic resource market
A global mechanism that internalises positive biodiversity conservation externalities
accruing to commercial users of genetic resources, both physical and informational
ones, is a potential alternative to the status-quo bilateral transactional ABS mecha-
nism. From an economic perspective such global mechanism could include in its sim-
plest form: no bilateral negotiations, access to all genetic resources, pre-determined
payments for genetic resource use into a global fund, subsidies to internalise the
benefits of genetic information in the public domain. We present findings from eco-
nomic theory, namely economics of information and transaction costs economics, on
such global mechanism and derive a simple model to illustrate the argument.
The informational dimension of genetic resources has similar characteristics and
implications as artificial information. Genetic and natural information13 is easily
distributed, especially as digital genetic code, and thus quickly in the public domain
(e.g. Schei and Tvedt 2010). Obtaining a remuneration for the provision of genetic
information resources, let alone an economic rent, is most unlikely under bilateral
ABS. Once genetic information is in the public domain, users can profit from it free
of charge, because a single country, or a few countries together, cannot regulate in-
tangible information. Novel genetic information may, if at all, be traded once. Users
acquiring genetic material often release the information contained therein as part of
the utilisation process and render further trade in the respective material or infor-
mation improbable. A firm A, for example, remunerates a country Z for screening,
discovers an interesting active ingredient, and subsequently develops a product out
of it for which it files a patent. Firm B uses the genetic information about the active
ingredient, which is not covered by the patent, also develops a product, and sells
12FAO (2001): International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Reso-
lution 3/2001, Rome, 3.11.2001)
13Ref. Footnote 3.
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it. Country Z has only been remunerated by firm A. The remuneration would have
been higher if it had negotiated simultaneously with firm A, B, and other potential
users. In other words, a social planner would pay more and demand more as an
individual firm. Besides genetic information, physical genetic resources are also in
the public domain in form of ex-situ resources, e.g. in research institutes or botanic
gardens. With a global mechanism, countries may regulate ABS in a way that ap-
proximates trade in genetic resources to the social optimum and thereby respect the
informational nature of resources more adequately.
Transaction costs are also lower in case of a global mechanism (Vogel (2007, p.
59 f.); for regional collusion ref. Winands and Holm-Mu¨ller (2014) id. Chapter 5).
Under a bilateral regime, every country has to develop institutions and profound
capacities in the fields of legislation, implementation, administration, monitoring,
and enforcement. Monitoring and enforcement costs tend to be considerable under
a bilateral regime as most physical genetic resources are non-endemic and thus widely
distributed. Diffusion of secondary metabolites is even greater as they often occur in
different species. Currently, most ABS regulations are neither effective nor efficient
(Kamau et al. 2010, p. 248). Transaction cost result also from the existence of
asymmetric information. Provider countries tend to pass strict regulations out of
concern to be deceived by users as they often have few information on research
and commercialisation processes. Opportunistic behaviour by one contract party,
namely “incomplete or distorted disclosure of information” (Williamson 1985, p.
47), is a problem in case of bilateral ABS (Sampath 2005, p. 67). It remains to be
seen whether and how the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol, which came into
force recently, impacts transaction costs of bilateral contractual ABS.
The above-mentioned arguments can be illustrated by a simple economic model,
where the pay-off function pid of a representative firm using genetic resources reads:
pid = py(x, z, z¯)− cxx− (cz + ν1 + ν2)z, (6.1)
with p = price of a final good produced with genetic resources as an input factor, y
= output of such final good, x = a vector of other input factors such as labour and
capital, z = appropriable genetic resources, z¯ = genetic information in the public
domain (exogenously given), cx = price vector of the other production factors, cz
= price of genetic resources, ν1 = transaction costs, ν2 = costs due to asymmetric
information.14 Appropriable genetic resources z encompass mainly the physical
14The contribution of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources can be considered
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resources as they become private property of the firm after purchasing them, but also
the information that can successfully be protected from becoming public information
(e.g. due to patent law or non-disclosure policies within the firm). The genetic
information z¯ that cannot be shielded away from others (due to public research,
expiring patent laws, knowledge spillovers and diffusion processes, use of the final
products for further innovation by other firms, etc.) benefits the general use of
genetic resources in an economy, but is not appropriable by a single commercial
user. Although a representative firm, by purchasing z units of genetic resources,
provides also z¯ = αz units, with α being the spillover rate, to the aggregate stock
of public genetic information resources, it perceives z¯ as exogenously given (as the
marginal impact of the particular firm to z¯ is negligible). For a representative
firm the first order conditions with respect to genetic resource purchase imply (ref.
Appendix 6.A.1):
cz + ν1 + ν2 = p
∂y
∂z
(6.2)
The sum of per unit costs of genetic resources, per unit transaction costs and per
unit costs of asymmetric information is equal to the marginal productivity of the
firm. Thus, the higher the transaction costs and the asymmetric information, the
higher marginal productivity must be in order for trade in the genetic resources to
take place.
On the supply side, the pay-off function pis of a representative country or com-
munity supplying genetic resources reads:
pis = czz − c(z), (6.3)
with c(z) = costs function comprising costs of in-situ conservation of genetic re-
sources and sample provision costs, whereby c(z) is a convex function, i.e. c′(z) > 0
and c′′(z) > 0. Solving the first order conditions with respect to z results in (ref.
by changing the the pay-off function pid such that it reads: pid = py(x, z, z¯,K) − cxx − (cz + ν1 +
ν2)z, with K = total amount of traditional knowledge, whereby K = k + k¯, with k = private
traditional knowledge and k¯ = traditional knowledge in the public domain. The implications of
internalising positive externalities of traditional knowledge accruing to commercial users of genetic
resources, however, might have ambivalent effects on the level of demand for genetic resources (and
thus indirectly conservation), because with traditional knowledge screening can be more precise,
which implies that less resources are needed than for random screening. The analysis of traditional
knowledge on the genetic resource market, though, is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Chapter 6. Global Mechanism for Genetic Resource Use 145
Appendix 6.A.2):
cz = c
′(z) (6.4)
Substituting cz into Eq. 6.2, we can characterise the market equilibrium:
c′(z) + ν1 + ν2 = p
∂y
∂z
(6.5)
In the social optimum, we assume asymmetric information to be close to zero,
ν2 ≈ 0, and genetic resources in the public domain z¯ to be determined endogenously.
The latter is based on the assumption that a social planner would anticipate the
impact of employing z genetic resources on the overall available stock of genetic
resources z¯. The social planner’s optimisation, thus, reads:
max
z
py (x, z, z¯)|z¯=αz − cxx− c(z)− ν1z (6.6)
Solving the first order conditions for the social optimum results in (ref. Appendix
6.A.3):
c′(z) + ν1 = p
(
∂y
∂z
+ α
∂y
∂z¯
)
|z¯=αz
⇐⇒ c′(z) + ν1 = p∂y
∂z
(1 + αθ), (6.7)
with θ :=
(
∂y
∂z¯/
∂y
∂z
)
|z¯=αz
being the relative productivity of genetic information in
the public domain. θ stands for the relevance of this information for production,
i.e. if θ is small, the genetic information in the public domain is not very relevant.
Technological progress is one factor likely to raise θ, because new technologies are
increasingly based on the use of genetic information rather than physical genetic
resources. Growing research fields like genomics or synthetic biology, for example,
rely on genetic information and increase θ. Compared to the market equilibrium
(Eq. 6.5), the marginal productivity considered is higher in the social optimum
(Eq. 6.7) for the same amount of resources used as θ > 0, even if ν1 and ν2 would
remain unaffected. Fig. 6.1 depicts the market equilibrium characterised by Eq. 6.5
(solid line) and in the social optimum described by Eq. 6.7 (dashed line), where
the left-hand side is associated to supply and the right-hand side to demand. Note
that we assign the transaction costs to the left-hand side (as also indicated in Eq.
146 Chapter 6. Global Mechanism for Genetic Resource Use
6.7 and Eq. 6.7) to facilitate the graphical illustration in Fig. 6.1. For any given
Figure 6.1: Genetic resource market
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The intersections denote the levels of genetic resource demand dependent on different
institutional settings, e.g. zA: case with high transaction costs, high costs due to
asymmetric information, no internalised genetic information spillovers, zB: case with
high transaction costs, high costs due to asymmetric information, internalised genetic
information spillovers, and zD: case with low transaction costs, low costs due to
asymmetric information, no internalised genetic information spillovers.
aggregate per unit costs (ν+ cz), more genetic resources are demanded in the social
optimum, as θ > 0, and demand rises in θ (zA < zB < zC , with θ
′ > θ). Lower
transaction costs and close to zero costs of asymmetric information in the social
optimum (ν ′+ cz)15 work in the same direction. In the social optimum these factors
apply in combination and genetic resource demand is thus much higher (zA vs. zE ,
or even zF if θ is large). A higher demand for genetic resources should lead to an
increase in conservation of genetic resources.
A global mechanism can approximate the social optimum by reducing asym-
metric information and transaction costs and by internalising the benefits from the
provision of z¯ through a subsidy on z. The subsidy matches the additional demand
for z in the social optimum, i.e. the difference between private and social optimal
15Another issue might be that individual firms may shy away from the risks in investing in genetic
resource acquisition as the outcome is highly uncertain. A social planner has better risk pooling
and diversification possibilities. Hence, there might also be too little demand due to risk aversion.
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demand. The subsidy s can be generated by governments e.g. from a lump-sum
tax on the i’th agent τi, whereby
∑
i τi = sz. It can be paid to either providers
or users with the same economic effect, at least in theory. To achieve political ac-
ceptance the subsidy could be paid into a fund that distributes it to providers of
genetic resources dependent on z. Under such regime, the pay-off function pis of a
representative country or community supplying genetic resources reads:
pis = (cz + s)z − c(z). (6.8)
Solving the first order conditions with respect to z we obtain
cz =c
′(z)− s. (6.9)
By substituting cz into Eq. 6.2, we can characterise the market equilibrium under a
global mechanism (reduction in trasaction costs, close to zero asymmetric informa-
tion, a subsidy for suppliers of z):
c′(z) + s+ ν1 = p
∂y
∂z
(6.10)
Comparing Eq. 6.10 and Eq. 6.7, we can deduce the optimal subsidy s∗:
s∗ = pα
∂y
∂z¯
= p
∂y
∂z
αθ. (6.11)
A global mechanism that approximates the social optimum not only increases
conservation (ref. Fig. 6.1), but, as we will show, also revenues for providers. When
considering profit-maximisation by substituting cz from Eq. 6.9 in Eq. 6.8, profits
under a global mechanism are characterised by:
pis = c
′(z)z − c(z) (6.12)
As the first derivative of Eq. 6.12 with respect to z is positive (given c′′(z) > 0),
pay-off rises with increasing z, and thus conservation. Hence, a global mechanism
raises conservation levels as well as providers’ net revenues. Importantly, the pay-off
in the market equilibrium with a subsidy is higher for provider countries because of
a higher z which is induced by the subsidy (see Fig. 6.1), not because of the subsidy
per se (profits with and without a global mechanism are characterised by the same
equation, Eq. 6.12, ref. Appendix 6.A.2).
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The internalization of positive conservation externalities accruing to commercial
users of genetic resources depends on the size of the coalition of states cooperating
under the NP, an amended NP, or a separate global mechanism. A regional mech-
anism will not be able to internalise benefits from genetic information in the public
domain and achieve less reductions in transaction costs and costs due to asymmet-
ric information. Special attention will have to be given inter alia to the case of the
United States of America, which is one of the few countries that have not ratified
the CBD nor the NP.
6.4 Empirical research methodology
Our empirical research to explore the political feasibility of a global mechanism
to internalise positive biodiversity conservation externalities accruing to commercial
users of genetic resources complements the economic analysis (Section 6.3). We con-
duct inductive research, i.e. explorative research in a hardly scientifically researched
field to lay the theoretic foundations for tentative hypotheses (Bortz and Do¨ring
2006, p. 50), as we cannot build on and statistically test existing ones. Inductive
reasoning does not deliver final conclusions. It aims at generating new knowledge by
exploring a topic and preparing hypotheses which have to stand the test of future
research and real world developments. Our methodology thus involves the study of
relevant CBD documents and an online discussion forum on a global multilateral
mechanism, as well as expert interviews. The three research phases link into each
other to generate and substantiate hypotheses (ref. Fig. 6.2). Such methodologi-
Figure 6.2: Empirical research methodology
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cal triangulation is a strategy for “further enriching and completing knowledge and
(...) transgressing the (always limited) epistemological potentials of the individual
method” (Flick 2009, p. 444). The CBD documents and statements in the online
forum provide a broad overview of countries’ official perceptions with regard to the
GMBSM specified under Art. 10, NP. The expert interviews allow to elicit more
specific and in-depth views. Expert interviews are particularly suited in early ex-
plorative research as they allow “unrivalled dense data collection” with interview
partners who are “cristallization points of practical insider knowledge” (Bogner and
Menz 2009b, p. 8). The data collection for these two research phases is described in
Section 6.4.1, the analysis in Section 6.4.2, and the results in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.
In the context of the studied global mechanism we use the term genetic resources to
simultaneously refer to physical genetic resources and genetic information.
6.4.1 Data collection
The CBD documents and the online discussion forum on the GMBSM of Art. 10,
NP, are publicly available online. We studied the debate on Art. 10 of the second
and third meeting of the ‘Open-Ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for
the Nagoya Protocol’ (ICNP), COP 11, and COP-MOP 1 of the NP. Moreover, we
analysed the online discussion forum16 on Art. 10 launched by the CBD Secretariat
through the ABS Clearing-House in April–May 2013 and its synthesis provided by
the CBD Secretariat. 142 participants took part in the online discussion and made
over 350 interventions17. A number of participants were chosen for an expert meeting
at which they reviewed the synthesis, further discussed the issues, and prepared a
report for ICNP-3 that we also considered in our analysis. Besides, we reviewed the
coverage of the CBD conferences related to Art. 10 (COP 10, ICNP-2, COP 11,
ICNP-3, COP-MOP 1) by the ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin’. We provide an overview
of the analysed data in the Supplementary Material S.6.1.
As third empirical-qualitative exploration phase we conducted loosely structured
face-to-face expert18 interviews with sixteen experts from eight biodiversity rich
16The online discussion (ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1) served the purpose of the
broad consultation on Art. 10 which was instructed by the COP 11 in decision XI/1 B
(UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35, XI/1 B, p. 76, ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1.). It uses the list
of questions included in decision XI/1 (UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35, XI/1, Annex I, p. 79 f.).
17UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/2, par. 4, online: http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/absem-
a10-01/official/absem-a10-01-02-en.pdf, last 12.11.2013.
18Bogner and Menz (2009a, p. 73) define an expert as a person who “possesses technical, process,
and interpretation knowledge, which relates to a specific field of action, in which he acts in a relevant
way (for instance in a specific organisational or his professional area of activity)” [emphasis added
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‘Latin American and Caribbean’ (LAC) countries in the context of a workshop on
ABS in November 201319. The LAC countries’ perceptions are particularly inter-
esting as these countries are rich in biodiversity and strongly value their sovereignty
over their genetic resources. The experts were competent stakeholders with deci-
sion power20 in the ABS process. The first author of this chapter, a quasi-expert
(Pfadenhauer 2009, p. 106), conducted the interviews in the preferred language of
the interviewee (12 in Spanish, 2 in English). We recorded all except two of the
interviews; for one notes were taken, the other one was a written one. We used a
pretested topic guideline21 to carry out loosely structured interviews. The guideline
questions concerned (i) a country’s past experience and satisfaction with bilateral
ABS, (ii) a country’s ability to estimate its benefits from genetic resources, (iii)
a country’s attitude towards a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism, (iv)
its preferences for certain benefit-sharing modalities, as well as (v) factors that are
important in international negotiations about such a mechanism. The interviewer
mainly listened. We left the experts freedom to decide which topics to discuss in
more depth and to turn the interlocution to specific aspects of the main questions
they considered decisive or urgent22. After each interview we wrote interview pro-
tocols to assure the quality of the later analysis.
6.4.2 Data analysis
We studied the CBD documents and the online discussion forum on Art. 10, NP, on
“the need for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism”23
with regard to the following aspects: (i) arguments in favour of a GMBSM, (ii)
arguments against a GMBSM, (iii) situations for a GMBSM, and (iv) modalities for
a GMBSM–all under the terms of Art. 10, NP. We excerpted the relevant statements
to reflect the authors’ further elaboration].
19The Science-Policy Workshop on Access and Benefit-Sharing for non-commercial academic re-
search in LAC was facilitated by DIVERSITAS, the International Council for Science, the Swiss
Academy of Sciences, the International Union of Biological Sciences, University of Bonn, and the
International Union for Conservation of Nature.
20Inter alia ABS national focal points in the government ministries.
21Ref. Supplementary Material S.6.4.
22We did not interrupt the interviewees as long as the information was not obviously unrelated,
because the experts with their knowledge-edge might mention an aspect which at first does not
seem relevant to the interviewer but which importance becomes clear eventually during the course
of the interlocution. Atteslander (2010, p. 134) point to the importance of giving the interviewee
considerable reaction space instead of provoking isolated reactions to specific stimuli in order to
explore the experts’ perceptions and preferences comprehensively.
23For a list of analysed documents and discussion forum threads ref. Supplementary Material
S.6.1.
Chapter 6. Global Mechanism for Genetic Resource Use 151
on (i) to (iv) made in the forum’s 350 interventions and listed them in separate
documents. In the CBD documents we likewise highlighted the data germane to (i)
to (iv). Next, we condensed the list on situations for a GMBSM from the online
discussion to remove duplications, grouped them by related situations, and added
highlights from the analysed CBD documents that contained new situations not
already covered by the list. For arguments against a GMBSM we proceeded in
the same manner. Next, we examined the compilations from the online forum and
the highlights from the CBD documents with regard to arguments in favour of a
GMBSM as well as to the modalities of such mechanism and included significant
statements in the results.
The expert interviews were inspected for adequate data quality prior to the
analysis. The interview material is particularly authentic because the interviewees
were familiar with a GMBSM due to previous discussions on Art. 10, NP24. We
transcribed the interviewees’ statements verbatim except for repetitions and obvious
digressions, but did not record prosodic and para-linguistic data, because there is
no additional benefit in case of expert interviews (Meuser and Nagel 2009, p. 56).
We re-listened to the interviews and checked the accuracy of our transcripts. To
analyse the verbal, qualitative data we used content analysis and interpretation.
Our approach is inductive (similar to Mayring (2010)) as we aim to preserve the
richness of the individual expert interviews. We examined the textual data line by
line and marked relevant lines in different colours (codings). The codings were then
aligned to the interview questions. Next, we copied the codings to meta-documents
that include all codings belonging to one question from different interviews. We
analysed the compilations of codings with direct relevance to this study in detail.
The other codings served to generate situative background information. We checked
internal validity by examining alternative interpretations of the interview material.
External validity is ensured by a ‘theoretical sample’ (Bortz and Do¨ring 2006, p.
335): we achieved a systematic choice of experts by using a pre-selected expert list
created for an ABS workshop in the LAC region that we narrowed down by focusing
on policy makers–whereas the workshop targeted researchers and policy makers–and
by choosing experts from different countries. Comparability of the interviews was
achieved by “the mutually shared institutional-organisational context of the experts”
and the interview guideline (Meuser and Nagel 2009, p. 56).
24Prior to the interviews, Art. 10, NP, had already been debated during ICNP-2 as well
as in the online discussion forum (www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=icnp-02; http://absch.cbd.int
/Art10 groups.shtml, last accessed 03.01.2014).
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6.5 Empirical results on the political feasibility of a
global mechanism
Countries currently implement ABS in form of a bilateral transactional mechanism.
A global mechanism is a potential alternative, or possibly complement if imple-
mented partially. Against this background we present findings from the analysis of
the political debate (Section 6.5.1) and from expert interviews (Section 6.5.2).
6.5.1 The political debate on a global multilateral mechanism
The consultation process of countries by the CBD Secretariat previous to ICNP-225
and the discussions at ICNP-226 in July 2012 portrayed a mixed picture of countries’
understanding of Art. 10, NP, and their preferences for some sort of multilateral
benefit sharing. The online discussion among ABS experts initiated by the CBD Sec-
retariat confirmed once more that the need and possible situations for a GMBSM
are highly controversial; this question permeated all discussion threads. Besides
positions in favour or against a GMBSM, some participants expressed their prefer-
ence for regional case-to-case cooperation in line with Art. 11, NP27. Interestingly,
the online discussion forum revealed that there is neither common understanding
of transboundary resources, although they are the subject of Art. 10 and Art. 11,
NP, nor of the very focus of the NP: the definition of genetic resources as physical
and/or information resources. The expert meeting that reviewed the synthesis of
the online discussion identified six aspects of common understanding28, of which the
most significant ones are that parties can create a GMBSM “in the exercise of their
sovereignty”, and that a GMBSM “should not undermine state sovereignty”, “con-
tribute to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”, and “supplement
the bilateral nature of the Nagoya Protocol”. Discussions at ICNP-3 did not advance
the matter; a decision recommendation that includes further deliberations in form
of a study and an expert workshop until NP COP-MOP 2 was agreed29. NP COP-
MOP 1 subsequently adopted this decision without any changes30. The discussions
25UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/7, ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1.
26Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 09, No. 579, ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1.
27Art. 11, NP, calls for cooperation between parties in case of in situ transboundary resources
and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that is shared by communities living
in more than one country.
28UNEP/CBD/ICNP/3/5, Item 4, ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1.
29UNEP/CBD/ICNP/3/L.8, ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1.
30UNEP/CBD/NP/COP-MOP/1/L.9, ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1. The brackets around
“subject to the availability of funds” were removed from the ICNP-3 decision recommendation.
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on the need for and design of a GMBSM are closely related to sovereignty aspects,
ease to obtain access to genetic resources, benefit-sharing fairness, and benefit and
cost expectations. Importantly, it is not a provider versus user discussion31.
The data we analysed32 provided us with a very large amount of statements in
favour of (i) or against (ii) a GMBSM as well as on situations for such mechanism
(iii) and its modalities (iv). The statements in favour of a GMBSM largely mirror
those presented in Section 6.3–albeit not always expressed in economic terms. In
addition to these, the African Group pointed out that a GMBSM may help countries
“to discharge their cooperation obligations under Art. 11 at a reasonable transac-
tion cost and without needing to deal with every instance on a case-by-case basis”33.
The statements34 against a GMBSM can be grouped under the following arguments:
a GMBSM undermines sovereignty and thus countries have less negotiation and deci-
sion power; countries might have conflicting interests with the GMBSM; the benefit
sharing might not be fair and equitable; benefits do not go directly to the provider
communities; benefits are earmarked for conservation; countries obtain fewer ben-
efits as they share with other providers and bear transaction and administration
costs; there is uncertainty about dispute resolution; a GMBSM may create disin-
centives for functioning national ABS mechanisms; it could create uncertainty for
users around rights and applicable processes and create delays; there is no need for
a GMBSM as all situations can be dealt with either under the bilateral ABS or Art.
11, NP, on transboundary cooperation.
The discussion of the need for a GMBSM includes deliberations on potential
situations that could fall under the GMBSM (iii). A number of situations are men-
tioned and controversially debated in the context of Art. 10. These situations refer
to the following clusters of resources35: that are transboundary including migratory
species; that are outside national jurisdiction; that can be obtained without any
physical access, i.e. genetic information resources (e.g. in databases, gene banks);
for which it is not possible to obtain ‘Prior Informed Consent’ (PIC) because the
origin is unknown or the country of origin has no ABS system; for which it is not
practical to obtain PIC (e.g. no reasonable time span); for which there are no legal
obligations to share benefits but users choose to do so voluntarily; that were accessed
31Ref., e.g., to the interventions made in the online discussion forum.
32For a list of analysed documents and discussion forum threads ref. Supplementary Material
S.6.1.
33African Group submission for ICNP-2, online: www.cbd.int/icnp2/submissions, last 12.02.2014.
34The statements against a GMBSM are listed in the Supplementary Material S.6.2.
35We provide a comprehensive list of situations in the Supplementary Material S.6.3.
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before the entry into force of the NP (different scenarios); that are used for basic
research; that are used in special research contexts (e.g. pathogens).
Situations for a GMBSM are trigger situations for benefit sharing and thereby
one aspect of the mechanism’s modalities (iv). In in the following we present infor-
mation on the mechanism’s modalities. In the discussions, the problem of identifying
the ‘object’ that triggers benefit sharing was raised: it was noticed that species vary
at the cell, gene, allelic, and mutation level between countries and regions, that a
gene, which is present, is not necessarily expressed, and that external factors influ-
ence gene expression and the production of chemical compounds. The importance of
binding trigger points was highlighted in the online discussion in light of the short-
comings of the ITPGRFA to generate benefits. Another aspect of the GMBSM’s
modalities discussed in the forum was its voluntary or mandatory nature. Some
party representatives suggested that it might be both, mandatory for certain sit-
uations and voluntary for those for which the former is not possible. The use of
the benefits and the benefit distribution were two other features subject to debate.
As mentioned before, countries agree that the GMBSM should contribute to con-
servation and sustainable use of biodiversity. During the online discussion several
party representatives proposed that the ‘Global Environment Facility’ (GEF) could
be involved to this end. It was suggested that the ‘Intergovernmental Platform on
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services’ (IPBES) could identify the global priorities
for conservation and sustainable use. Another suggestion was to use the mecha-
nism to support developing countries to establish a genetic resource inventory and
contribute to the ‘International Barcode of Life’ (iBOL) project. Benefits from
traditional knowledge, it was opined, should be devoted to projects that maintain
traditional practices and knowledge and favour indigenous and local communities.
In this context it was mentioned that benefits from traditional knowledge associ-
ated with genetic resources might have to be treated by different policy and legal
approaches than benefits from genetic resources. Common understanding existed
that the mechanism should include monetary and non-monetary benefits. A gen-
eral remark made was that every party has to profit from the mechanism. Further
aspects mentioned were that the mechanism needs to promote solidarity, contribute
to poverty eradication, and should include capacity building on the implementa-
tion of the mechanism and lessons-learned. It was emphasised that discussions
will have to address the rules of operation, the administration, and the financial
and budgetary implications of a GMBSM. Moreover, some questioned whether the
mechanism should be regional or global in scope.
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6.5.2 Results from the expert interviews on a global mechanism
In this Section we describe the findings from the expert interviews on preferences
for the benefit-sharing design–bilateral trade versus a global mechanism–and add
contextual information given during the interviews where relevant.
Status-quo bilateral benefit sharing: country attractiveness, experiences,
and satisfaction. The experts36 stated that above all megadiversity, both ter-
restrial and marine biodiversity, and high endemism render countries attractive for
genetic resource users. Further favourable factors that were mentioned are tradi-
tional knowledge associated with the identification and use of genetic resources–
being ‘megacultural’–, juridical certainty, experience in applying the respective leg-
islation, the broader economic context, and an own biotechnological industry and
research centres. Asked about their countries’ attractiveness in comparison to other
countries, many experts stated that all LAC countries are megadiverse. One expert
opined that “rather than saying this country is more or less, it is about seeing us
as Andeans, Amazonians; this is how we have to position our strength in the global
context”.
According to the experts much more progress has been made with non-commercial
bilateral genetic resource contracts than with commercial trade: Mexico issues 500
to 600 permits per year for scientific research while the first commercial contract
was being processed at the time of the interview. Costa Rica has granted around
322 permits out of which the majority were for basic or non-commercial research
and around 30 to 40 permits for commercial bioprospecting projects. Colombia
had 197 non-commercial and two commercial permit applications since 2003, out
of which 88 non-commercial and one commercial contracts were signed. Peru has
concluded more than 20 non-commercial contracts and no commercial one. Ecuador
has received 19 applications since 2011 out of which it is about to negotiate one com-
mercial and one research contract. Bolivia has formalized two to three commercial
contracts out of ten solicitations and Cuba has signed a few commercial contracts.
Brazil concluded 98 commercial contracts between 2004 and 2013. Consequentially
and contrary to the governments’ expectations, most countries have received few
or no monetary benefits so far. An expert from Costa Rica, though, told us that
her country has negotiated monetary benefits for non-commercial research processes
36If not explicitly requested otherwise, we refer to all experts without their names and in the
female gender to disguise their identity.
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which are predominantly used for the forest conservation areas, the main provider
of the country’s genetic resources. She explained that up to 10% of the investiga-
tion budget can be negotiated and estimated that altogether around some hundred
thousand dollars have been obtained from non-commercial projects.
Besides few monetary benefits having been realised, several experts addressed
deficiencies in their national legislation or institutional arrangement: too protec-
tive and bureaucratic legislation, various decrees in different laws instead of spe-
cific legislation, involvement of various administrations, lack of human resources,
no differentiation between national and foreign laboratories, and problems with the
intra-country benefit distribution. Experts from all member countries of the An-
dean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) considered that their joint
access legislation, Decisio´n 391 37, has not evolved as intended and needs revision.
The experts criticised an overly precautionary approach to access regulation, the
need for a national counterpart for all utilisations of genetic resources, a lacking
differentiation between commercial and scientific contracts, non-existing communi-
cation about solicitations and contracts, as well as frequent disagreements among
the member countries.
Attitude towards the GMBSM of Art. 10, NP. The experts affirmed that
their countries were not yet in a position to declare their stance towards the GMBSM
of Art. 10. An expert from Costa Rica explained that her country has hardly worked
on the topic so far. She considered a GMBSM difficult and problematic with re-
gard to retaining the countries’ sovereignty over their genetic resources as well as
regarding bilateral negotiations, but imagined that it could solve problems related
to transboundary resources and transboundary traditional knowledge. One Peru-
vian expert believed that the GMBSM would be necessary to avoid price dumping.
But also the Peruvian experts explained that the country has not yet established
a position concerning the proposition of Art. 10. They questioned how to realise
a GMBSM in practice, how to identify, if existent, truly transboundary genetic re-
sources and associated traditional knowledge, and how to distribute the resulting
benefits. One Peruvian expert opined that the implementation has to be very differ-
ent from the Andean Community’s cooperation. Another stated that the scientists
and those who suggested the mechanism should take the lead in substantiating the
37Decisio´n 391 on a ‘Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources’ (Comision del Acuerdo
Cartagena (1996): Decisio´n 391: Re´gimen Comu´n sobre Acceso a los Recursos Gene´ticos, Gaceta
Oficial del Acuerdo de Cartagena, An˜o XII, Numero 213, Lima, 17.06.1996.)
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proposal. The Brazilian experts did not have a formed opinion regarding Art. 10 ;
they said that it was still under discussion. An expert from Mexico opined that the
idea of a GMBSM for transboundary genetic resources has good aspects, namely
a fund supporting conservation in countries. However, she was not sure whether
it should be a distribution of benefits or another approach to deal with shared re-
sources. She considered that one should focus first on other aspects of the NP and
think about the implementation of the GMBSM after having gained bilateral expe-
riences. A Colombian expert said as well that her country has not yet developed
a position with regard to Art. 10. She explained that some believe a multilateral
system to be wonderful, especially for countries like hers that share a lot of biodi-
versity with neighbouring countries, but that others deem it to be impossible and a
non-equitable benefit distribution to be the potential result. An expert from Cuba
stated that her country has always been in favour of a fund and that benefit shar-
ing of transboundary genetic resources is a justification for the fund. However, she
added that before her country can support the fund the modalities will have to be
established. An Ecuadorian expert was in favour of a multilateral mechanism and
opined that “we have to see how to take decisions that go beyond the borders, it is
complex, we need to mature a lot [...] on the political level”.
Attitude towards a comprehensive global mechanism for benefit sharing
from genetic resource use. Most experts were sceptical about a multilateral
mechanism and, if generally in favour of it, they had doubts about its (current)
practical feasibility. A Peruvian expert questioned global cooperation as countries
are at different stages. She argued that cooperation should be regional–an opin-
ion expressed by several experts–and without handing over some sovereignty to a
multilateral mechanism. The expert affirmed the need for a multilateral mechanism
“because we have many shared resources, all topics related to trade with species and
genetic resources have to be coordinated in the block of the Andean and Amazonian
countries, and we can be a more powerful block in negotiations”. She emphasised,
though, that these remarks represented her own opinion as her country did not have
an agreed-upon position. The other Peruvian experts only spoke for themselves
as well. One explained that bilateral negotiations are more adequate in light of
countries’ different characteristics such as varying property rights. Nevertheless, she
could imagine that an improved multilateral system of the Andean Community could
be beneficial if it provides a clear framework, increases transparency, and reduces
asymmetric information within the country. She made clear that Peru’s sovereignty
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has to be respected at all times and that Peru has to be able to negotiate for it-
self. Another Peruvian expert explained that the member countries of a multilateral
mechanism would have to be able to decide about the use of the funds. Advantages
of a mechanism, in her view, were that it would create a higher obligation with
users and facilitate the monitoring of benefit sharing. She viewed a mechanism, if
at all, as a regional one. Another was very sceptical but stated that an advantage
could be security with regard to foreign patents. She reminded, however, that there
are different realities within the countries as well as important legislative differences
and that existing multilateral agreements in Latin America are in disarray. She
observed that nationalism surges in response to imposed multilateral ideas. More-
over, she opined that a global mechanism “sounds like a communist inspiration–the
lesser of the evils is the liberal market [...]. A state which supervises the market
could help, but the market has to do the benefit and resource allocation”. Another
Peruvian expert expressed her opposition to a multilateral mechanism. An expert
from Costa Rica regarded a global mechanism as potentially favourable for countries
which have not yet established national ABS legislation, but not so for countries with
existing legislation. She was unsure about the whole idea of a global mechanism for
genetic resource trade and feared that monetary benefits would not arrive at the
resource providers. She believed that one would have to be very innovative in de-
signing such mechanism. A Bolivian expert considered that a regional mechanism
similar to the one of the Andean Community, but with more solidarity, equity, and
possibly sovereignty, could be imagined. She judged that “for the moment it is per-
haps premature or too much ahead for that institution to function, but it is this
attitude that Bolivia negotiates in block with the Latin American countries”. An
expert from Ecuador believed that regional cooperation is vital as ecosystems, water
sources, and the indigenous population do not follow political borders. She stated
that “this is an integrating vision that has not to be seen from the point of view of
the political discourse, but rather from an ecosystem point of view, as people that
are administrating biodiversity”. The Ecuadorian expert confirmed that sovereignty
is important for her country but that it is also about defending it globally. She said
that “a lot of our genetic material is in the DNA banks, the germplasm banks, we
already lost sovereignty about this [...]–for example among Andean countries as a
block we have to demand the information that is in the international research centres
[...]–we don’t want the dry plant or animal back, but rather the information”. The
Ecuadorian expert advised to use regional and sub-regional fora that already exist
and extend their scope to environmental topics rather than to create a new institu-
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tion. She believed that a regional mechanism for sharing the benefits from genetic
resource use could be established within these regional fora once the topic has ma-
tured at national level. A Mexican expert was sceptical about a global mechanism
as there is no established value for genetic resources and because the communities
would lose their autonomy to take decisions on their resources. She preferred case
by case negotiations although she was aware that they are also complicated. The
Mexican expert assumed a multilateral mechanism might be applicable to ex-situ
genetic resources, albeit one needs to be cautious and respect the property rights
held by different countries. An expert from Cuba assessed compliance enforcement
including a lacking arbitrage court to be an obstacle to a global mechanism. She
believed that from the point of view of Cuba a global mechanism for genetic resource
use could be realised, but added that the many experiences with funds indicate that
a global mechanism will not work. The Brazilian experts did not have a formed
opinion on such a global mechanism.
Asked about the general prospect of a global mechanism for the sharing of ben-
efits from genetic resource use, Manuel Ruiz, director of the program ‘International
Affairs and Biodiversity’ from the ‘Peruvian Society for Environmental Law’, judged
that politically it faces major obstacles. He explained that “there is not much in-
tention [...] to consider a really multilateral alternative based basically on economic
arguments; there are various reasons, but one of the reasons is that the current
bilateral, contractual regime has already advanced too much”.
Modalities of a global mechanism The experts named several modalities which
they considered important for a hypothetical global mechanism for the sharing of
benefits from genetic resource use: contractual nature, contracts that allow a poste-
riori adjustments, timely transactions, trade facilitating nature, precise legal frame-
work, and the maintenance of countries’ sovereignty. Comparing the types of ben-
efits, experts regarded monetary and non-monetary benefits equally important in
case of four countries, whereas for two countries monetary ones and for one country
non-monetary ones were assessed to be more desirable. In this context one expert
explained that there has been a shift in her country, that “at the beginning the
expectations were monetary ones, today it is capacity building and technology, non-
monetary”. The distribution of funds and the administration board of the fund were
highlighted as decisive design elements of a global mechanism. The experts gave the
following input for designing benefit-sharing rules: just and equitable distribution,
those who engage in conservation have to receive benefits, respect of countries’ con-
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servation efforts, accounting for endemic species, transfer of technology, as well as
support for research projects. The Cuban, Ecuadorian, and Mexican experts pre-
ferred to dedicate the benefits to the financing of conservation projects, with clear
rules for selecting and evaluating these projects. Besides conservation, the Ecuado-
rian expert added technology transfer and protection of traditional knowledge as
possible project purposes. Overall, the experts expressed the need for further delib-
erations about the topic of benefit distribution. Experts from four countries stated
that negotiations should be case by case rather than according to a standard proce-
dure, because genetic resources differ in their value. One of these experts opined that
in case the value is not known, benefits could be negotiated in a generic manner. Sev-
eral experts highlighted that the modalities should be developed in a participatory
way that includes the countries and the indigenous and local communities. Accord-
ing to the experts economic aspects as well as political, social, and environmental
ones–such as biodiversity conservation and protection of traditional knowledge–will
be relevant in international negotiations about the mechanism design.
In summary the expert interview results show that non-commercial research,
which generates few monetary benefits and was not the original focus of ABS, is
currently predominant. Benefits from commercial contracts are low, much lower than
transaction costs of the status-quo bilateral ABS regime. Even Cost Rica, which is
one of the most successful countries in generating benefits, obtained little benefits
in relation to expenditures for establishing and operating national ABS institutions
and for bilateral negotiations. The experts stated that their countries were not yet in
a position to declare their stance towards the GMBSM of Art. 10, NP, nor towards
a comprehensive global mechanism covering all genetic resources. Many experts
were sceptical about a global mechanism, some opposed and some in favour of it.
For many experts sovereignty was a critical issue, some found it hard to imagine
the practical implementation of a global mechanism, some opined that a global
mechanism would be positive for dealing with transboundary resources, some voiced
concerns about equity and the role of communities, and some favoured regional over
global cooperation. Increased transparency, reduced asymmetric information, legal
security regarding patents, and easier monitoring and enforcement were voiced as
advantages of a multilateral mechanism. Most experts made concrete proposals for
individual aspects of the modalities of a global mechanism.
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6.6 Conclusion
Internalising positive biodiversity conservation externalities accruing to commercial
users of physical genetic resources and genetic information constitutes one policy in-
strument to contribute to the provision of the public good biodiversity conservation.
If benefit sharing of genetic resources is regarded and further developed out of this
understanding, countries might be able to refocus the debate on how to best imple-
ment ABS such that the Convention’s three goals are promoted in a balanced way.
Through our methodological triangulation we were able to provide ample insights
into the political feasibility of such global mechanism. In the following we discuss
the implications of these findings for a global mechanism and further research.
The economic arguments clearly favour a comprehensive global mechanism for
internalization that covers all physical genetic resources and information resources.
However, political realities render the implementation of economic theory difficult.
The results from the analysis of the CBD documents, contributions to the online
discussion forum, and interview statements revealed that the bilateral contractual
approach to ABS enjoys broad political consent as the predominant mechanism de-
sign due to path dependencies and an arguably narrow understanding of national
sovereignty. It seems that various stakeholders have not yet realised the implications
of the informational nature of genetic resources for sovereignty (namely no possibil-
ity to unilaterally act effectively with regard to genetic information), nor the high
importance of genetic information for commercial users.
Our evaluation of the political discourse suggests that a global mechanism for
specific genetic resources might emerge under Art. 10, NP, in the mid-term future
once experiences with the bilateral mechanism have been made. Then the need
for a global mechanism will have become clearer. This might for example be the
case once countries take the implications of the informational nature of genetic re-
sources on board. The GMBSM could even be imagined to evolve into the common
scenario for ABS given the transboundary nature of most physical resources–and
virtually all genetic information resources. Countries seem to have common under-
standing that, theoretically, “in the exercise of their sovereignty over their natural
resources, including genetic resources, parties could create a GMBSM and could re-
quire that benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources be shared through
a GMBSM”38. Our research provides substantiated information on the situations for
which countries perceive a need for a multilateral mechanism and their preferences
38UNEP/CBD/ICNP/3/5, Item 4, ref. Supplementary Material S.6.1.
162 Chapter 6. Global Mechanism for Genetic Resource Use
for its modalities (ref. Sections 6.5.1, 6.5.2). A number of experts preferred a re-
gional ABS mechanism to a global one and the Ecuadorian expert suggested that
such cooperation could be established within existing regional fora (ref. Section
6.5.2). Nevertheless, an Art. 10 mechanism will only lead a few short steps towards
the social optimum if it does not address genetic and natural information and inter-
nalise related positive externalities. As long as the mechanism remains regional it
cannot deal with intangible and easily distributable information resources–and will
neither achieve the same reduction in transaction costs and costs due to asymmetric
information as a global mechanism.
Hence, the key for economic research and communication into the political arena
is to continue to highlight the economic and political advantages of a comprehensive
global mechanism that covers physical genetic resources and genetic information
resources–or ideally, even broader, natural information. Transaction costs and costs
due to asymmetric information are much lower under a global mechanism. The bi-
lateral status-quo ABS is characterised by frequently prohibitively high transaction
costs resulting in few ABS contracts (ref. Section 6.5.2), whereby it remains to be
seen whether and how the implementation of the recent Nagoya Protocol impacts
transaction costs of bilateral contractual ABS. A global mechanism could facilitate
payments for appropriable genetic resources and internalise benefits from genetic in-
formation spillovers to the public domain via a subsidy on genetic resource use. Such
regime would increase revenues for providers of genetic resources and biodiversity
conservation.
Appendix
6.A Appendix to Section 6.3
6.A.1 Demand side
Pay-off function of the representative firm without a global mechanism (subsidy):
pid = py(x, z, z¯)− cxx− (cz + ν1 + ν2)z (6.A.1)
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FOC 1 :
∂pid
∂x
= 0 =p
∂y
∂x
− cx (6.A.2)
⇐⇒ cx =p∂y
∂x
(6.A.3)
FOC 2 :
∂pid
∂z
= 0 =p
∂y
∂z
− cz − ν1 − ν2 (6.A.4)
⇐⇒ cz + ν1 + ν2 =p∂y
∂z
(6.A.5)
6.A.2 Supply side
Supply function of a representative country without a global mechanism (subsidy):
pis = czz − c(z) (6.A.6)
FOC:
∂pis
∂z
= 0 =cz − c′(z) (6.A.7)
⇐⇒ cz = c′(z) (6.A.8)
When considering profit-maximisation, profits are:
Substituting cz (Eq. 6.A.8) back into pis (Eq. 6.A.6):
pis =c
′(z)z − c(z) (6.A.9)
(6.A.10)
Supply function of a representative country with a global mechanism (subsidy):
pis = (cz + s
∗)z − c(z) (6.A.11)
FOC:
∂pis
∂z
= 0 =cz + s
∗ − c′(z) (6.A.12)
⇐⇒ cz =c′(z)− s∗ (6.A.13)
When considering profit-maximisation, profits are:
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Substituting cz (Eq. 6.A.13) back into pis (Eq. 6.A.11) and rearranging:
pis =(c
′(z)− s∗ + s∗)z − c(z) (6.A.14)
⇐⇒ =c′(z)z − c(z) (6.A.15)
The profits under a global mechanism if form of a subsidy is higher for provider
countries because of a higher z (see Fig. 6.1), not because of the subsidy (Eq.
6.A.10 = Eq. 6.A.15).
6.A.3 Social optimum
Pay-off function in the social optimum:
max
z
py (x, z, z¯)|z¯=αz − cxx− c(z)− ν1z (6.A.16)
FOC:
∂pi
∂z
= 0 =p
(
∂y
∂z
+ α
∂y
∂z¯
)
|z¯=αz
− c′(z)− ν1 (6.A.17)
⇐⇒ c′(z) + ν1 =p
(
∂y
∂z
+ α
∂y
∂z¯
)
|z¯=αz
(6.A.18)
⇐⇒ c′(z) + ν1 =p∂y
∂z
(1 + αθ), with θ :=
(
∂y
∂z¯
/
∂y
∂z
)
|z¯=αz
(6.A.19)
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
To conclude, I summarise the main findings of the thesis and its contribution to the
scientific and political debate in Section 7.1. The results have important implications
for further research and policy making, which I address in Section 7.2.
7.1 Synthesis and contribution of the thesis
With this thesis, I provide an inter- and transdisciplinary perspective on fundamen-
tal and current aspects of international cooperation for biodiversity conservation and
its sustainable and fair use. The inter- and transdisciplinary perspective is a central
contribution in itself. More specifically, I contribute to the game theoretic mod-
elling of multilateral cooperation for biodiversity conservation and to the scientific
knowledge on the formation, stability, and effectiveness of international biodiversity
conservation coalitions (Objective 1, ref. Chapter 1.2), as well as to the scientific and
policy debate on multilateral cooperation on the genetic resource market (Objective
2, ref. Chapter 1.2)–all the while combining economic analyses with political and
legal perspectives as well as various experts’ inputs. In this section, I summarise the
results and contributions from the previous chapters.
7.1.1 Methodological contribution to game theoretic modelling of
multilateral biodiversity conservation cooperation
In Chapter 3, I show how international cooperation for biodiversity conservation of
sovereign heterogeneous states can be modelled game theoretically (research ques-
tion Q I.1 part 1, ref. Chapter 1.2). The general game theoretic biodiversity con-
servation model is purposely very general. It provides a conceptual framework for
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a game theoretic analysis, which considers important aspects of international bio-
diversity conservation. It is the first model conceptualisation that simultaneously
covers (i) countries that differ in both ecosystems and wealth, (ii) a continuous
action space, (iii) an ecosystem resilience threshold, (iv) imperfect substitutability
between ecosystem services, (v) an explicit consideration of local benefits, and (vi)
a fund that redistributes coalition benefits. A further specification of the functional
forms would impair the generality. In order to provide some results nevertheless,
I provide the model frame together with a numerical application, which delivers
illustrative results (see below). The general model provides the framework for the
numerical appraisal, without which it would lack theoretical grounding. As far as
I am aware, the model is the most comprehensive game theoretic conceptualisation
of multilateral biodiversity conservation cooperation. Moreover, the consideration
of imperfect ecosystem substitutability or even imperfect complementarity is, to my
knowledge, unique in stability analyses of biodiversity conservation agreements.
Furthermore, in Chapter 4, I derive a benefit sharing rule for coalition formation
games, which is applicable to biodiversity conservation cooperation (Q I.2 part 2,
ref. Chapter 1.2). Whereas sharing rules are in general based on purely theoretical
considerations, I differ in grounding them on empirical-qualitative research as well as
on technical and political economy deliberations. The proposed sharing rule allocates
the expected assessable coalition pay-off among the coalition members. I suggest
to specify the determinant of the sharing weight as the relative size of protected
ecosystems weighed by a country’s biodiversity richness and population density. The
determinant is compatible with established game-theoretic benefit-sharing rules and
can thus be used for different levels of information on benefits. It will nevertheless
have to stand up to practical scrutiny. As far as I know, the benefit-sharing rule is
the only one developed specifically for biodiversity conservation coalition formation
that accommodates real-world constraints. Thereby, I contribute to game theoretic
methodological research over and above the development of a general biodiversity
cooperation model.
7.1.2 Findings on international biodiversity conservation coalitions
With the numerical application of the biodiversity model in Chapter 3, I enhance
the understanding of how heterogeneity in wealth and imperfectly substitutable
ecosystems impact the stability of international biodiversity conservation agreements
among countries differing in ecosystems and wealth, as well as of how local benefits,
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ecosystem resilience thresholds, and transfers impact stability and effectiveness (Q
I.1 part 2, ref. Chapter 1.2). The biodiversity game is a highly aggregated and
stylized model of reality and the insights gained in the numerical application rely
on specific assumptions, importantly on the number of players and ecosystems (I
discuss the implications of relaxing the assumptions in Chapter 3.4.3). At this point
the results are mainly illustrating what can be done with the model; I perceive the
application as a numerical appraisal (as indicated in the heading of Chapter 3.4).
Nevertheless, it reveals some general, important insights into coalition formation,
stability and conservation that could not be obtained with previous models: Coop-
eration improves upon the Nash conservation share. The social optimum, which can
be achieved by full cooperation, is characterised by the highest conservation share.
The total grand coalition conservation share is highest under imperfect substitutabil-
ity, lower under perfect substitutability and lowest under imperfect complementarity.
The total conservation share increases in local benefits for all coalitions under all
substitution elasticities. A higher ecosystem resilience threshold increases the total
conservation share and leads to a larger total grand coalition conservation share even
in case the threshold is not binding. The continuous action space allows countries
to observe the ecosystem resilience threshold and conserve some (however little) of
their biodiversity. The main further findings of the numerical model application are:
(i) heterogeneity in the form of different, imperfectly substitutable ecosystems and
wealth asymmetry as well as transfers are decisive for the stability of biodiversity
conservation agreements; (ii) heterogeneity reduces the size of a stable coalition; (ii)
the destabilizing effect is stronger the higher the ecosystem substitutability; (iii)
high local benefits have a decreasing effect on the size of the stable coalition with-
out transfers; (iv) optimal transfers in contrast facilitate a large stable coalition;
(v) an increase in the resilience threshold decreases total pay-offs (and, v.s., in-
creases the total conservation share), especially in the Nash-equilibrium. Hence, the
model application provides an illustration how important factors in the biodiversity
game interact–so far countries’ cross-heterogeneity, the imperfect substitutability of
ecosystems and their resilience threshold have not been modelled.
In Chapter 4, I investigate whether established sharing rules for coalition forma-
tion games such as the benefit surplus sharing rule and the outside option sharing
rule are applicable to biodiversity conservation cooperation (Q I.2 part 1, ref. Chap-
ter 1.2). To this end I discuss potential application impediments and assess these
through empirical-qualitative research in form of expert interviews with political
stakeholders. I argue that the information requirements for game-theoretic per-
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member partition functions are too demanding in case of biodiversity cooperation.
Decision makers face uncertainty about the dimensions of biodiversity, ecosystem
behaviour, reproduction, thresholds, feedback loops and system interdependencies.
Besides, the economic valuation of biodiversity is challenging. The results from the
expert interviews confirm that benefit-sharing rules that consider rational utility
maximisers who are aware of expected biodiversity benefits are currently not a fea-
sible model abstraction. Even the application of rules based on expected benefits
from various coalition structures is currently untenable. These arguments motivate
the hypothesis that currently only a sharing-rule based on expected assessable total
coalition benefits may be suitable–a joint estimate by coalition members of their
expected assessable total coalition pay-off. Moreover, the expert interviews reveal
that non-monetary benefits are important besides monetary benefits. Likewise, the
expert interviews indicate that in international negotiations about a benefit-sharing
rule economic benefits and costs are likely to be only one aspect countries consider
besides political, social and environmental ones.
7.1.3 Findings on multilateral cooperation for genetic resource use
In Chapter 5, I explore the scope of payments for in-situ conservation of genetic re-
sources to internalise positive conservation externalities which accrue to commercial
users of physical genetic resources (Q II.1, ref. Chapter 1.2). I show that eco-regional
cooperation has the potential to improve upon the status-quo on the market for phys-
ical genetic resources as regards the level of payments and conservation. Dependent
on the degree of cooperation, such coalitions may significantly reduce transaction
costs for both suppliers and customers. Suppliers face lower transaction costs due
to economies of scale in information, administration, monitoring, and enforcement
together with other institutional advantages such as transparency and reputation.
Transaction cost reductions arise for customers in particular through an increase in
transparency. This diminishes the overall price customers have to pay for physical
genetic resources. As a result their demand increases–which in turn increases the
volume of benefits for biodiversity rich countries. Besides, I contribute to the de-
bate on eco-regional cooperation by discussing differences between countries with
a view to their ability to appropriate cooperation induced benefits. I evince that
countries with a relatively higher biodiversity richness and a comparatively better
institutional environment tend to obtain a higher benefit share. Moreover, I argue
that an increase in genetic resource demand should also lead to higher conservation
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levels. The perceived option value for future bioprospecting contracts provides an
incentive for in-situ biodiversity conservation. Nevertheless, in a case study of the
Andean Community’s joint access legislation, I find that the member countries re-
alise few of these cooperation advantages. This observation is significant, because
the Andean Community member countries host two biodiversity hotspots as well
as important wilderness areas and thereby cover large parts of global biodiversity.
It has to be evaluated in light of the role of genetic information resources and ex-
situ resources. Eco-regional cooperation and in particular the potential for collusion
are limited through substitutes which impede market power. Especially easily dis-
tributable and accessible genetic and natural information are threatening collusion
and eco-regional cooperation–as well as bilateral ABS contracts.
Against this background, I analyse in Chapter 6 whether a global mechanism
that internalises positive biodiversity conservation externalities accruing to com-
mercial users of physical genetic resources and genetic information with the objec-
tive of increasing biodiversity protection is politically feasible (Q II.2, ref. Chapter
1.2). With a small economic model I show that the economic arguments clearly
favour a comprehensive global mechanism for internalization that covers all phys-
ical genetic resources as well as information resources. A global mechanism could
facilitate payments for appropriable genetic resources and internalise benefits from
genetic information spillovers to the public domain via a subsidy on genetic resource
use. Such regime would increase revenues for providers of genetic resources and
biodiversity conservation. Yet, my observation is that political realities obstruct
implementing such mechanism. The results from the analysis of the ‘Convention
on Biological Diversity’ (CBD) documents, contributions to the online discussion
forum, and interview statements show that the status-quo ABS is largely met with
approval. Path dependencies and restricted perceptions of national sovereignty seem
to influence this support of a contractual approach to ABS. In addition, the impli-
cations of the informational nature of genetic resources for ABS seem not to be clear
to a number of politicians and other stakeholders. Nevertheless, my research sug-
gests that in the mid-term future a global mechanism for specific genetic resources
might emerge under Art. 10 of the ‘Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits’ (NP). Through the triangulation of
empirical research, I provide substantiated findings on the situations for which this
might be the case and countries’ preferences with regard to such mechanism.
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7.2 Outlook and suggestions for further research
The outlook brings me back to my reference to the United Nations ‘World Com-
mission on Environment and Development’ (WCED)’s report (1987) “Our common
future” in the introductory chapter and thereby closes the circle: Biodiversity is the
backbone of our existence, a global public good. Yet, biodiversity conservation is
not free of conflicts. A Peruvian expert I interviewed outlined impressively potential
conflicts between the objectives of biodiversity conservation and development:
“I make the example that communities currently are like a family that has cas-
tles full of treasures and is spending all its income by protecting these treasures
and starves from hunger. We are putting too much effort in protecting, pro-
tecting, protecting, but our people and our children are undernourished. The
undernourishment reaches up to fifty per cent of the indigenous population, in
the Andean communities thirty and something. It’s paradox that we are protect-
ing so much, but our people starve from hunger. The perspectives of economic
development in the Amazon are zero short term. They live from illegal trade of
wood and drugs, wild emigration to urban settlements, especially of the youth.
In this situation you ask yourself, why protect? Tomorrow no one will be left,
the Shamans die with all their knowledge and the people emigrate. What are
we protecting? This is a question we ask ourselves from time to time–and the
protectionists tell us ‘You are extractionist’.”
The international community is currently taking a major further step towards rec-
onciling the ecological, economic, and social dimensions of development under the
‘United Nation’s post-2015 development agenda’ and the ‘Sustainable Development
Goals’. The biodiversity game can be used and further refined to understand the dy-
namics behind the biodiversity-development nexus. The results of the numerical ap-
plication in Chapter 3 show that poverty reduction can contribute to effective global
biodiversity conservation: Conservation facilitating coalition formation is eased in a
world with low heterogeneity in wealth and biodiversity quality between countries.
Besides, wealthier countries assign higher values to biodiversity. Hence, the redistri-
bution of wealth can be one measure to increase the size of a stable coalition–whereas
the redistribution of ecosystem quality is impossible. This underpins once more the
importance of transfers. In Chapter 4, I deduced a tentative benefit-sharing rule that
is assumably feasible under current information constraints regarding biodiversity
benefits. Given the relevance of transfers, further research on benefit-sharing rules
is advisable both with regard to testing and fine-tuning the proposed sharing rule as
well as in the context of biodiversity benefit valuation. Besides, additional empirical
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research can contribute to further explore countries’ preferences with regard to the
modalities of sharing rules for benefits from biodiversity and to broaden the scope
of the analysis by addressing other international environmental agreements.
In the past, global cooperation efforts to preserve and sustainably use the planet’s
biodiversity have often focused on the international level. The national and subna-
tional perspective has to be strengthened within global governance regimes such as
the CBD. Biodiversity has a complex, multidimensional nature on the entire con-
tinuum of private to public goods. Hence, biodiversity governance should follow a
comprehensive and inclusive approach that mainstreams biodiversity into all policy
areas, economic sectors, and across the society. This is particularly important, as
the efficiency of biomass use has to increase throughout all sectors given the contin-
uously rising demand for biological resources (Von Braun and Gerber 2012, p. 494
f.). Mainstreaming biodiversity implies to better pay attention to individual cases
and local benefits within a global setting. Future research could build on the biodi-
versity game outlined in Chapter 3 and provide a deeper analysis of the mechanisms
linked to local benefits that underlie the model. A consequent mainstreaming of
biodiversity would also imply the inclusion of natural assets into welfare accounting.
So far, though, biodiversity and ecosystem services are insufficiently defined for this
purpose–the inclusion of intermediate services, for example, would lead to double-
counting (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007). Further research is needed on how to accurately
identify and assess final ecosystem services. Yet, individual conservation decisions
can be conducted without precise valuation.1
The Nagoya Protocol is one example of mainstreaming a particular aspect of
biodiversity, viz. genetic resources, across economic sectors. Conservation and sus-
tainable use, however, feature arguably not as prominently in its current implemen-
tation as the third goal of the CBD and primary focus of the Nagoya Protocol, the
“access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising
from their utilization” (CBD, Art. 1 ; NP). Yet, it is not clear to which extend
the holders of knowledge associated with genetic resources, which are often indige-
nous and local communities, participate on equal footing in ABS. Siriwardane and
Winands (2013, p. ii) even argue that “whilst the public and institutional hype
1Heal (2000, p. 29) highlights that “Valuation is neither necessary nor sufficient for conservation.
(...) It lies in incentives: to conserve systems we must give their owners incentives to conserve them.
We must make conservation more attractive than any other uses.” Economic valuation can inform
specific decisions on marginal changes in biodiversity taken by economic minded persons. Often
partial valuation suffices to show that the cost-benefit ratio is negative for destroying biodiversity
en lieu of land use and development. In cases where the assessment is not straight forward, more
detailed evaluation is necessary (Helm and Hepburn 2012, p. 7).
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around traditional knowledge may have resulted in its prioritization within inter-
national conventions and frameworks, its institutionalization may have adversely
impacted marginalized communities, and in particular contexts, unintentionally led
to the creation of “new” marginals.” The role of indigenous and local communities
within national ABS contexts and the impact of ABS on individual communities
and their knowledge governance regimes would be interesting aspects for further
empirical research.
The window of opportunity exists during the further elaboration of the provi-
sions of the Nagoya Protocol to stronger respect the link between benefit sharing
and biodiversity conservation. A key level is to give priority to Art. 9, Nagoya
Protocol, which stipulates that “the Parties shall encourage users and providers to
direct benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources towards the conserva-
tion of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components”. Importantly,
though, the Nagoya Protocol will only gain long-term relevance if parties succeed
in reducing transaction costs and broadening the application scope to genetic and
natural information. Genetic and natural information are of high and growing im-
portance for commercial users of genetic resources. In particular marine genetic
resources still promise a huge potential and patents over these are growing at an
annual rate of 12% (Arrieta et al. 2010). Whereas eco-regional cooperation can
be most relevant to reduce transaction cost (ref. Chapter 5), a global mechanism
may in addition also cover genetic information (ref. Chapter 6). Further empirical
research on the political feasibility of the Art. 10 mechanism of the Nagoaya Pro-
tocol and of a general global mechanism can build on the respective findings of the
methodological triangulation in Chapter 6. If countries acknowledge and respect the
informational nature of genetic resources, the Art. 10 mechanism could even evolve
into a general mechanism for ABS; the Art. 10 mechanism refers to transboundary
genetic resources and virtually all genetic information resources are transboundary.
Such mechanism of reduced transaction costs and increased scope is likely to rise
genetic resource demand–by which, in turn, in-situ conservation in biodiversity rich
countries can be expected to increase as well, as shown by the small economic model
in Chapter 6. Further research could model more complex game structures with
sub-coalitions and different coalition designs in order to enhance the understand-
ing of and incentives for regional coalition formation and their merge into a grand
coalition.
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Supplementary Material Chapter 3
S.3.1 Stability analysis
Note that the notation piKi employed in the paper is changed to pi(K, i) in the fol-
lowing tables for better readability.
S.3.1 Stability analysis without transfers
Coalition Country A Country B Country C Country D
1 pi(1, A)− pi(5, A) pi(1, B)− pi(4, B) pi(1, C)− pi(3, C) pi(1, D)− pi(2, D)
2 pi(2, A)− pi(9, A) pi(2, B)− pi(7, B) pi(2, C)− pi(6, C) pi(2, D)− pi(1, D)
3 pi(3, A)− pi(10, A) pi(3, B)− pi(8, B) pi(3, C)− pi(1, C) pi(3, D)− pi(6, D)
4 pi(4, A)− pi(11, A) pi(4, B)− pi(1, B) pi(4, C)− pi(8, C) pi(4, D)− pi(7, D)
5 pi(5, A)− pi(1, A) pi(5, B)− pi(11, B) pi(5, C)− pi(10, C) pi(5, D)− pi(9, D)
6 pi(6, A)− pi(13, A) pi(6, B)− pi(12, B) pi(6, C)− pi(2, C) pi(6, D)− pi(3, D)
7 pi(7, A)− pi(14, A) pi(7, B)− pi(2, B) pi(7, C)− pi(12, C) pi(7, D)− pi(4, D)
8 pi(8, A)− pi(15, A) pi(8, B)− pi(3, B) pi(8, C)− pi(4, C) pi(8, D)− pi(12, D)
9 pi(9, A)− pi(2, A) pi(9, B)− pi(14, B) pi(9, C)− pi(13, C) pi(9, D)− pi(5, D)
10 pi(10, A)− pi(3, A) pi(10, B)− pi(15, B) pi(10, C)− pi(5, C) pi(10, D)− pi(13, D)
11 pi(11, A)− pi(4, A) pi(11, B)− pi(5, B) pi(11, C)− pi(15, C) pi(11, D)− pi(14, D)
12 pi(12, A)− pi(16, A) pi(12, B)− pi(6, B) pi(12, C)− pi(7, C) pi(12, D)− pi(8, D)
13 pi(13, A)− pi(6, A) pi(13, B)− pi(16, B) pi(13, C)− pi(9, C) pi(13, D)− pi(10, D)
14 pi(14, A)− pi(7, A) pi(14, B)− pi(9, B) pi(14, C)− pi(16, C) pi(14, D)− pi(11, D)
15 pi(15, A)− pi(8, A) pi(15, B)− pi(10, B) pi(15, C)− pi(11, C) pi(15, D)− pi(16, D)
For a coalition to be stable all pay-off differences in the respective coalition row of
this table have to be positive.
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S.3.2 Stability analysis with transfers
Internal Stability
Neg. pi Coalition 1 Coalition 2 Coalition 3 Coalition 4
A
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(5, i)
∑
i pi(2, i) ≥
∑
i pi(9, i)
∑
i pi(3, i) ≥
∑
i pi(10, i)
∑
i pi(4, i) ≥
∑
i pi(11, i)
B
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(4, i)
∑
i pi(2, i) ≥
∑
i pi(7, i)
∑
i pi(3, i) ≥
∑
i pi(8, i) —
C
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(3, i)
∑
i pi(2, i) ≥
∑
i pi(6, i) —
∑
i pi(4, i) ≥
∑
i pi(8, i)
D
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(2, i) —
∑
i pi(3, i) ≥
∑
i pi(6, i)
∑
i pi(4, i) ≥
∑
i pi(7, i)
AB
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(11, i)
∑
i pi(2, i) ≥
∑
i pi(14, i)
∑
i pi(3, i) ≥
∑
i pi(15, i) —
AC
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(10, i)
∑
i pi(2, i) ≥
∑
i pi(13, i) —
∑
i pi(4, i) ≥
∑
i pi(15, i)
AD
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(9, i) —
∑
i pi(3, i) ≥
∑
i pi(13, i)
∑
i pi(4, i) ≥
∑
i pi(14, i)
BC
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(8, i)
∑
i pi(2, i) ≥
∑
i pi(12, i) — —
BD
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(7, i) —
∑
i pi(3, i) ≥
∑
i pi(12, i) —
CD
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(6, i) — —
∑
i pi(4, i) ≥
∑
i pi(12, i)
ABC
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(15, i) — — —
ABD
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(14, i) — — —
ACD
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(13, i) — — —
BCD
∑
i pi(1, i) ≥
∑
i pi(12, i) — — —
Neg. pi Coalition 5 Coalition 6 Coalition 7 Coalition 8
A —
∑
i pi(6, i) ≥
∑
i pi(13, i)
∑
i pi(7, i) ≥
∑
i pi(14, i)
∑
i pi(8, i) ≥
∑
i pi(15, i)
B
∑
i pi(5, i) ≥
∑
i pi(11, i)
∑
i pi(6, i) ≥
∑
i pi(12, i) — —
C
∑
i pi(5, i) ≥
∑
i pi(10, i) —
∑
i pi(7, i) ≥
∑
i pi(12, i) —
D
∑
i pi(5, i) ≥
∑
i pi(9, i) — —
∑
i pi(8, i) ≥
∑
i pi(12, i)
AB — — — —
AC — — — —
AD — — — —
BC
∑
i pi(5, i) ≥
∑
i pi(15, i) — — —
BD
∑
i pi(5, i) ≥
∑
i pi(14, i) — — —
CD
∑
i pi(5, i) ≥
∑
i pi(13, i) — — —
Neg. pi Coalition 9 Coalition 10 Coalition 11
A — — —
B
∑
i pi(9, i) ≥
∑
i pi(14, i)
∑
i pi(10, i) ≥
∑
i pi(15, i) —
C
∑
i pi(9, i) ≥
∑
i pi(13, i) —
∑
i pi(11, i) ≥
∑
i pi(15, i)
D —
∑
i pi(10, i) ≥
∑
i pi(13, i)
∑
i pi(11, i) ≥
∑
i pi(14, i)
For a coalition to be internally stable all inequalities in the respective coalition
column have to be satisfied.
External stability
A coalition is externally stable if the coalition is not internally stable with any
additional member joining from the set of non-members, i.e. if there is no enlarged
internally stable coalition (for a formal proof refer to Weikard (2009, p. 581)).
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S.3.2 Model results
The following tables present the results of the various analysis runs, which examine
the impact of variations in biodiversity quality, wealth, the magnitude of the local
benefits, and the minimum conservation share on coalition stability, the total Nash
and the total social optimum pay-off and conservation share. The table in Section
S.3.1 shows the results for perfect ecosystem substitutability, the table in Section
S.3.2 for imperfect ecosystem substitutability, and the table in Section S.3.3 for
imperfect ecosystem complementarity. The first percentage in a row describes by
how much the total pay-off under the largest stable coalition is short of the total pay-
off under the social optimum. The second percentage in a row gives the conservation
potential of the social optimum, the third percentage in a row the welfare enhancing
potential of the social optimum. The coalitions are numbered from one to sixteen
according to:
1 ABCD 4 ACD 7 AC 10 BD 13 B 16 Nash
2 ABC 5 BCD 8 AD 11 CD 14 C
3 ABD 6 AB 9 BC 12 A 15 D
S.3.1 Model results for perfect ecosystem substitutability
ρ = 1.0
Scenario Stable coalitions Stable coalitions
without t. with transfer
# total P total payoff # total P total payoff Nash Full coop. Nash Full coop.
largest c. largest c. largest c. largest c.
Base-Scenario 9 1.540 51.008 1 2.803 56.970 0.245 2.803 34.116 56.970
89.535% 1142.763% 166.990%
Barrett-Scenario 11 0.001 9.339 1 2.001 23.306 0.000 2.001 9.335 23.306
40.072% 503658.445% 249.664%
ωi = 5
qi = 0.55 1 4.000 55.912 1 4.000 55.912 0.161 4.000 25.636 55.912
yi = 0.45 100.000% 2480.363% 218.102%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.625
qC, qD = 0.475
yA, yB = 0.475 1 4.000 55.912 1 4.000 55.912 0.161 4.000 25.712 55.912
yC, yD = 0.425 100.000% 2479.451% 217.453%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.7
qC, qD = 0.4
yA, yB = 0.5 1 4.000 55.912 1 4.000 55.912 0.162 4.000 25.944 55.912
yC, yD = 0.4 100.000% 2476.417% 215.512%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.775
qC, qD = 0.325
yA, yB = 0.525 6 2.052 47.324 1 4.000 55.912 0.162 4.000 26.338 55.912
yC, yD = 0.375 84.640% 2470.298% 212.291%
total conservation 
share P
total payoff 
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ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.85
qC, qD = 0.25
yA, yB = 0.55 6 2.042 49.721 1 4.000 55.912 0.163 4.000 26.907 55.912
yC, yD = 0.35 88.927% 2459.259% 207.801%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.925
qC, qD = 0.175
yA, yB = 0.575 6 2.034 52.265 1 3.519 55.991 0.164 3.519 27.674 55.991
yC, yD = 0.325 93.344% 2146.682% 202.327%
ωi = 5
q Base (1.0; 0.1) 6 2.026 54.998 1 2.708 56.641 0.166 2.708 28.680 56.641
y Base (0.6; 0.3) 97.100% 1629.366% 197.491%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45 1 4.000 55.912 1 4.000 55.912 0.161 4.000 25.636 55.912
ωi = 5 100.000% 2480.363% 218.102%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 4 9 2.056 43.571 1 4.000 55.912 0.170 4.000 26.145 55.912
ωB,ωC = 6 77.927% 2356.953% 213.855%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 3.5 9 2.047 45.162 1 4.000 55.912 0.180 4.000 26.782 55.912
ωB,ωC = 6.5 80.773% 2218.942% 208.770%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 3 9 2.039 46.883 1 4.000 55.912 0.195 4.000 27.674 55.912
ωB,ωC = 7 83.851% 2050.810% 202.040%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45 9 2.028 50.719 1 3.675 55.953 0.237 3.675 30.228 55.953
ω Base (2;8) 90.646% 1548.946% 185.101%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 1 9 2.022 55.100 1 2.605 57.004 0.296 2.605 33.825 57.004
ωB,ωC = 9 96.659% 878.834% 168.527%
SMin=0.05 9 1.660 37.039 1 2.883 56.138 0.405 2.883 33.782 56.138
65.978% 711.331% 166.179%
SMin=Base(0.01) 9 1.540 51.008 1 2.803 56.970 0.245 2.803 34.116 56.970
89.535% 1142.763% 166.990%
SMin=0.005 9 1.525 51.106 1 2.793 57.073 0.225 2.793 34.158 57.073
89.545% 1239.785% 167.086%
v = 3.29 13 1.129 53.409 1 2.850 59.167 1.128 2.850 53.398 59.167
→ bli large 90.268% 252.739% 110.804%
v = Base (10) 9 1.540 51.008 1 2.803 56.970 0.245 2.803 34.116 56.970
89.535% 1142.763% 166.990%
v = 120 9 1.515 48.701 1 2.782 55.984 0.045 2.782 15.732 55.984
→ bli small 86.990% 6189.898% 355.854%
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S.3.2 Model results for imperfect ecosystem substitutability
ρ = 0.2
Scenario Stable coalitions Stable coalitions
without t. with transfer
# total P total payoff # total P total payoff Nash Full coop. Nash Full coop.
largest c. largest c. largest c. largest c.
Base-Scenario 9 1.461 20.999 1 3.980 31.261 0.126 3.980 16.158 31.261
67.171% 3160.092% 193.466%
Barrett-Scenario 11 0.021 8.532 1 0.382 9.839 0.000 0.382 8.391 9.839
86.716% 136568.226% 117.262%
ωi = 5
qi = 0.55 1 4.000 55.912 1 4.000 55.912 0.161 4.000 25.636 55.912
yi = 0.45 100.000% 2480.363% 218.102%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.625
qC, qD = 0.475
yA, yB = 0.475 1 4.000 55.503 1 4.000 55.503 0.160 4.000 25.468 55.503
yC, yD = 0.425 100.000% 2492.683% 217.928%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.7
qC, qD = 0.4
yA, yB = 0.5 1 4.000 54.249 1 4.000 54.249 0.158 4.000 24.959 54.249
yC, yD = 0.4 100.000% 2530.949% 217.353%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.775
qC, qD = 0.325
yA, yB = 0.525 1 4.000 52.068 1 4.000 52.068 0.154 4.000 24.084 52.068
yC, yD = 0.375 100.000% 2599.545% 216.195%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.85
qC, qD = 0.25
yA, yB = 0.55 1 4.000 48.788 1 4.000 48.788 0.148 4.000 22.795 48.788
yC, yD = 0.35 100.000% 2707.696% 214.028%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.925
qC, qD = 0.175
yA, yB = 0.575 1 4.000 44.059 1 4.000 44.059 0.139 4.000 20.998 44.059
yC, yD = 0.325 100.000% 2874.499% 209.827%
ωi = 5
q Base (1.0; 0.1) 1 4.000 37.039 1 4.000 37.039 0.127 4.000 18.471 37.039
y Base (0.6; 0.3) 100.000% 3146.423% 200.528%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45 1 4.000 55.912 1 4.000 55.912 0.161 4.000 25.636 55.912
ωi = 5 100.000% 2480.363% 218.102%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 4 1 4.000 55.026 1 4.000 55.026 0.161 4.000 25.207 55.026
ωB,ωC = 6 100.000% 2487.494% 218.299%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 3.5 2 4.000 53.891 1 4.000 53.891 0.160 4.000 24.665 53.891
ωB,ωC = 6.5 100.000% 2497.433% 218.494%
total conservation total payoff 
share P
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qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 3 9 2.062 34.540 1 4.000 52.245 0.159 4.000 23.894 52.245
ωB,ωC = 7 66.112% 2513.446% 218.649%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45 9 2.042 30.530 1 4.000 47.100 0.155 4.000 21.604 47.100
ω Base (2;8) 64.819% 2575.835% 218.013%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 1 9 2.027 24.525 1 4.000 38.169 0.147 4.000 18.053 38.169
ωB,ωC = 9 64.252% 2730.118% 211.427%
SMin=0.05 9 1.621 20.664 1 4.000 30.834 0.286 4.000 15.824 30.834
67.017% 1398.895% 194.857%
SMin=Base(0.01) 9 1.461 20.999 1 3.980 31.261 0.126 3.980 16.158 31.261
67.171% 3160.092% 193.466%
SMin=0.005 9 1.441 21.040 1 3.976 31.314 0.106 3.976 16.200 31.314
67.192% 3753.106% 193.292%
v = 1.6 13 1.505 31.118 1 4.000 37.425 1.505 4.000 31.117 37.425
→ bli large 83.147% 265.844% 120.273%
v = Base (10) 9 1.461 20.999 1 3.980 31.261 0.126 3.980 16.158 31.261
67.171% 3160.092% 193.466%
v = 120 9 0.903 15.756 1 3.976 30.256 0.042 3.976 10.507 30.256
→ bli small 52.074% 9450.677% 287.962%
S.3.3 Model results for imperfect ecosystem complementarity
ρ = -1.0
Scenario Stable coalitions Stable coalitions
without t. with transfer
# total P total payoff # total P total payoff Nash Full coop. Nash Full coop.
largest c. largest c. largest c. largest c.
Base-Scenario 9 0.141 10.497 1 1.729 15.919 0.089 1.729 10.269 15.919
65.940% 1946.083% 155.019%
Barrett-Scenario 1 0.012 8.206 1 0.012 8.206 0.000 0.012 8.172 8.206
100.000% 5354.251% 100.419%
ωi = 5
qi = 0.55 1 4.000 55.912 1 4.000 55.912 0.161 4.000 25.636 55.912
yi = 0.45 100.000% 2480.363% 218.102%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.625
qC, qD = 0.475
yA, yB = 0.475 1 4.000 54.893 1 4.000 54.893 0.160 4.000 25.265 54.893
yC, yD = 0.425 100.000% 2505.529% 217.270%
total payoff 
share P
total conservation 
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ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.7
qC, qD = 0.4
yA, yB = 0.5 1 4.000 51.835 1 4.000 51.835 0.155 4.000 24.152 51.835
yC, yD = 0.4 100.000% 2585.000% 214.625%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.775
qC, qD = 0.325
yA, yB = 0.525 1 4.000 46.739 1 4.000 46.739 0.146 4.000 22.296 46.739
yC, yD = 0.375 100.000% 2732.202% 209.629%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.85
qC, qD = 0.25
yA, yB = 0.55 1 3.446 39.829 1 3.446 39.829 0.134 3.446 19.704 39.829
yC, yD = 0.35 100.000% 2562.963% 202.136%
ωi = 5
qA, qB = 0.925
qC, qD = 0.175
yA, yB = 0.575 1 2.891 31.469 1 2.891 31.469 0.119 2.891 16.409 31.469
yC, yD = 0.325 100.000% 2435.126% 191.775%
ωi = 5
q Base (1.0; 0.1) 1 2.435 21.586 1 2.435 21.586 0.100 2.435 12.579 21.586
y Base (0.6; 0.3) 100.000% 2439.069% 171.599%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45 1 4.000 55.912 1 4.000 55.912 0.161 4.000 25.636 55.912
ωi = 5 100.000% 2480.363% 218.102%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 4 1 4.000 53.720 1 4.000 53.720 0.153 4.000 24.431 53.720
ωB,ωC = 6 100.000% 2621.732% 219.882%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 3.5 1 4.000 50.979 1 4.000 50.979 0.143 4.000 22.980 50.979
ωB,ωC = 6.5 100.000% 2805.707% 221.836%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 3 2 4.000 47.142 1 4.000 47.142 0.130 4.000 21.053 47.142
ωB,ωC = 7 100.000% 3073.792% 223.922%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45 9 0.287 16.792 1 3.333 36.481 0.104 3.333 16.220 36.481
ω Base (2;8) 46.030% 3199.008% 224.907%
qi = 0.55
yi = 0.45
ωA,ωD = 1 9 0.119 11.295 1 2.552 22.524 0.089 2.552 11.277 22.524
ωB,ωC = 9 50.149% 2867.877% 199.726%
SMin=0.05 9 0.301 10.163 1 1.839 15.564 0.249 1.839 9.935 15.564
65.294% 738.872% 156.667%
SMin=Base(0.01) 9 0.141 10.497 1 1.729 15.919 0.089 1.729 10.269 15.919
65.940% 1946.083% 155.019%
SMin=0.005 9 0.121 10.539 1 1.715 15.963 0.069 1.715 10.311 15.963
66.020% 2491.517% 154.819%
v = 1.1 13 1.381 19.170 1 2.878 22.485 1.379 2.878 19.170 22.485
→ bli large 85.256% 208.731% 117.295%
v = Base (10) 9 0.141 10.497 1 1.729 15.919 0.089 1.729 10.269 15.919
65.940% 1946.083% 155.019%
v = 120 9 0.051 8.918 1 1.661 15.433 0.041 1.661 8.801 15.433
→ bli small 57.781% 4033.787% 175.365%
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S.4.1 Topic guideline for the expert interviews
The guideline served as a loose topic guideline. The interviewer varied the formula-
tion, accompanying explanations, and order of questions according to the interview
situation and the flow of the conversation.
1. In general, which characteristics render a provider country attractive for ge-
netic resource users? Please, could you describe briefly why your country is
interesting for users of genetic resources? Compared to other provider coun-
tries, where do you see your country–above or below the average?
2. Has your country signed commercial ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (ABS) treaties
since 1992? Has your country obtained monetary benefits from these con-
tracts? Compared to your / your country’s initial expectations, how satisfied
are you / is your country with the benefits your country / it has received?
Do you believe that your country has obtained more or less benefits than the
average of other countries?
3. Has your country received non-monetary benefits from ABS contracts? Which
ones? Do you think that the non-monetary benefits, which your country has
obtained, are important?
4. How easy or difficult is it for your country to estimate its monetary benefits
from genetic resource trade? Do you believe that it is now easier to estimate
the monetary and non-monetary benefits than in the early years of the CBD?
Can your country make benefit estimates with more confidence?
5. Are you familiar with Article 10 of the ‘Nagoya Protocol’ on a ‘Global Multi-
lateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’ [for transboundary genetic resources and
associated traditional knowledge and for those resources, for which it is not
possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent]? What is your country’s
position with regard to this proposal?
6. According to which rule should the benefits from transboundary genetic re-
sources be distributed among the affected provider countries? Should such rule
be based on a global agreement or should the benefit sharing be negotiated
every time anew?
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7. Article 10 only covers a benefit-sharing mechanism for specific genetic re-
sources, but not a general global ABS mechanism. What is your country’s
position with regard to an multilateral ABS mechanism which applies to all ge-
netic resources? (Possibly: What are arguments for and against both options–a
bilateral and a multilateral mechanism? Is a multilateral mechanism a realistic
option?)
8. Could you imagine some regulations of such a multilateral mechanism which
could be attractive for your country? Under which conditions would your
country be willing to participate? (Possibly: How important is the distribution
of benefits? The sovereignty over the resources? Or which other aspects are
important?)
9. How should a fund of such a multilateral mechanism distribute the benefits
from genetic resources among provider countries?
10. Would the costs and benefits of different possibilities to design such a multilat-
eral mechanism be important for the position of your country in international
negotiations about such a multilateral mechanism? How important are they
in comparison to other political, social, and environmental aspects?
If the benefits and costs are important:
11. How easy or difficult is it for your country in international negotiations to
estimate the monetary benefits and costs of different options to regulate genetic
resource trade?
If easy:
12. How easy or difficult is it for your country in international negotiations to
estimate the change in its own benefits and costs if another country leaves or
joins a global agreement on genetic resource trade?
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S.6.1 Documents on Art. 10 of the Nagoya Protocol
S.6.1 UNEP/CBD documents
1. Article 10, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention
on Biological Diversity, United Nations, Nagoya, 29.10.2010;
Online: www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf, last 14.02.2014.
2. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1, Annex II, Section B, Item 10;
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-01-en.pdf, last 14.02.2014.
3. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/INF/2
Morten Walløe Tvedt (Ed.) (2011): A Report from the First Reflection Meet-
ing on the Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism, FNI Report 10,
Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute;
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/icnp-02/information/icnp-02-inf-02-
en.pdf, last 07.02.2014.
4. Submissions received for the Second Meeting of the Open-ended Ad Hoc In-
tergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
sharing;
Online: www.cbd.int/icnp2/submissions, last 12.02.2014.
5. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/7
Synthesis of views with respect to the need for and modalities of a global mul-
tilateral benefit-sharing mechanism (Article 10)–and
UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/7/Corr.1;
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/icnp-02/official/icnp-02-07-en.pdf, last
07.02.2014.
6. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/REC/2/3
Recommendation adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya
Protocol at its second meeting, The need for and modalities of a global mul-
tilateral benefit-sharing mechanism (Article 10);
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/recommendations/ICNP-02/icnp-02-rec-03-en.pdf,
last 07.02.2014.
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7. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XI/1(B)
Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Bi-
ological Diversity at its eleventh meeting, Status of the Nagoya Protocol on
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits
Arising from their Utilization and related developments, The need for and
modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism (Article 10);
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-11/full/cop-11-dec-en.pdf, last 12.11.2013.
8. Online discussion groups on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol, ABS Clearing-
House Portal on Art. 10, 8. April – 24 May 2013;
Online: http://absch.cbd.int/Art10 groups.shtml, last 10.01.2014.
Round 1
 What could be the ‘transboundary situations’ covered by Article 10 of
the Nagoya Protocol that are within the scope of the Protocol?
 What could be the situations where it is not possible to grant or obtain
prior informed consent?
 How could a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism be used to
support the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity glob-
ally?
Round 2
 How might the operation of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mech-
anism co-exist with the underlying principles, objective and scope upon
which the Nagoya Protocol is based?
 What could be the advantages and disadvantages of a global multilateral
benefit-sharing mechanism?
 What influence might other articles of the Nagoya Protocol have in the
context of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism?
Round 3
 Are there any existing international instruments or processes that could
offer lessons learned for consideration in the context of a global multilat-
eral benefit-sharing mechanism under the Nagoya Protocol?
 What other aspects of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism
should be considered?
Round 4
 Perspectives on other matters which should be considered
9. UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/2
Synthesis of the Online Discussions on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on
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Access and Benefit-Sharing;
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/absem-a10-01/official/absem-a10-01-
02-en.pdf, last 07.02.2014.
= UNEP/CBD/ICNP/3/INF/4
Synthesis of the Online Discussions on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on
Access and Benefit-Sharing;
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/icnp-03/information/icnp-03-inf-04-
en.pdf, last 03.03.2014.
10. UNEP/CBD/ABSEM-A10/1/3
Report of the expert meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access
and Benefit-Sharing;
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/absem-a10-01/official/absem-a10-01-
03-en.pdf, last 07.02.2014.
= UNEP/CBD/ICNP/3/5
Report of the Expert Meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access
And Benefit-Sharing;
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/icnp-03/official/icnp-03-05-en.pdf, last
14.02.2014.
11. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/3/L.8
The Need for and Modalities of a Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mecha-
nism (Article 10);
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/icnp-03/in-session/icnp-03-L-08-en.doc,
last 04.03.2014.
12. UNEP/CBD/NP/COP-MOP/1/L.9
The Need for and Modalities of a Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mecha-
nism (Article 10);
Online: www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/np-mop-01/insession/np-mop-01-L-09-
en.pdf, last 24.10.2014.
S.6.2 Other documents
 International Institute for Sustainable Development (2010): Tenth Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Earth
Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 534 - 544;
Online: http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/cop10/, summary: http://www.iisd.ca/
download/pdf/enb09544e.pdf, last 15.04.2014.
 International Institute for Sustainable Development (2012): Second Meeting
of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Pro-
tocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ICNP-2), Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
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Vol. 09, No. 574 - 579;
Online: http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/icnp2/, summary: http://www.iisd.ca/
download/pdf/enb09579e.pdf, last 15.04.2014.
 International Institute for Sustainable Development (2012): Eleventh Meeting
of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 534 - 544;
Online: http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/cop11/, summary: http://www.iisd.ca/
download/pdf/enb09595e.pdf, last 07.07.2014.
 International Institute for Sustainable Development (2014): Third Meeting of
the Open-ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Pro-
tocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ICNP 3), Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
Vol. 09, No. 612 - 617;
Online: http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/icnp3/, summary: http://www.iisd.ca/
download/pdf/enb09617e.pdf, last 15.04.2014.
 International Institute for Sustainable Development (2014): Twelfth Meeting
of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD COP 12) and First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as
Meeting of the Parties to the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing
(NP COP/MOP 1), Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 09, No. 630 - 645;
Online: http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/cop12/compilatione.pdf, last 24.10.2014.
S.6.2 Arguments against a Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing
Mechanism (Art. 10, Nagoya Protocol)
In the following, we provide a list of arguments against a ‘Global Multilateral Benefit-
Sharing Mechanism’ (GMBSM) stated in CBD documents and the online discussion
forum. They are literal excerpts from the CBD documents and the online discussion
forum given in Supplementary Material S.6.1, whereby some are partly paraphrased:
 A GMBSM undermines a country’s sovereignty over its genetic resources (Art.
15(1), CBD). It is those who hold the resource at the time that it is accessed
who have the right to determine how the benefits from its future use should
be shared.
 A GMBSM might create incentives for non-compliance with national require-
ments; it could be seen as an alternative process that applies when a user does
not meet national legislative requirements.
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 A GMBSM would remove users’ ability to negotiate benefit-sharing directly
with a provider, to customize benefit-sharing arrangements with providers and
tailor benefit-sharing to the needs of the provider.
 A GMBSM could replace the role of states in decision-making by an outside
organization that could be subject to lobbying pressure by users, which could
create frustration and disputes.
 A GMBSM would relinquish a country’s ability to negotiate benefit-sharing to
a multilateral body whose interests may not be aligned with its own.
 A GMBSM might not be motivated to negotiate benefit-sharing as quickly and
efficiently as a country.
 A GMBSM could require users to negotiate with a global body that likely
would not have as much understanding of the value of the genetic resource in
question as would the provider country.
 A GMBSM could extend benefit-sharing requirements to genetic resources that
previously did not carry such obligations.
 A GMBSM increases the likelihood that benefit-sharing focuses on monetary
benefits.
 It is unresolved how to address non-monetary benefits under a GMBSM.
 The benefit-sharing under a GMBSM might not be fair and equitable.
 There is uncertainty over how benefits would be received by the provider and
whether they would be used to solve specific conservation problems in the
country of origin.
 Providers with “more valuable” genetic resources might be giving up value to
the benefit of other providers (to global conservation via a GMBSM).
 Benefits would go to conservation rather than to provider communities, obscur-
ing the rationale of the Convention in that those conserving genetic resources
would not be the ones reaping the benefits.
 Monetary and non-monetary benefits will not be directly received by the con-
servation areas, indigenous communities or local people who are making con-
servation efforts.
 Multiple processes may produce uncertainty for providers over which process
or mechanism applies and could result in a situation where a GMBSM seeks
to override a provider’s claim.
 Benefits to providers might be reduced if there is a need to also provide benefits
to a GMBSM and to use benefits towards the administration of a GMBSM.
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 There is uncertainty whether a GMBSM will cost parties, collectively, more
than it benefits them: Will a GMBSM only raise the level of uncertainty and
the transaction costs in return for the possibility that a fraction of profit will
be shared among all parties to the Protocol? What will it cost to administer
such a system? How much R&D will be dissuaded?
 A GMBSM creates a disincentive for cooperation between countries.
 A GMBSM could provide a disincentive to create functional national ‘Access
and Benefit-Sharing’ (ABS) frameworks. Will countries with no / less capacity
use the multilateral mechanism for endemic species and share benefits in a
global way?
 There is uncertainty how to handle the prerogative of governments that elect
not to require benefits-sharing.
 There is uncertainty what would be a dispute resolution mechanism for cases
of disputes about benefit-sharing between several providers and for resolving
jurisdictional disagreements between providers and a GMBSM.
 There is no need for a multilateral mechanism as transboundary cooperation
is already covered by Art. 11 of the Nagoya Protocol.
 There is no need for a multilateral mechanism because in both in-situ and
ex-situ situations ‘Prior Informed Consent’ (PIC) from a legitimate provider
should always be possible for resources that fall under the scope of the Nagoya
Protocol.
 There is no need for a multilateral mechanism, because the Nagoya Protocol
does not provide for implementing ABS retroactively.
 A GMBSM that sets up rules on genetic resources which lie outside the coun-
tries’ jurisdiction contradicts Art. 4 of the CBD.
 There is no need for a multilateral mechanism as the cases in which PIC is not
possible to grant or obtain should be solved via capacity building measures.
 A GMBSM might not resolve difficulties around unclear benefit-sharing situ-
ations. They might only be transferred from bilateral ABS to a multilateral
mechanism.
 A GMBSM will not close gaps in the existing ABS system but will create new
loopholes.
 In situations where only two countries are involved, a GMBSM will make
things more difficult by involving a larger number of countries.
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 A GMBSM might create uncertainty around rights and applicable processes
for users, e.g. in case of conflicting jurisdictional claims between the GMBSM
and providers.
 A GMBSM’s lack of legal authority to enforce its jurisdictional claims on a
national government leaves open the possibility that providers could require
additional protections on top of a GMBSM. Users would face an additional
level of bureaucracy, compliance costs and PIC / ‘Mutually Agreed Terms’
(MAT) requirements.
 A GMBSM could create delays for users who, having followed the appropriate
process established in national legislation, then find there is an additional
process under a GMBSM.
S.6.3 Potential situations for a Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing
Mechanism (Art. 10, Naogya Protocol)
In the following we present results from the analysis of the CBD documents and the
online discussion forum given in Supplementary Material S.6.1. We list all potential
situations for a ‘Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism’ (GMBSM) under
Art. 10 of the Nagoya Protocol mentioned in the analysed data to provide a com-
prehensive overview. They are excerpts from the CBD documents and the online
discussion forum given in Supplementary Material S.6.1 that are partly paraphrased.
A GMBSM might apply to genetic resources, traditional knowledge associated with
genetic resources, or both,
 that exist in more than one country.
 that are shared by countries which have no specific cooperation agreement.
 that belong to migratory species (air, land, and water; including genetic re-
sources of species which are migratory from the national jurisdiction to out-
side).
 that are ‘outside national jurisdiction’
– the high seas and the deep seabed
– the Antarctica
– all areas outside national jurisdiction
 that can be obtained without any physical access (e.g. from databases, gene
banks).
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 for which it is not possible to obtain ‘Prior Informed Consent’ (PIC) because
the country of origin has decided not to establish access requirements.
 for which it is not possible to obtain PIC because the country of origin does
not have an operational ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (ABS) system (lack of
capacity, or no priority, no consensus with indigenous communities).
 for which it is not practical to grant or obtain PIC (e.g. PIC not available
within a reasonable time span; political difficulties involved in granting a PIC;
no consensus with indigenous communities).
 whose biological source is unknown (lack of documentation or lack of scientific
knowledge).
 that exist in ex-situ collections where the country of origin is unknown.
 for which the origin is unknown (situations where resource has been taken
without any PIC by another agent and the exact origin cannot be traced; or
resources that were taken out illegally; traditional knowledge associated with
genetic resources that is in public domain).
 for which there are no legal obligations to share benefits but users choose to
do so voluntarily.
 from countries which have designated that the benefits from the utilization
of genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge associated with genetic re-
sources go to the multilateral mechanism.
 that were taken out from countries of origin prior to the ‘Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity’ (CBD).
 that were taken out from countries of origin after the entry into force of the
CBD, but prior to the Nagoya Protocol.
 that were first ‘accessed’ in the biological material after the entry into force of
the Nagoya Protocol, but the biological material had been acquired before its
entry into force.
 that were acquired and accessed in the biological material before the entry into
force of the Nagoya Protocol, but generate new benefits from prior or ongoing
uses of the resource.
 that were acquired and accessed in the biological material before the entry into
force of the Nagoya Protocol, but generate new benefits from new uses of the
resource.
 for which there is a change of intended use.
 that are transferred to third parties.
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 that are used for basic research and generate benefits from basic research.
 that are used in a very large quantity at the same time for explorative research
with R&D aim, but which are not used or only used peripherally in the final
product.
 Plant genetic resources taken under the Annex 1 of the ‘International Treaty
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ (ITPGRFA) but used
for non-food or non-feed purposes.
 Access to microorganisms (situations where they occur globally; where col-
lected samples contain millions of cells of unknown species).
 Access to genetic resources of pathogens.
S.6.4 Topic guideline for the expert interviews
Refer to Supplementary Material S.4.1.
Bibliography
Weikard, H.-P. (2009). Cartel stability under an optimal sharing rule. The Manch-
ester School 77 (5), 575–593.
